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Official channels are things like grievance 
procedures, ombudsmen and courts. They are 
supposed to resolve problems and provide 
justice. However, trust in official channels 
can be misplaced: in many cases they may 
give only an illusion of a solution. In Official 
Channels, Brian Martin tells what he has 
learned about formal procedures set up to deal 
with problems associated with whistleblowing, 
sexual harassment, plagiarism, Wikipedia and 
other issues. He says it is unwise to put too 
much reliance on official channels and that more 
emphasis should be put on developing skills, 
changing cultures and exploring alternatives.
Brian Martin is emeritus professor of social sciences at the 
University of Wollongong, Australia. He is the author of 
20 books and hundreds of articles on dissent, nonviolent 
action, scientific controversies and other topics.
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Preface 
 
 
My ideas about official channels — such as grievance 
procedures, ombudsmen and courts — have been develop-
ing for a very long time. 
 In 1980, Michael Spautz, a senior lecturer at the 
University of Newcastle, was dismissed from his tenured 
position. At the time, I was investigating cases of suppres-
sion of dissent. After hearing about Spautz’s experiences, I 
began corresponding with him and ended up writing articles 
about his case.  
 Spautz had raised concerns about alleged flaws in the 
research carried out by a recently appointed professor in his 
department. One of the striking features of his story was 
that when he attempted to raise these concerns through the 
proper academic channels, they led nowhere. Instead, 
university procedures were turned against Spautz himself. 
 After he was dismissed, Spautz continued to seek 
justice through official channels, mainly the courts. For 
decades, he was a persistent complainer, one who starts 
with a seemingly legitimate concern and then, when 
rebuffed, refuses to let it drop. 
 In 2018, Spautz died. After discussions with his 
daughters, I wrote a long blog post about his story.1 In it, I 
 
1 “A disastrous quest for justice,” Brian’s Comments, 29 August 
2018, https://comments.bmartin.cc/2018/08/29/a-disastrous-quest-
for-justice/. This post contains links to many documents about the 
Spautz case. 
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commented that it provided me with an important lesson 
about the shortcomings of official channels. 
 Later, as I studied more cases of suppression of 
dissent, often the same pattern appeared: formal procedures 
to address problems didn’t work, at least not the way you 
might expect. After I became president of Whistleblowers 
Australia in 1996, I heard from whistleblowers every week. 
As recounted in chapter 2, many of them repeated the same 
story: grievance procedures and watchdogs (organisations 
intended to stop wrongdoing) were unhelpful.  
 In the early 2000s, I developed the backfire model. 
When powerful groups do something seen as unjust, they 
regularly use a variety of methods to reduce public outrage. 
One of them is to use or set up official channels, such as 
government-initiated inquiries, that gave an appearance of 
providing justice, usually without much substance. In 
formulating this component of the model, I was influenced 
by my prior experience with whistleblowers, but soon 
discovered plenty of evidence that the same methods are 
used in many other circumstances. 
 One of my collaborators on backfire dynamics, Truda 
Gray, left a sheet of paper for me with this note: “A book 
about official channels?” At the time, this topic was too big 
and too hard, but the idea stuck with me. 
 One of my other collaborators on backfire was Steve 
Wright, an authority on the “technology of repression”: 
tools used for surveillance, crowd control and torture. Steve 
recognised that regulations to control the trade in torture 
technologies often gave only an illusion of protection, but 
nevertheless maintained hope that some such regulations 
would have a significant beneficial effect. We discussed 
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this issue many times over the years. Steve’s comments 
helped me remember that official channels are not neces-
sarily ineffective. It was just that often they are.  
 In 2013, I started writing an introduction to this book, 
but before long set the text aside and worked on other 
projects. It took quite a few years to think through how to 
present my ideas about official channels.  
 Initially, my plan was to look at the different roles 
played by official channels, for example being attackers or 
misleading symbols. Then, after figuring out the main roles, 
I would describe one or more case studies to illustrate each 
role and draw on academic writings about regulatory 
capture, which addressed one particular role.  
 However, this plan never felt quite right. Part of the 
problem was that organisations seldom conform to a single 
role. They are always more complex. But there was some-
thing more. Through conversations and reading, I was 
continually reminded that many people have a deep belief 
in official channels. When these channels don’t work, then 
the feeling is that they should work, so the solution is to fix 
them or support them or rebuild them until they do. An 
academic analysis would not begin to address this feeling. 
 Eventually I turned to a writing approach that has 
affinities with autoethnography, which involves using one’s 
own life experiences to search for wider understanding. For 
writing about official channels, this means telling about my 
experiences learning about them. I haven’t fully adopted the 
autoethnography approach but have used it to help structure 
my accounts. Because I have had a longer and deeper 
interaction with whistleblowing, that is the longest chapter. 
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 The main purpose of the book therefore is not to 
provide a detailed analysis of official channels, but rather 
to provide a plausible case that they are not necessarily the 
only or most effective way to deal with problems. Instead, 
attention needs to be paid to developing skills, changing 
cultures, organising collective action and investigating 
alternative ways to achieve goals. This is a simple enough 
claim that may seem obvious on the surface. By telling 
about my own engagements with these issues, and about 
what I’ve learned in some of my studies, I hope to offer 
encouragement to think more widely about official chan-
nels. The system — the ways things are set up, everything 
from courts to elections — is so familiar that it seems inev-
itable, the only possible way. Examining the shortcomings 
of official channels and, more importantly, the shortcom-
ings of relying so heavily on them provides a window into 
a different way of seeing the world and what it might be. 
1 
Introduction 
 
 
It was March 1993. I came to Canberra for a two-day 
conference on intellectual suppression and whistleblowing. 
The first day, which I had helped organise, was on intellec-
tual dissent. The second day was on whistleblowing. After-
wards, there was a meeting of Whistleblowers Anonymous, 
a group set up just two years previously. At the meeting the 
group was renamed Whistleblowers Australia. 
 I knew about whistleblowing. It means speaking out in 
the public interest. A typical whistleblower is an employee 
who sees a problem at work, such as corrupt practice or 
hazards to the public, and reports it to authorities. This 
seems like an honourable thing to do, but it is often 
unwelcome to those higher up in the organisation. 
 I had read about whistleblowing for quite a few years. 
But there is nothing quite like hearing whistleblowers tell 
their stories. At the meeting of Whistleblowers Australia, 
each of those attending — perhaps a dozen people — was 
invited to introduce themselves and tell a bit about their 
background. I was amazed to hear story after story of 
dismaying experiences. 
 
Vince’s story 
One of those present was Vince Neary, an engineer who 
worked for State Rail, the government body that ran the 
railway network for the state of New South Wales. Origi-
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nally from Britain, Vince had years of experience at State 
Rail. He spoke calmly and clearly, in a mild, almost 
unassuming way. He was the opposite of a firebrand. 
 Some years previously, Vince had seen two problems. 
The first was unsafe signalling practices, which posed a 
danger to passengers and crew. The second was misappro-
priation of funds. He was in charge of projects and large 
amounts of money were requisitioned with no work being 
done. It seemed to be fraud. 
 In 1987, Vince complained to his superiors about the 
unsafe signalling practices and misappropriation of funds. 
What should have happened? If someone of Vince’s expe-
rience and seniority said there was a problem, then it makes 
sense to imagine that his concerns would be investigated. If 
his concerns were correct, then the problems should be 
addressed. On the other hand, if his concerns were found to 
be incorrect, then the organisation was vindicated.  
 However, there was no investigation. Instead, Vince 
was ignored or ostracised. 
 Vince continued with his story. Two years later, he 
made a complaint to the chief executive of State Rail. This 
led to some action. A task force was set up, but it didn’t 
support Vince’s claims: it said there were no problems. 
However, Vince did not receive a copy of the report, so he 
continued to raise his concerns. 
 In early 1990 he made a complaint to his local member 
of state parliament, who referred the matter to the Minister 
of Transport, who cited the task force findings. Then Vince 
made a complaint to the state ombudsman, who declined to 
investigate. Next, in August 1990, he made a complaint to 
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the Independent Commission Against Corruption, which in 
February 1992 announced an inquiry, but then cancelled it. 
 Also in August 1990, Vince complained to the 
Auditor-General, which undertook an investigation and 
produced a lengthy report. However, despite taking the 
complaint seriously, the Auditor-General’s report seemed 
to have no effect on practices at State Rail. 
 Vince hadn’t forgotten about the 1989 task force 
report that was being used to say everything was okay. In 
September 1990, he requested the report through Freedom 
of Information legislation. State Rail opposed its release. At 
the Whistleblowers meeting where Vince was telling his 
story, he hadn’t yet obtained the report, but he eventually 
did the next year, in 1994. 
 In January 1991, Vince made a new complaint to State 
Rail. This led to a report being commissioned, and this time 
it vindicated him. But it also signalled an escalation of 
reprisals. Over the next two years, Vince was demoted, 
referred to psychiatrists, attacked in state parliament, had 
his pay stopped and finally was dismissed. 
 It was a horrific story. Vince had tried all sorts of 
means to raise his concerns. State Rail management seemed 
to do the right thing by setting up a task force, but refused 
to show its report to Vince and spent hundreds of thousands 
of dollars trying to prevent its release. The various agencies 
Vince approached didn’t seem to help. Vince ended up 
losing his job. His career was over. 
 What about all the agencies that he approached? The 
ombudsman wouldn’t investigate. The Independent 
Commission Against Corruption announced an inquiry but 
then cancelled it. In contrast, the Auditor-General made a 
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significant investigation and wrote a long report. I later 
talked to someone in the Auditor-General’s office who said 
it was a bit unfair of Vince to see its report as inadequate. 
The problem was that the Auditor-General had no power to 
correct problems in State Rail.  
 So what happened to Vince? In 1995 he reached a 
settlement with State Rail. He received a considerable sum 
of money, setting him up for the rest of his life. However, 
part of the settlement agreement was a silencing clause. 
Vince couldn’t say publicly how much he had received, nor 
say anything about the matters of dispute. 
 Is all well that ends well? Vince had some tough years 
before he received the settlement, but he ended up with 
some financial compensation. But he was hardly a winner. 
After all, he lost his job and his career. He never worked 
again for a salary. 
 Actually, Vince was one of the lucky ones. Many 
whistleblowers lose their jobs and receive little compensa-
tion, or none at all. 
 
What’s the problem? 
We heard Vince’s perspective. The other side of the story 
was State Rail. What happened with signalling systems? 
What happened concerning the alleged corrupt practices, 
with a million dollars unaccounted for? 
 It is common in cases of whistleblowing for nearly all 
the attention to be on the whistleblower, with disputes over 
whether the whistleblower is doing their job properly, is 
mentally balanced, has violated any rules or regulations or 
has been treated fairly. The story is about the whistle-
blower, with the result that the original problem is almost 
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forgotten. The end of the story is when the whistleblower is 
discredited and ousted, perhaps compensated or very 
occasionally vindicated. But seldom does the story, at least 
as told in public, include information about whether the 
alleged problem in the organisation, the one that the 
whistleblower spoke out about, was dealt with. 
 Organisations are complex entities, so often it is not 
easy to determine what is going on. In State Rail, signalling 
systems have many features, some working well, some 
perhaps not so well. Vince claimed there were problems, 
but were they serious ones? What is not publicly known is 
what, if anything, State Rail did in relation to signalling 
systems. If changes were made, were they helpful? Then 
there is the issue of corruption. If Vince’s concerns were 
correct and State Rail monies were being siphoned off to 
individuals, this was likely to be something bigger than just 
what he suspected. However, there is little public infor-
mation about the scale of corruption in State Rail or about 
what has been done to deal with it and prevent it.  
 Another State Rail whistleblower, Lesley Pinson, 
alleged corruption in the organisation. She lost her job, and 
for quite a few years was a key figure in Whistleblowers 
Australia. 
 Over the years, I’ve talked with hundreds of whistle-
blowers. They report all sorts of reprisals, including ostra-
cism (shunning, sometimes called the cold shoulder), petty 
harassment, reprimands, referral to psychiatrists, demotion, 
dismissal and blacklisting. This is bad enough, causing 
financial, health and relationship problems. But in some 
ways, one of the worst things is the failure of watchdog 
agencies to address their concerns. Just like Vince’s 
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experience, whistleblower after whistleblower reports that 
these agencies — the ones that are supposed to address 
problems in organisations — don’t help. 
 
Official channels 
Vince’s story helped me focus on the shortcomings of 
official channels, namely the organisations and processes 
that are supposed to fix problems. Vince tried a series of 
official channels: his boss, State Rail management, the state 
ombudsman, an anti-corruption commission, a parliamen-
tarian and the state auditor-general — and none of them 
worked, at least not to his satisfaction. If it had just been 
Vince’s story, it could have been ignored, because after all 
he might have been wrong and State Rail management 
right. But there were too many other similar cases to ignore. 
Then I started looking at the shortcomings of official chan-
nels in a range of other contexts, from sexual harassment to 
elections.  
 Official channels have a great hold over people’s 
imagination. When one agency fails in some way, it is seen 
as a localised issue, with no implications for agencies in 
general. I wanted to point to shortcomings inherent in the 
system of official channels, and decided to approach the 
topic by telling what I have learned over the years. 
 Chapter 2 is about whistleblowers in Australia and 
their reports of dealing with official channels. The strange 
thing is that politicians, journalists and whistleblowers 
themselves see official channels as the source of salvation, 
yet the goal of protection is like an ever-receding mirage.  
 In chapter 3, I tell about my experiences on university 
sexual harassment committees. It is another story about the 
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widespread belief in formal procedures despite plenty of 
evidence that these procedures often don’t work very well. 
 For both adverse treatment of whistleblowers and for 
the problem of sexual harassment, I saw a preoccupation 
with official channels at the expense of other options. Sev-
eral other options are worth considering. One is to increase 
people’s understanding and skills to address problems. 
“People” here refers to everyone, not just whistleblowers 
and targets of harassment. A second option is to change the 
culture so that reprisals and harassment are simply not done, 
because they are implicitly understood as inappropriate. A 
third option is collective action: mobilising groups of 
people to apply pressure for change, or to change things 
directly. A fourth option is to find different ways to address 
the problems. There may be other options, too, depending 
on the issue. 
 Chapters 4 through 8 address additional areas where 
official channels may give only the illusion of being a 
solution, yet where emphasis on them discourages other 
options. Chapters 4 and 5 examine plagiarism and Wikipe-
dia. Chapter 6 looks at how official channels can operate to 
reduce outrage over police beatings, massacres of civilians, 
torture, genocide and other cases in which a powerful group 
is the perpetrator of an injustice.  
 In systems of representative government, elections 
serve to legitimise rule by politicians, and deserve special 
attention as an official channel, covered in chapter 7. In 
chapter 8, I present a variety of examples to show that the 
same sorts of issues arise in different contexts, in various 
countries. Chapter 9 offers a few summary comments. 
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 In the appendices I’ve placed some material deriving 
from my original conception of this book. Appendix 1 
outlines a series of roles that official channels can play. 
Appendices 2 and 3 are accounts of two particular Austral-
ian regulatory bodies, not intended to laud or condemn them 
but rather to illustrate several of the roles they play or 
inhabit. I picked these two bodies simply because I’ve 
learned a bit about them. My hope is that others will try to 
observe the roles illustrated here in other contexts, in order 
to gain greater understanding and provide better guidance 
for those seeking justice. 
2 
Whistleblowing 
 
 
Whistleblowers are people who speak out in the public 
interest. A typical whistleblower is an employee who 
notices a problem at work — for example, a discrepancy in 
accounts, bullying, favouritism in appointments, or 
dangerous work practices — and reports it to someone in 
authority. Usually the first person notified is the boss. If the 
boss doesn’t address the problem, there are other possibili-
ties. Internal to the organisation, there may be grievance 
procedures, the human resources unit, the boss’s boss and 
the board of management. External to the organisation there 
are various watchdog agencies, for example an ombuds-
man, auditor-general or anti-corruption body, and others 
depending on the organisation. Requests can be made to 
politicians. Legal actions can be commenced: the courts 
constitute a high-prestige formal channel. 
 The key feature of official channels is that they are 
supposed to provide justice. Someone who has a concern is 
searching for a person, agency or process that has some 
authority to investigate, determine whether there is a 
problem and, if there is, to address it. 
 Whistleblowers sometimes go to the media. The 
media, including both mass media and social media, are not 
official channels. They have no formal responsibility to 
rectify injustices. However, the media are often the most 
effective avenue for whistleblowers. 
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 In chapter 1, I told the story of Vince Neary, a 
whistleblower in State Rail. Over the years, I’ve heard 
many stories like Vince’s. His is worth telling because it so 
nicely illustrates the persistence with which many whistle-
blowers pursue one official channel after another, despite 
each official channel failing to address the original concern. 
  
Whistleblower stories 
When I heard Vince’s story, Whistleblowers Australia had 
only recently been formed. Initially I was not heavily 
involved, but then in 1996 I became the national president. 
It was an eye-opening experience.  
 At the time, awareness about whistleblowing was 
surging. The New South Wales branch of Whistleblowers 
Australia was quite active, holding a “caring and sharing” 
meeting every week in Sydney at which people were invited 
to attend, tell about their experiences and receive advice 
from experienced members. Some people would come for 
just one or two meetings, tell their stories and then depart, 
with or without some useful suggestions about how to 
proceed. 
 I attended a few of these meetings, enough to gain a 
good impression of the dynamics and to confirm what 
regulars told me about the meetings. In the 1990s, the term 
“whistleblower” had some level of stigma. It was linked to 
the Australian expression “dobber” meaning a snitch or 
informer. To dob on your mate (your friend or co-worker) 
was seen as a low act. Most whistleblowers were not 
dobbing on their mates but reporting problems higher in the 
organisation, but the dobber label often stuck. Some of 
those who attended the caring-and-sharing meetings started 
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their stories by saying “I’m not a whistleblower, but …”, 
then proceeding to tell a classic whistleblower story. 
 Media coverage of whistleblowers, often presenting 
them as heroes, gradually changed public perception of 
whistleblowing. Years later, the term became for some a 
badge of honour, sometimes adopted by individuals who 
simply had a dispute with a co-worker, or some grievance 
about their treatment. 
 When I became president of Whistleblowers Australia 
in 1996, I thought I knew a fair bit about the issues. Lots of 
others assumed I did too! I was contacted by numerous 
whistleblowers wanting to tell me their stories.  
 It is quite common for whistleblowers to start at the 
beginning and provide a blow-by-blow account of their 
experiences: “I spoke to the manager on Friday 24 July. Ten 
days later, I received a letter from the head office. I wrote a 
reply on 10 August and arranged a meeting.” And so on. 
 One feature of these lengthy stories became a recurrent 
theme: the shortcomings of official channels. Quite a few 
callers from New South Wales said they had made a 
submission to the state’s Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC), but their matter was not addressed. 
ICAC sometimes referred their complaints to their employ-
ers and sometimes their identity was compromised, and 
they were worse off than before. 
 So predictable were the reports about the uselessness 
of official channels that occasionally I could anticipate 
what a whistleblower would tell me. They might say, “Then 
I went to the ombudsman” and I would interject “That 
didn’t work, did it?” and they would say “How did you 
know?” 
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 I knew because I had heard it so many times before. 
Besides, if an agency had fixed the problem, then probably 
this person wouldn’t be ringing Whistleblowers Australia 
for advice. 
 I heard all sorts of stories, but I only heard one side. 
Those of us in Whistleblowers Australia are volunteers, 
giving advice and information in our spare time. We do not 
have the capacity or the authority to investigate complaints 
or to even to check out claims by contacting employers. The 
people who contacted us might have been telling us 
concocted stories. They might have been delusional. They 
might have been a source of trouble at the workplace and 
adopted the mantle of whistleblower. 
 We were contacted by all these sorts of people, and 
sometimes it was hard to tell the difference. Sometimes I 
knew callers were delusional, when they told me that a 
device had been implanted in their brain to control their 
thoughts. Sometimes I guessed they had a grievance at 
work, because that was the only issue they raised. In a few 
cases, people who claimed to be whistleblowers turned out 
not to be quite what they claimed. One visitor to the weekly 
meetings of the NSW branch of Whistleblowers Australia 
said he had been to prison. That didn’t automatically dis-
credit him, because in worst-case scenarios whistleblowers 
are framed for crimes and imprisoned. However, infor-
mation emerged that this particular fellow had lied about 
the reason he had gone to prison: it was for paedophilia. 
 In the NSW branch, our policy and practice was to 
respond to all enquiries without trying to make a judgement 
about the bona fides of the enquirer. In other state branches, 
members of the executive would try to determine whether 
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someone was a genuine whistleblower before offers of 
assistance were made. I liked the NSW branch approach. 
By not insisting that enquirers be vetted, we avoided the 
risk of causing further harm to individuals who had already 
been subject to continued disbelief and repeated reprisals. 
We did not set up a hierarchy separating genuine whistle-
blowers from those who didn’t meet some arbitrary criteria. 
We created more good will among those we helped. 
Anyway, it usually didn’t matter whether someone was a 
whistleblower or actually the cause of problems at the 
workplace. Our advice would help whistleblowers but not 
do much harm otherwise. 
 Although in most cases it was impossible to judge the 
accuracy of what people told us, nevertheless the common-
alities were unmistakable. They usually involved raising 
some concerns at work, being subject to various types of 
adverse actions (reprisals), going to a person, procedure or 
agency to address the problem, and failing to get any 
satisfaction. The part about not obtaining satisfaction was 
striking. It made me think much more about official 
channels and reflect on experiences in other domains 
besides whistleblowing. 
 
Some relevant research 
If it had only been my personal experience listening to 
whistleblowers tell their stories, I would have been cautious 
about generalising. But there was some evidence suggest-
ing that what I heard was typical. 
  In the 1990s, Bill De Maria at the University of 
Queensland undertook pioneering research on whistleblow-
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ing.1 He sent out invitations to whistleblowers to participate 
in a survey, and obtained a large body of data. One of the 
questions on the survey concerned official channels, 
namely responses by external agencies to disclosures. The 
results were stunning. In one quarter of the cases, the 
agency took no action. In 40% of cases, the response was 
negative, most commonly because the agency investigation 
did not proceed. In about one in six cases, the agency 
referred the matter to another agency. Finally there were 
positive outcomes, with wrongdoing substantiated and 
whistleblowers protected. This occurred less than one out 
of ten approaches to an agency. In other words, whistle-
blowers felt that agencies helped them in only about ten 
percent of approaches. Some whistleblowers approached 
several agencies, so their odds were improved, but even so 
these were discouraging findings. 
 In some cases, the respondents reported, they were 
worse off after going to an agency. How could this be? 
Some agencies referred the matter back to the whistle-
blower’s employer, leading to further reprisals. 
 Bill wrote several articles based on his research, and 
in 1999 his book Deadly Disclosures appeared. It is highly 
pessimistic about the prospects for whistleblowers in 
Australia. From my perspective, it provided independent 
 
1 William De Maria and Cyrelle Jan, “Behold the shut-eyed sentry! 
Whistleblower perspectives on government failure to correct 
wrongdoing,” Crime, Law & Social Change, vol. 24, 1996, pp. 
151–166; William De Maria, Deadly Disclosures: Whistleblowing 
and the Ethical Meltdown of Australia (Adelaide: Wakefield Press 
1999). 
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confirmation of what I was hearing over and over from 
whistleblowers who contacted me. It reinforced my scepti-
cism of the value of official channels. 
 Perhaps, though, Australia is an exception, and things 
are much better elsewhere. The obvious place to check was 
the US, which was at least a decade ahead of any other part 
of the world in terms of trying to provide protection for 
whistleblowers. 
 
The US experience 
The term “whistleblower” got its start in the US. Ralph 
Nader helped organise a conference in 1971 and a book was 
published based on the conference.2 Rising awareness led 
to the introduction of various processes and laws for 
protecting whistleblowers and addressing their disclosures. 
As well, several organisations were set up to support 
whistleblowers. Of these, prominent was the Government 
Accountability Project (GAP), which took on a small 
percentage of whistleblowers cases, providing legal 
support. As well, GAP offered advice to whistleblowers 
and publicly promoted the cause of whistleblowers. 
 In Whistleblowers Australia, GAP was best known for 
a manual giving advice for whistleblowers. Initially circu-
lated as a booklet, it was later published as a book under the 
title The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide: Courage without 
Martyrdom.3 The title is revealing. It is a challenge for 
 
2 Ralph Nader, Peter J. Petkas and Kate Blackwell, eds., Whistle 
Blowing: The Report of the Conference on Professional Respon-
sibility (New York: Grossman, 1972). 
3 Tom Devine, The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide: Courage 
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whistleblowers to survive in their jobs, or to maintain a 
decent life after losing their jobs or their careers. Whistle-
blowers need courage to challenge corruption and dangers 
to the public, but courage is wasted if it does not lead to 
change. All too often, whistleblowers sacrifice their liveli-
hood for little effect: they are martyrs. 
 The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide offered insightful 
general advice. We in Whistleblowers Australia who had 
talked to numerous whistleblowers could vouch for all this 
advice. The Guide provided this in a cogent way. It also 
provided an assessment of the various avenues in the US for 
making disclosures. There were so many of these that this 
information made up half the book. It was sobering reading, 
because none of the avenues was particularly promising. An 
example was hotlines offered by organisations. Employees 
could ring a phone number and register a concern or 
complaint. The problem, according to the Guide, was that 
hotlines seldom worked. Nothing would be done about the 
matter reported, and the caller sometimes would be marked 
out for reprisals. (This was before the advent of anonymous 
hotlines.) Hotlines gave only the appearance of addressing 
concerns. 
 And so it went through nearly all the avenues for 
reporting problems. They were not promising, according to 
the Guide, and were to be used only with caution. The main 
exception was the False Claims Act. Dating from the Civil 
War and updated by Congress in the 1980s, it allowed whis-
tleblowers to make disclosures when the US government 
 
Without Martyrdom (Washington, DC: Fund for Constitutional 
Government, 1997). 
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had been defrauded. If the government thought the matter 
was worth pursuing, it could join the whistleblower in legal 
action to recover monies and, if the action was successful, 
the whistleblower would receive a portion of the monies. In 
a few cases, this has amounted to millions or even tens of 
millions of dollars. Most impressively, the False Claims 
Act actually worked, at least for the government, recouping 
billions of dollars from corrupt operators. 
 One sign of the effectiveness of the False Claims Act 
was relentless pressure from businesses to neuter or repeal 
the act. However, although the act recouped billions of 
dollars for the US government and rewarded some whistle-
blowers handsomely, it was not an easy road, nor for them 
quite as wonderful as it might seem. Whistleblowers who 
tried to invoke the act faced two obstacles. The first was 
getting the government to join them, and this didn’t always 
occur. Without government legal support, few whistleblow-
ers can afford to pursue the long legal effort involved. The 
second obstacle was time and effort. Legal actions often 
took years and required arduous preparation. 
 For successful cases, the financial reward for some 
whistleblowers was generous, but seldom enough to 
compensate for what they lost. Nearly all whistleblowers 
using the False Claims Act lost their jobs, and often their 
careers. They never worked again. Would a $1 million pay-
out compensate for 20 years of salary? More importantly, 
work is an important source of meaning. It is a big sacrifice 
to lose a career in order to tackle corruption. 
 The point here is that even the False Claims Act, 
undoubtedly the most effective piece of whistleblowing 
legislation in the US, is far from providing ideal outcomes 
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for whistleblowers. If you’re going to lose your job in 
pursuit of a good cause, it is certainly better to receive 
generous compensation than nothing at all. But it is remote 
from the optimal outcome, which is to remain in the job and 
perhaps receive a bonus or promotion for being a good 
corporate citizen. 
 In Australia, the US False Claims Act has been an in-
spiration to whistleblower supporters, some of whom have 
been agitating since the 1990s to introduce an Australian 
version of the act. However, the idea is usually dismissed 
out of hand, often with the argument that if people are 
acting in the public interest, they shouldn’t receive a private 
benefit.4  
 
Problems with whistleblower laws 
Introduction of a law protecting whistleblowers sounds like 
a great idea. If an employee speaks out about corruption or 
hazards to the public, they can claim to have made a 
“protected disclosure” and invoke the law to ensure they are 
not subject to reprisals. In principle, this should make 
whistleblowing much safer. In practice, it seldom does, and 
in the worst-case scenario it makes things riskier. 
 Employers, when they know about whistleblower 
laws, can get around them. Employers do not send letters to 
workers saying, “You’re being fired because you raised 
concerns over corruption.” Adverse actions can be quite 
subtle. Rosters are changed, making work more difficult. 
 
4 In contrast, within workplaces, salaries and bonuses are routinely 
used to motivate workers, even when their jobs involve serving the 
public interest. 
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Requests for equipment or leave are lost, delayed or 
rejected. Co-workers are less friendly or stay at a distance 
(they are afraid for their own jobs). A unit is “restructured,” 
causing employees to lose their jobs. In court, proving that 
such actions are reprisals for whistleblowing can be 
difficult. 
 In Australia, there are whistleblower laws in every 
state and territory, and federally. Yet only in rare instances 
have the laws have been invoked against an employer for 
taking reprisals against a whistleblower. The laws might be 
fine on paper but are useless if they are not actually used as 
intended. 
 In the US, there is a different way in which the intent 
of whistleblower laws is frustrated. Judges, when ruling on 
whistleblower cases, regularly support employers. The lead 
sentence of one article about this summarises the problem: 
“A top watchdog investigated 190 cases of alleged retalia-
tion against whistleblowers — and found that intelligence 
bureaucrats only once ruled in favor of the whistleblower.”5 
Congress, when passing laws, wanted whistleblowers to be 
protected, but courts sabotaged this intent.6 
 Another problem with many whistleblower laws is that 
they only offer protection when disclosures are initially 
made internally to the organisation, typically to managers 
or special units. This sounds reasonable but is a recipe for 
 
5 Kevin Poulsen, “US intelligence shuts down damning report on 
whistleblower retaliation,” The Daily Beast, 2 November 2018. 
6 On this and several other points, see Robert G. Vaughn, The 
Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012). 
24     Official Channels 
keeping challenges under control. Internal processes keep 
information out of the public eye, allowing managers to 
cover their tracks.  
 In many cases, laws are designed to limit the scope of 
protection. They might cover only some types of employ-
ees, such as government workers but not those in private 
enterprise. They might have provisions to penalise employ-
ees who make disclosures that are allegedly vexatious. In 
Australia, because agencies do not invoke the laws on their 
own initiative, the whistleblower may have to go to court to 
seek protection or restitution. This is an onerous task, 
especially for a dismissed former employee with little 
money, who needs to fight a lengthy court battle against an 
opponent with plenty of money to cause delays, mount 
appeals and in other ways wear them down. 
 Whistleblower laws, while looking good on paper, 
may not accomplish much in the face of other laws that 
enable silencing of dissenters. Government employees are 
under a legal obligation not to reveal information they 
acquire on the job. In Britain, this is called the Official 
Secrets Act; in Australia, there is another name, state 
services acts, but the effect is the same. These acts are 
seldom invoked but they serve as a form of intimidation — 
they frighten employees.  
 Defamation law can inhibit speech. Saying anything 
that harms someone else’s reputation is to be guilty of 
defamation, called slander when it is verbal and libel when 
it is published. Whistleblowers are sometimes threatened 
with being sued for defamation. Defamation law is one of a 
number of laws regularly used against free speech in what 
are called Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
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or SLAPPs.7 These sorts of actions are a misuse of the legal 
system by powerful groups to deter citizens from engaging 
in otherwise ordinary activities such as protesting against a 
real estate development. In the US, where SLAPPs were 
first identified, many states have passed anti-SLAPP laws, 
but in Australia there is no legal protection.8 
 The Australian government passed a law in 2014 
making it a criminal offence for national security workers 
to reveal information and for journalists to report it. So if a 
worker contacts a journalist about corruption in a spy 
agency, and the journalist writes a story about it, they can 
go to prison for five or ten years.  
 To make things worse, the Australian government also 
passed legislation requiring telecommunication companies 
and Internet service providers to retain metadata for two 
years. Metadata includes details about phone calls, includ-
ing caller and receiver numbers and times when calls were 
initiated and completed, but not what was said. This 
information can be used to figure out who is calling who. If 
a journalist publishes a story, police can obtain information 
about everyone who called the journalist. This means the 
identity of whistleblowers is potentially compromised. 
 The Australian government touts the country’s 
whistleblower laws. Meanwhile, it retains or passes various 
 
7 George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for 
Speaking Out (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996). 
8 On SLAPPs in Australia, see Greg Ogle, Gagged: The Gunns 20 
and Other Law Suits (Sydney: Envirobook, 2009); Brian Walters, 
Slapping on the Writs: Defamation, Developers and Community 
Activism (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2003). 
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other laws — official secrets, defamation, national security, 
metadata retention — that can easily be used against whis-
tleblowers. This suggests that Australian whistleblower 
laws give only the appearance of protection.  
 The problems go beyond Australia. In January 2020, 
Mark Worth, executive director of Whistleblowing Interna-
tional and of the European Center for Whistleblower 
Rights, sent an email inviting participation in their global 
network of activists. The email started this way: 
 
With the spread of new whistleblower laws being 
passed in all regions — including the recently 
approved EU Directive — more and more people are 
expecting to be protected from retaliation if they report 
crime, corruption and public health threats. 
 Unfortunately, as we very well know first-hand, 
a vast majority of whistleblower laws and systems do 
not adequately work in real-life cases. They essentially 
serve as traps — enticing people to come forward with 
inside information, but leaving them defenseless 
against being fired, sued, prosecuted, threatened or 
attacked. 
 
Official channels: shortcomings 
Based on my experience talking with whistleblowers and 
reading studies of what happens to whistleblowers, I came 
to a preliminary assessment of the shortcomings of official 
channels. They: 
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• usually focus on technicalities 
• rely on experts 
• are slow 
• give only the appearance of solving problems 
• seldom challenge those with the most power. 
 
 Official channels usually focus on technicalities. In 
other words, they are procedural: they follow rules for 
dealing with issues, and this means that much of their work 
deals with technicalities. In many cases, the result is that the 
central issues become peripheral. Many whistleblowers 
most of all want justice to be done, but agencies instead 
seek documentation about who said what and when, and 
whether a particular regulation was followed. 
 Official channels rely on experts. Because they are 
rule-bound, they depend on specialists in dealing with the 
rules. In courts, this means lawyers. Because of the reliance 
on experts, non-experts cannot easily understand, use or 
effectively challenge the processes and decisions in official 
channels. 
 Official channels are often slow. An agency may take 
months or even years to address a complaint. Meanwhile, 
the original problem remains unaddressed. 
 Official channels often give only the appearance of 
justice, not the substance. Because of the credibility of 
official channels, people think they provide solutions to 
problems, but in many cases this may be only an illusion. 
 Official channels seldom work when they challenge 
groups with a lot of power. They may work fine in other 
circumstances.  
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 This catalogue of problems may make it sound like 
official channels are totally useless, are fatally compro-
mised or are staffed by incompetents. Not so. Most of the 
staff in watchdog agencies and other bodies tasked with 
dealing with problems are hard-working and sincere. Many 
of them achieve extraordinary results in difficult circum-
stances. The problems with official channels are not primar-
ily due to failures of people; they are predictable conse-
quences of the way the whole system is set up. 
 It’s useful to take a step back and ask, “Why would 
anyone expect official channels to work?” Whistleblower 
laws are a case in point. A whistleblower can be thought of 
as a person who speaks truth to power. In the most dramatic 
instances, whistleblowers speak out about corruption that 
implicates senior management. To speak of justice in such 
cases is to expect that some junior figure in an organisation, 
by shining the light on a problem, can bring down top 
figures and fundamentally change operations. If heed were 
taken of whistleblowers all over the place, it would be 
revolutionary: systematic corruption would be challenged 
and organisational hierarchies jeopardised. From everyday 
observation, this rarely happens. Instead, the whistleblow-
ers suffer, with their jobs and careers sacrificed, yet seldom 
with much impact on power structures. 
 It is reasonable to expect that official channels can 
operate satisfactorily when low-level operations and 
personnel are affected, namely when the power structure is 
not at stake. Official channels are least likely to be effective 
when major systems and top-level figures are involved. The 
trouble is that official channels seldom have sufficient 
power to tackle the biggest problems. Therefore, when 
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looking at the shortcomings of official channels, it is useful 
to keep a focus on power differences. Without sufficient 
power to bring about change, it is more likely that official 
channels will give only the illusion of justice.9 
 
Organisational power and corruption 
The fundamental reason why whistleblower protection fails 
so often is straightforward, even simple. However, it is 
based on a perspective different from the usual one, and 
therefore can be hard to appreciate. Here I present the 
reason in simple terms, recognising that reality is complex.  
 To begin, it is necessary to accept that some people try 
to do things that others see as wrong, such as cheating, 
stealing, exploiting and even murdering. Some of these 
people get caught when they are young and are punished. 
Others, though, rise to high places.  
 For many practical purposes, most people are honest 
most of the time. They might cheat a little, for example by 
speeding while driving or when declaring their income for 
tax purposes. Even if most people are honest most of the 
time, that still means some people are not honest. For 
example, people with antisocial personality disorder — 
commonly called sociopaths or psychopaths — have little 
empathy and look out only for themselves. Psychopaths 
 
9 There is a connection here with the work of Murray Edelman — 
Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence 
(Chicago: Markham, 1971) and The Politics of Misinformation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), among others — 
who analyses how the symbolic environment, especially political 
action, helps maintain elite power. 
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have characteristics that are helpful for some worthwhile 
purposes, but also can cause immense damage.10 Some rise 
to positions of power. Only a few per cent of the population 
are psychopaths, but that is enough to mean that some 
behaviour is corrupt. To deal with social problems, it is 
unwise to rely on the innate goodness of people. 
 There is also evidence that normal people can do 
horrible things, such as hurting others. Being normal 
psychologically is not a protection against doing harm.11 
For example, most killers in genocides, such as Nazi killers 
during the Holocaust, are psychologically normal — few of 
them are psychopaths. What people will do, and what they 
will let others do without intervening, depends greatly on 
the circumstances. Only a few German men who were 
drafted into killing squads asked not to participate, even 
though there were few penalties for seeking to leave. When 
evil behaviour is the norm, only a relatively small number 
of people will try to stop it. 
 To this can be added a feature of human psychology 
epitomised by a famous saying by Lord Acton: “Power 
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” 
Acton’s aphorism has been confirmed by careful research 
 
10 For contrasting approaches, see Paul Babiak and Robert D. 
Hare, Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths Go to Work (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2006); Kevin Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths: 
Lessons in Life from Saints, Spies and Serial Killers (London: 
Heinemann, 2012). 
11 Steven James Bartlett, The Pathology of Man: A Study of 
Human Evil (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 2005). 
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that shows exactly the sort of psychological processes that 
operate when one person has power over another.12 
 In a small group of equals, the corrupting influence of 
power is limited, though there still can be personal disputes 
and attempts at dominance. The corruptions of power are 
minimised in small groups that are voluntary and where 
members have a common aim, for example amateur 
musicians playing for their own enjoyment. 
 In large hierarchical organisations, for example 
militaries, government departments and corporations, those 
higher up have considerable power over those further down. 
To this can be added other systems of power, including 
male domination, ethnic domination and religious domina-
tion, with the result that an organisation can be a seething 
interplay of systems of power. Within the organisation, 
those seeking power are more likely to rise, and some of 
them will have antisocial tendencies. All of them are 
vulnerable to the corruptions of power. 
 In addition, large organisations are set up to limit 
accountability of those at the top. Those at the top have the 
most power within the organisation — that’s obvious 
enough. Only when subordinates combine together do they 
have a chance of bringing down those at the top. This 
happens only rarely. Trade unions can be thought of as 
 
12 Dacher Keltner, The Power Paradox: How We Gain and Lose 
Influence (London: Penguin, 2017); David Kipnis, The 
Powerholders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); 
David Kipnis, Technology and Power (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1990); Ian Robertson, The Winner Effect: How Power 
Affects Your Brain (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). 
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groups of subordinates who band together. However, 
unions usually are only concerned about wages and condi-
tions, not addressing high-level corruption. Therefore, in 
most cases accountability is only possible when there is an 
equally powerful force acting outside the organisation, one 
that targets corruption.  
 So here is the setting: in a large organisation, there is 
almost bound to be bad behaviour, and sometimes there is 
systematic corruption. Those at the top are especially prone 
to abuse their power. The organisation, to remain stable in 
the face of competition and threats from other organisa-
tions, is set up to protect those at the top and, even more 
importantly, to maintain the system of hierarchy. It is there-
fore continually vulnerable to corruption. 
 In this scenario, a lone employee speaks out, saying 
there is a problem. If the problem implicates those higher 
up — either as perpetrators or as knowingly allowing the 
problem to persist — then this lone employee has no 
chance. What is involved is truth (about corruption) pitted 
against an entrenched system of power. Truth hardly ever 
wins in this scenario. 
 Next: bring in whistleblower protection. Grievance 
procedures are introduced within the organisation and 
external watchdogs are set up. Now imagine that the proce-
dures and watchdogs actually made it possible for truth to 
win over hierarchical power. This would mean that a single 
employee could bring down an entire organisation, or at 
least bring down a whole swathe of senior managers. 
 Empirically, this occurs only very rarely. Given that 
bad behaviour and systemic corruption are commonplace, 
where are the examples of major organisations that have 
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been radically reformed solely on the basis of an employee 
who spoke out? All the evidence is to the contrary: it is the 
lone employee who loses out. 
 Consider the following examples. 
 
• Massive corruption in military procurement 
• Criminal action by pharmaceutical companies in 
selling drugs known to be dangerous, falsifying data, 
faking authorship of scientific papers 
• Involvement of police in criminal activities 
• Cover-up of paedophilia in churches 
• Intentional killing of civilians during wars. 
 
These are all examples of activities that break laws but 
where for years or decades perpetrators were not brought to 
justice. Those who challenged abuses were more likely to 
suffer. 
 Even more difficult to challenge are institutionalised 
injustices, in which unfairness is officially okay. The 
easiest way to protect power and wealth is to promote laws 
and processes that serve the interests of the powerful and 
wealthy. 
 
• Tax loopholes that benefit the wealthy 
• Lack of enforcement of the rules of war 
• Copyright and patent systems that mainly benefit 
pharmaceutical companies, Hollywood producers, 
software manufacturers and genetic engineering 
companies 
• Laws that exempt companies from social obligations 
• Laws and legal traditions that treat white-collar crime 
more leniently than petty crime by the poor. 
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Only when the employee speaking truth has powerful allies 
is there a chance of significant change. These powerful 
allies might be other employees, supporters in another 
major organisation, campaigning groups or members of the 
public agitated by media coverage. 
 Let’s look at grievance procedures and watchdog 
agencies. Do they operate like powerful allies or help 
mobilise powerful allies? Usually not. Grievance proce-
dures operate inside the organisation and are normally 
confidential, minimising the possibility of mobilising 
support. Watchdog agencies usually have limited powers 
and operate without publicity, again minimising the possi-
bility of mobilising support. It seems that these procedures 
and agencies are set up in a way that ensures that they are 
very unlikely to ever be a serious threat to organisational 
hierarchies. That’s exactly what is observed in practice. In 
most cases, they serve to keep challenges contained.  
 Strengthening the powers of watchdog agencies seems 
like a good solution, and can sometimes be helpful to 
whistleblowers and aid corruption prevention. But few of 
the agencies see it as their role to mobilise constituencies 
that can bring about significant change.  
 
Why whistleblower protection is fundamentally flawed 
Anthony Evans provides an insightful framework for 
understanding whistleblowing and the failure of official 
channels.13 Evans draws on a framework developed by 
 
13 Anthony J. Evans, “Dealing with dissent: whistleblowing, 
egalitarianism, and the republic of the firm,” Innovation: the 
European Journal of Social Science Research, vol. 21, no. 3, 
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anthropologist Mary Douglas using the concepts of grid and 
group.  
 When people are subject to imposed regulations, 
“grid” is high; when individuals can freely negotiate, grid 
is low. Whistleblowing typically occurs in hierarchical 
organisations, where people are subject to rules and a chain 
of command. In Douglas’s terms, this is high grid, a place 
where free discussion is difficult between those at different 
levels in the hierarchy.  
 “Group” refers to commitment to others in a group. 
Whistleblowers are usually people who have a strong 
commitment to the organisation: they are “high group.” If 
they had little commitment, they wouldn’t bother trying to 
do anything about problems. 
 Here’s the situation: the power structure is based on 
domination by those at the top over those below, rather than 
being a community of equals. But what a whistleblower 
does, when raising an issue of concern, is behave as if the 
organisation is actually open to dialogue, as if it were an 
egalitarian culture. 
 Whistleblowers may or may not believe in the chain of 
command. The point is that by speaking out, they are 
expecting an engagement that is more characteristic of an 
equal relationship. 
 
September 2008, pp. 267–279. For a summary of key ideas from 
this article, see Anthony J. Evans, “Egalitarianism and the failure 
of whistleblower protection,” The Whistle (newsletter of 
Whistleblowers Australia), no. 57, January 2009, pp. 8–10, 
http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/contacts/au_wba/whistle200901.pdf. 
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 Those in command see the whistleblower as a traitor, 
someone who has challenged the hierarchy. In fact, the very 
fact of this challenge may be sufficient to trigger reprisals, 
irrespective of what the whistleblower says, right or wrong. 
 Actually, the whistleblower has high commitment to 
the organisation, just with a conception that is different 
from those in command. As Evans puts it, “whistleblowers 
are loyal to what they deem to be the principles of the 
organisation, or indeed to the wider community with which 
they identify.” There is a fundamental difference in 
perspective between those at the top and the whistleblower 
who is somewhere below. 
 Evans sees the challenge posed by the whistleblower 
as the challenge posed by an expectation of a discussion 
between equals — that’s implicit in the whistleblower’s 
expectation that their concerns will be examined — that 
confronts a system based on command and control. This, at 
the root, is the challenge posed by egalitarianism to a 
hierarchical system. 
 What is the solution? Official channels are the mecha-
nism offered by the hierarchy. The idea is that someone in 
power will address the problem. However, Evans argues, 
this is fundamentally misconceived. Whistleblowing, in 
asking for a focus on a concern, is an egalitarian assertion: 
it is implicitly a request for looking at the information, at 
the problem, rather than acquiescing to those with formal 
authority. 
 Bringing in whistleblower laws, watchdog bodies and 
courts means using hierarchical bodies to address a 
challenge to hierarchy. They are bound to fail because the 
whistleblower is expecting a form of dialogue, of engage-
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ment with the issues on a fair basis, and this expectation 
cannot be satisfied by someone in power invoking more 
rules.  
 The implication of Evans’ analysis is that whistle-
blower protection is a flawed approach because it does not 
alter systems of unequal power. To really address the whis-
tleblower’s concerns requires a change to a more egalitarian 
system.  
 
Myth system or operational code? 
You’re walking along a downtown street, not at an intersec-
tion, and cross to the other side to get to a shop. In Australia, 
legally, you’re supposed to cross only at an intersection, 
when the “walk” light is on. But you decided it was safe 
enough to cross. Besides, loads of people were doing the 
same thing, and no one is ever charged with jaywalking 
(crossing a road when there’s traffic). Or are they? 
 To understand what’s going on here, it’s useful to 
apply some labels. The official rules — the law in this case 
— can be called a myth system. The law says jaywalking is 
illegal, but most of the time the law is not enforced. The law 
on jaywalking is a type of myth or fiction. 
 What actually happens is that people routinely jaywalk 
and are never charged or even warned. This can be called 
the “operational code.” People know, from experience or 
observation, that jaywalking is not penalised. That is the 
way the law is applied in practice — by not being enforced. 
If you know the code, namely non-enforcement, then you 
know when you can jaywalk without penalty.  
 Of course, jaywalking might be dangerous or annoy 
drivers. That’s a different set of issues, also part of the 
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operational code. It’s unacceptable to stand in front of mov-
ing vehicles or to shout abuse at drivers. The operational 
code doesn’t say anything goes, but rather prescribes 
acceptable violations of the law. 
 A friend of mine in Brisbane was fined $50. His trans-
gression? He was standing at a corner waiting for the 
“walk” light to go on, and stepped out onto the street one 
second beforehand. For a pensioner, $50 was a big 
payment. Half a dozen other pedestrians were at the same 
corner and stepped out before him, but they were younger 
and faster and got away. 
 He was outraged and wrote a letter to the newspaper. 
He knew the operational code, which was that pedestrians 
are not fined for crossing early at a crosswalk. But he was 
fined. It turned out that the police applied the law in a 
technical fashion. They applied the rules of the myth 
system, thereby raising money at the expense of a few 
unlucky pedestrians. 
 You’re driving along a suburban street about 10km/h 
above the speed limit. This is nothing special. Most other 
drivers do the same. In fact, you become annoyed when the 
driver ahead of you goes 5km/h less than the speed limit, 
though this is quite legal. 
 The myth system is that people are supposed to obey 
the law and transgressors are subject to penalties. The 
operational code is that breaking the law just a little, when 
no one is hurt, is okay. This helps explain some drivers’ 
outrage over speed cameras. They are a challenge to the 
operational code, which is that driving safely is acceptable 
even when laws are technically broken. 
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 These thoughts are inspired by a book by Michael 
Reisman titled Folded Lies.14 Reisman applied the ideas of 
the myth system and the operational code to US corruption 
issues, especially bribery. 
 Folded Lies was published in 1979. I read it a few 
years later and took some notes. The book is written in a 
rather abstract style, yet filled with numerous examples 
from US politics and administration.  
 Recently I came across my old notes on the book and 
thought, “Hey, these ideas are relevant to whistleblowing,” 
so I obtained a copy and read it again. Reisman didn’t talk 
about whistleblowing but his ideas are directly relevant. 
Here’s how he explains the myth system and operational 
code at the beginning of his book: 
 
Most people learn early that there are things they can 
get away with; from the perspective of an observer, 
some social “wrongs” are selectively permitted. An 
observer may distinguish, in any social process, a myth 
system that clearly expresses all the rules and prohibi-
tions (the “rights” and “wrongs” of behavior expressed 
without nuances and shadings), and an operational 
code that tells “operators” when, by whom, and how 
certain “wrong” things may be done. An operator is 
someone who knows the code in his own social setting 
— certain lawyers, some police officers, some busi-
nessmen, an agent, a kid at school. (p. 1) 
 
 
14 W. Michael Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and 
Reforms (New York: Free Press, 1979). 
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In many organisations, the operational code allows things 
to happen that an outsider would see as wrong or even 
terrible. In some families, beatings of children are a routine 
occurrence. In some churches, sexual abuse by clergy was 
not penalised. In some businesses, siphoning off money for 
personal use is accepted. In other businesses, dumping toxic 
waste into public waterways is the norm. 
 In most of these examples, the operational code allows 
insiders to do things that outsiders might condemn. The 
outsiders are subscribers to the myth system. If they are 
informed about the activities, they want them stopped.  
 In many cases — far from all — whistleblowers 
endorse the myth system. They believe in honesty, fairness 
and the rule of law. So when they encounter damaging and 
dangerous activities, they want something done about them. 
 Those on the inside, participating in the activities, are 
subscribers to the operational code. They can react with 
fury when someone tries to invoke the myth system. After 
all, the operational code is the way things are done. Anyone 
who goes against this is a traitor. 
 Whistleblowers have a chance of making a difference 
when outsiders widely endorse the myth system and 
demand that something be done about abhorrent operational 
codes. A good example is paedophilia, which over the years 
has become increasingly stigmatised. As a result, paedo-
philia in churches became a massive scandal. 
 Another example is animal welfare, for which there is 
a growing movement and public concern. As a result, 
whistleblowers who expose ill treatment of animals, for 
example in the live animal trade, can trigger public outrage.  
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 On the other hand, in areas where there is little public 
awareness or concern about issues, the operational code can 
continue with little disturbance. An example is cheating on 
income tax. The myth is that everyone pays their fair share 
of tax. The operational code for big businesses and wealthy 
individuals is that tax dodges will be exploited to the hilt, 
while governments are lobbied or pressured to maintain or 
expand loopholes.  
 Now and then there are media exposés of large 
companies that pay little or no tax, but these seem not to 
create a groundswell of rage against big-company tax 
evasion. One reason may be that tax avoidance is a national 
pastime: minimising one’s own tax is seen as acceptable. In 
other words, the operational code is that it is okay to avoid 
tax as long as you can get away with it. There are so many 
small cheaters that cheating is seen as normal. 
 Government regulatory bodies are supposed to ensure 
laws are followed and that the public is protected from 
unfair and dangerous activities. The myth is that these 
watchdogs are doing their job well and keeping corruption 
and abuse under control. In other words, you don’t need to 
worry about injustice because the watchdogs are on guard. 
 In many cases, regulatory agencies become close to 
the enterprises they are supposed to regulate, and become 
lapdogs: they are toothless and called “captured bureaucra-
cies.” Another way of understanding lapdogs is that they 
have subscribed to an operational code of minimal interven-
tion, cooperation with regulated organisations and facilita-
tion of their activities. The public might believe there is 
effective regulatory oversight, but this is a myth. 
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 Next consider whistleblower protection. The myth is 
that whistleblower laws, and the agencies that are supposed 
to implement them, actually work. The operational code is 
that little will be done that disturbs organisational elites. 
Organisations will not be seriously penalised, dismissed 
whistleblowers will not be reinstated, and managers who 
institute reprisals will not be punished. Reisman writes: 
 
The function of the legislative exercise is not to affect 
the pertinent behavior of the manifest target group, but 
rather to reaffirm on the ideological level that compo-
nent of the myth, to reassure peripheral constituent 
groups of the continuing vigor of the myth, and 
perhaps even to prohibit them from similar practices. 
As elsewhere, the mere act of legislation functions as 
catharsis and assures the rank and file that the govern-
ment is doing what it should, namely, making laws. 
(pp. 31–32) 
 
Applied to whistleblowing, what Reisman is saying is that 
whistleblower laws aren’t intended to affect the behaviour 
of employers but rather to encourage popular belief that the 
government is looking after whistleblowers. The aim is to 
sustain the myth of whistleblower protection while allow-
ing organisational operational codes to continue as usual. 
 Whistleblowers, perhaps more than most members of 
the public, are subscribers to the myth system. They expect 
that watchdog agencies will help them and they call for 
better whistleblower protection. However, the most that 
happens is governments come up with more rhetoric and 
pass additional ineffective laws. 
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 To be effective, whistleblowers need to understand the 
difference between the myth system and the operational 
code. This isn’t always easy. The myth system is regularly 
endorsed by leaders, within organisations and in the media. 
So it is possible to hear heartfelt support for whistleblowers 
and to think that they will actually be supported. The chal-
lenge is to identify the operational code that is relevant to 
the situation, especially the code within an organisation.  
There is even an operational code within organised crime. 
 It is the operational code, namely the set of beliefs and 
practices that define what is expected and acceptable, that 
determines the response to a whistleblower. In general, the 
code within organisations is that whistleblowing isn’t 
welcome.  
 This should be obvious. In Australia, governments say 
they support whistleblowers, but they also maintain laws 
that prohibit public servants speaking out, institute searches 
for leakers, pass laws to criminalise whistleblowers and 
journalists on national security matters, and do not enforce 
whistleblower laws when employers take reprisals against 
whistleblowers. To identify the operational code, look at 
what people do and set aside what they say.  
 It is also valuable to understand the power of the myth 
system, in particular when it can be used to challenge 
wrongdoing. Within an organisation, it might be common 
practice to cheat customers, avoid tax, dump chemicals and 
appoint cronies. However, outside the organisation there 
are two types of people who can help. Some of them are 
subscribers to the myth system: they think it’s wrong to 
cheat and cause damage, and they want something done 
about it.  
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 The second group of helpers are ones who see an 
opportunity to pursue their own interests by invoking the 
myth system and triggering a crusade. Reisman says, “… 
there may be a point where perception of discrepancy 
between myth and operational code becomes so great that 
part of the content of the myth system changes, belief in it 
wanes, or crusades for reassertion of the myth burst forth.” 
(p. 24) 
 A crusade sounds like it might make a difference. Let’s 
protect whistleblowers! However, Reisman says crusades 
are sound and fury, a lot of noise about fixing problems, but 
never intended to change the basic way things operate.  
 In a crusade, politicians pass new laws, giving the 
appearance that the problem is being addressed. However, 
the laws don’t work in practice, and perhaps were never 
intended to. There are several ways that new laws can be 
neutered. Sometimes it is by narrow writing of the law. For 
example, early Australian whistleblower laws gave no 
protection to private-sector employees, or when workers 
went to the media. 
 Another way to limit the impact of a new law is to give 
inadequate funding to the watchdog body, or burden it with 
onerous bureaucratic requirements. In Australia, anti-
corruption agencies are woefully underfunded. In New 
South Wales, the Independent Commission Against Cor-
ruption can take up only a few percent of the matters 
brought to its attention.15 
 Another technique is to staff regulatory bodies with 
incompetent staff, or ones who are sympathetic to the 
 
15 See appendix 3. 
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industry being regulated. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, as revealed in the royal commis-
sion, was more attuned to the top management of banks 
than to the revelations about corruption provided by 
whistleblowers.16 
 In a crusade, a few individuals may be sacrificial 
lambs. They are penalised, lightly or heavily, for doing 
what hundreds of others did. To the public, it seems like 
justice has been done. Sometimes, though, there are no 
sacrificial lambs. In the global financial crisis, not a single 
US banker went to prison or was even charged, except for 
one who was actually a good guy. 
 What happens in a crusade is a symbolic endorsement 
of the myth system. The myth in Australia is that whistle-
blowers are valued and protected. The song and dance 
involved in passing new whistleblower protection laws 
encourages the belief that, yes, whistleblowers actually are 
valued and protected. Meanwhile, the operational code is 
largely unchanged: power structures remain untouched and 
routine practices stay the same. This means that it remains 
just as risky as before to blow the whistle. 
 Reisman uses the term “reform” to refer to changes in 
the operational code. For him, a reform means that people’s 
behaviour changes. This can happen for various reasons. 
Sometimes the popular pressure for change is so great that 
elites decide they need to change their practices in order to 
maintain their money and status. 
 Reisman says you sometimes can’t tell the difference 
between a crusade and a reform until years or decades later. 
 
16 See chapter 8. 
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For example, a reform might be quietly reverted, and some 
crusades eventually lead to changes in the operational code. 
To my mind, defining things this way just makes them 
confusing. Nonetheless, Reisman points to an important 
issue. To see whether laws are making a difference, check 
out the state of play down the track. Reisman: 
 
Even if passed, “reform” legislation, that is, legislation 
actually intended to change the operational code, is not 
equivalent to reform, for it may be blunted by opera-
tors at lower levels of the bureaucracy who may pre-
vent or indefinitely postpone the drafting of rules or 
secondary, implementing legislation. If implementing 
legislation is actually created, it may be starved to 
death by an inadequate budget allocation or emascu-
lated by the assignment of incompetents to positions 
of responsibility. If the implementing machinery actu-
ally tries to be effective, it may be overwhelmed by 
larger and superior legal teams who will mount adju-
dications protracted even beyond the wildest dreams 
of the pettifoggers of Bleak House or conclude settle-
ments that are translated into overhead costs and 
passed on to consumers. (p. 114) 
 
 Whistleblower laws have been on the books in 
Australia since the 1990s. Because it is exceedingly rare for 
one of the laws to be invoked against an employer who has 
taken reprisals against a whistleblower, this basically 
means the laws are not being enforced — one of the typical 
ways that crusade-inspired legislation is prevented from 
having any impact on the operational code. So, in Reis-
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man’s terms, the entire exercise of passing Australian 
whistleblower laws has been a giant façade. It reassures 
members of the public that the government is looking after 
whistleblowers, while ensuring that there is no substantial 
change in actual practices within workplaces.17 
 
An obsession with whistleblower protection 
Governments in Australia regularly consider, introduce and 
modify whistleblower laws, and this becomes newsworthy. 
Because I have a profile in the area, journalists regularly 
contact me asking about whistleblower protection. They 
nearly always assume that what is needed for protection is 
a law, or a better law. It takes a bit of explaining to convey 
the idea that the laws often don’t provide protection and that 
it might be more useful to help employees develop their 
knowledge and skills to effectively challenge problems at 
work. It is difficult to explain these points because they are 
off the agenda, not part of the regular discourse.  
 Governments have set the framework for thinking 
about workplace problems, so nearly everyone thinks 
whistleblower protection is the way to go. Most journalists 
go along with this framing of the issues. What then of 
whistleblowers themselves? Many, perhaps most, of them 
also look to protection from laws or from government 
agencies. They believe in official channels. 
 This is not surprising. Vince Neary’s story is typical. 
He reported problems to his boss, then to higher manage-
 
17 See also the work of Murray Edelman, noted earlier, especially 
Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence 
(Chicago: Markham, 1971). 
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ment, then to outside agencies and authorities. He was 
searching for someone — in particular, some person in 
authority — who would intervene to address his concerns. 
If there had been a whistleblower law in the state at the 
time, he would have sought protection under it. 
 For most whistleblowers, their own cases loom large. 
They have seen a problem and focus on having the problem 
addressed. When they suffer reprisals, they become preoc-
cupied with the unfairness of being targeted for trying to do 
the right thing. Due to focusing on their own situation, few 
of them spend time learning about the experience of other 
whistleblowers or about the dynamics of bureaucratic 
systems. In reporting problems to authorities, they display 
their trust in the system, and when that trust is betrayed, 
they seek other authorities. It is natural to hope that better 
whistleblower laws are not just desirable but are the 
solution. The contrary idea that such laws give only an 
illusion of protection is hard to understand and accept, 
because it means revising understandings of how the 
system works. Often it is only through bitter experience that 
whistleblowers start to question their assumptions about the 
proper workings of organisations, laws and regulations. 
 Whistleblower laws thus are a prime example of the 
shortcomings of official channels. They give the appear-
ance of protection but, all too often, this is only an illusion. 
More importantly, their existence — and failure — suggests 
to people that what is needed is better official protection. 
The assumption is that some white knight will come to the 
rescue and, if this doesn’t happen, what is needed is more 
power to white knights.  
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 Left off the agenda are other paths: skill development 
by workers and citizens, changing organisational cultures, 
and democratising workplaces. I will discuss these later in 
a bit of detail. Suffice it to say here that they all involve 
some change in the balance of power between employers 
and managers. Workers who are more skilled at challenging 
abuses on the job can use some of those skills to assert their 
interests in other ways. Changing organisational cultures to 
enable speaking out without reprisals — even to encourage 
reporting of problems — threatens those at the top who 
enjoy and benefit from exercising their power without con-
straints. Democratising workplaces, which involves giving 
more power to the rank and file, increases the accountability 
of managers and bosses. 
 Compared to these alternatives, whistleblower protec-
tion is a safe option, safe in the sense that it provides 
relatively little threat to those at the top. The threat is even 
less when the protection is an illusion, serving to convince 
everyone that the problem is being addressed when actually 
nothing much has changed. 
 Politicians like the approach of whistleblower protec-
tion because it keeps whistleblowers under control. 
Managers are responsible for dealing with disclosures, 
keeping the information inside the organisation. The risk of 
mobilising outside constituencies — the media, workers’ 
movements, action groups — is limited. From the point of 
politicians, the message to whistleblowers is this: “We will 
make sure you’re protected. Don’t go running around with 
your information, just follow the rules we set up and you’ll 
be okay. We’ve got everything under control.” 
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 For managers in organisations — government depart-
ments, militaries, corporations, churches, universities and 
others — the thinking is much the same. Grievance proce-
dures, internal ombudsmen, hot lines and other such mech-
anisms ensure that disclosures are made to management and 
thereby kept in-house, away from other groups such as the 
media, shareholders, competitors and citizen groups. A 
disclosure contained inside the organisation is far less of a 
danger than one made to outside constituencies. The 
message to whistleblowers is exactly the same as the one 
provided by politicians: “We will make sure you’re 
protected. Don’t go running around with your information, 
just follow the rules we set up and you’ll be okay. We’ve 
got everything under control.” 
 The mass media can be very useful in publicising 
whistleblower cases. Indeed, they are often the most 
powerful allies a whistleblower can have. However, when 
it comes to what to do to help whistleblowers, the mass 
media largely follow the cues of government and managers 
and emphasise whistleblower protection.  
 What then about the general public? Few people have 
direct experience of whistleblowing; few know whistle-
blowers as family members or close friends. Therefore, 
members of the public are also likely to follow the cues of 
mass media reporting. Some may hear about whistleblower 
procedures at their workplace. 
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Belief in a just world 
There is also something deeper at play. Many people 
believe the world is just.18 They believe this even though 
there is plenty of evidence of both individual and systematic 
injustice. Examples include people sent to jail who are later 
exonerated, bullying at school and in workplaces, organised 
crime and genocide. So how can a person’s belief in a just 
world survive exposure to such injustices? One way is to 
ignore uncomfortable information. Another is to blame the 
victim. If someone is impoverished or homeless, it must be 
their fault. If a woman is assaulted, it must be her fault. 
 Belief in a just world can be all-encompassing but for 
practical purposes is most salient in arenas close to a 
person’s life, for example when seeing a beggar on the 
street or knowing the next-door neighbour has an out-of-
control gambling habit. This belief is highly relevant to 
whistleblowers. 
 It is plausible that whistleblowers are especially prone 
to believe the world is just — or at least the part of the world 
they inhabit. When they decide to speak out, they often 
assume that managers will respond reasonably to their 
concerns, investigate them and then, if needed, address any 
problem. In other words, whistleblowers who report their 
concerns through the proper channels assume that these 
 
18 See for example Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: 
A Fundamental Delusion (New York: Plenum, 1980); Leo 
Montada and Melvin J. Lerner, eds., Responses to Victimizations 
and Belief in a Just World (New York: Plenum, 1998); Michael 
Ross and Dale T. Miller, eds., The Justice Motive in Everyday Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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channels will do what they are supposed to do. Problems 
will be fixed. Justice will be done. 
 When this doesn’t happen, it can be a terrible shock to 
the system. Instead of the problem being fixed, instead the 
whistleblower is seen as the problem, and reprisals begin. 
For those who believe the world is just, this is a fundamen-
tal challenge to their way of understanding the world. With 
their own eyes they saw corruption or unfairness at work 
but, instead of this being fixed, instead they are targeted 
with reprisals.  
 Some whistleblowers start believing what others say 
about them. When they are accused of being poor workers, 
of being vindictive or unreliable, they take this to heart. 
When they are accused of being crazy, they start believing 
it. This may have been especially common before whistle-
blowing received so much media attention. Jean Lennane, 
a psychiatrist, worked for the New South Wales Health 
Department. In the late 1980s, she spoke out about lack of 
funding for psychiatric services and, as a result, lost her job. 
Being a psychiatrist, she was able to set up a private 
practice. After Whistleblowers Australia was set up, she 
became president in 1993.  
 In those days, many bosses said whistleblowers were 
insane and sent them to psychiatrists, and some of them 
ended up in Jean’s consulting office. After hearing their 
stories, she would tell them, “You’re not insane. You’re a 
whistleblower!” 
 For someone who believes the world is just, suffering 
reprisals for blowing the whistle is especially disturbing. 
There are two injustices that are hard to deny. One is the 
problem at work, about which nothing is done. The other is 
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the reprisals inflicted on yours truly, who only tried to do 
the right thing. 
 Fred Alford wrote a penetrating study of whistleblow-
ers, giving a deep insight into their existential angst. 
Psychologically, their worlds were turned upside down. Not 
only was their understanding of the world shredded, but 
they themselves become the victim. For many, the psycho-
logical impact is just as shattering as the loss of income, a 
job or even a career.19 
 For these sorts of whistleblowers, it is attractive to 
believe in white knights. Somewhere there is a valiant 
defender of truth and justice who will provide vindication 
for the beleaguered whistleblower and slay the wrongdoers. 
As described earlier, many whistleblowers go from agency 
to agency, presenting their case in gory detail, hoping that 
someone who knows and cares will act on their behalf.  
 Another approach used by some individuals seeking 
justice is the broadcast message: a plea for help to ten, 
twenty or more recipients. Decades ago, before the Internet, 
these pleas arrived by post, sometimes large envelopes with 
many pages of enclosures. These days, the plea is usually 
sent via email, containing a long message, one or more 
attachments, and sometimes a lengthy email exchange. The 
recipients typically include watchdog agencies (such as 
ombudsmen), politicians, journalists — and sometimes 
office bearers in Whistleblowers Australia. The sender 
imagines that at least some of the recipients are just waiting 
to rectify an injustice and will spend however much time 
 
19 C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organi-
zational Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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and effort are needed to get to the bottom of the story. In 
other words, the sender believes in the existence of justice 
warriors who will save the day.  
 For those on the receiving end, it is easy to delete the 
email. Watchdog agencies can accept only those complaints 
fitting their brief, and they have only a limited capacity to 
address all the matters that come their way. Politicians are 
overwhelmed by requests of all kinds, and their staff have 
no time to try to get to the bottom of a lengthy and 
complicated matter. Journalists also have no time to address 
every issue brought to their attention. They prioritise what 
can be turned into a story: long, complicated and obscure 
messages, sent to all and sundry, hardly ever qualify.  
 Then there are those of us in Whistleblowers Australia. 
We don’t act on behalf of whistleblowers, but instead only 
provide information, advice and contacts. For those search-
ing for a white knight who will deliver justice, we are not 
what they are after, because we turn around and say, 
“Here’s what you need to do.” Those who believe in a just 
world seldom welcome the suggestion that there’s no one 
who will provide salvation. 
 In summary, there is a widespread assumption that the 
solution to the problems faced by whistleblowers is protec-
tion by laws, regulations and authorities. This assumption 
is manifest in governments passing laws and companies 
setting up procedures, and in journalists and academics 
focusing their attention on laws and procedures. It so 
happens that whistleblower protection is an approach that 
provides little threat to established hierarchies in all major 
organisations. This is because the protection provided to 
whistleblowers is supposed to be provided by authorities, 
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while little is done to empower the rank and file. Another 
reason for putting trust in whistleblower protection is a 
belief that the world is just. If there is wrongdoing at a 
workplace and an employee is penalised for speaking out 
about it, the solution is assumed to be to find or set up some 
process or agency that will provide justice. The possibility 
that many systems are unfair and that transgressors go 
unpunished is unpalatable.  
 Linked to the focus on whistleblower protection is a 
lack of effort and initiative on other approaches, including 
changing the culture of organisations, encouraging workers 
to develop knowledge and skills to deal with problems, and 
collective action. It is to these options that I now turn. 
 
Changing organisational culture 
From the point of view of whistleblowers, the ideal is 
working in an organisation in which there is no need for 
protection, because speaking out about issues is the norm. 
In a hospital, for example, it is common for problems to be 
covered up because those involved might be blamed and 
punished. A much different approach is for reporting of 
problems — including mistakes and mishaps — to become 
routine and not subject to reprisals. When this sort of 
approach is implemented, more errors are reported, because 
previously most were covered up, but outcomes are better. 
This is because recognising problems without blaming 
enables action to fix the causes of problems.20 
 
20 For an accessible account, see Matthew Syed, Black Box 
Thinking: Marginal Gains and the Secrets of High Performance 
(London: John Murray, 2015). 
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 Another approach to improving organisations is called 
appreciative inquiry. Instead of focusing on problems and 
trying to fix them, workers are encouraged to identify what 
things are being done well and what enables them to be 
done well, and to strengthen the enabling factors. A key part 
of appreciative inquiry is involvement of the entire 
workforce in the process of inquiry and change. There are 
many inspiring stories of this approach bringing about 
better workplaces and improved performance.21 
 These options sound wonderful and they make sense. 
So why don’t all organisations set up no-blame monitoring 
systems or institute a process of appreciative inquiry? There 
are many reasons. One of them is the hierarchical structure 
of most large organisations. As noted earlier, power tends 
to corrupt. When top managers have lots of power, and 
when economic and political inequality in society is 
extreme, corruption is a constant risk. 
 When organisations are pitted against each other, top 
managers see success in competition as more important 
than ensuring a supportive culture internally. For compa-
nies in the marketplace, success can mean a larger market 
share and higher profits. For churches, success can mean 
 
21 See for example David L. Cooperrider, Diana Whitney and 
Jacqueline M. Stavros, Appreciative Inquiry Handbook 
(Brunswick, OH: Crown Custom; San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 
2005); Sue Annis Hammond, The Thin Book of Appreciative 
Inquiry (Plano, TX: Thin Book Publishing, n.d., c. 1998); Jane 
Magruder Watkins and Bernard J. Mohr, Appreciative Inquiry: 
Change at the Speed of Imagination (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass/Pfeiffer, 2001). 
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more members and more donations. For universities, 
success can mean more students and higher status. 
 However, you might think that eliminating corruption 
would make an organisation more successful. True, at least 
in the long term. But in the short term, acknowledging 
corruption has costs to reputation. Church leaders didn’t 
want outsiders to know about paedophile clergy because 
this would damage the church’s reputation. And as soon as 
organisation leaders tolerate corruption, they are implicated 
in it and are likely to resist taking action. 
 There is also an in-group dynamic. Members of the 
organisation are seen as family or as team members, to be 
supported without question. Breaking ranks and exposing 
internal shortcomings is to be disloyal. 
 Putting all these factors together, the result is that 
changing organisational cultures is very difficult. That 
should be obvious simply by looking at the history of major 
scandals, by looking at surveys showing the prevalence of 
bullying, and by looking at the persistence of toxic organi-
sational cultures.  
 This is true despite evidence that greater worker 
participation improves productivity.22 Imagine that salary 
differentials were quite small, or even that managers were 
paid less than subordinates. This could be justified on the 
grounds that the jobs of subordinates are less fulfilling, so 
they deserve more money to compensate for lower satisfac-
tion. Or imagine that everyone automatically receives a 
 
22 A classic treatment is Seymour Melman, Decision-making and 
Productivity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958). 
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wage, enough to live on, whether they work or not.23 This 
would enable workers to leave without drastic sacrifices: 
they would be in a much stronger position to resist toxic 
organisational cultures. And they could speak out more 
easily. 
 
Skill development 
Imagine that all the workers in an organisation were given 
a booklet on how to be effective in challenging corruption, 
abusive behaviours and dangers to the public. Rather than 
saying “report the problem to your boss or to a designated 
authority,” instead it would tell about the possibility of 
reprisals, how to figure out whether managers are impli-
cated, the need to collect information to document the 
problems, how to communicate with journalists and how to 
contact others with experience in dealing with problems. 
This and other information is already available, but is little 
known to employees. 
 Imagine that an employer (government or private 
enterprise) commissions production of a leaflet on “How to 
be an effective leaker.” It would describe the ways to collect 
and distribute documents and other information to journal-
ists, action groups and other recipients without being 
tracked or identified. It would give examples of effective 
 
23 A cogent articulation of this option is Rutger Bregman, Utopia 
for Realists (London: Bloomsbury, 2017). 
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leakers and of leaks gone wrong. It would give advice on 
when it is ethical to leak.24 
 In Australia, this is a fanciful idea, because employers 
don’t want workers to leak. Instead, they want to control 
access to inside information, including information about 
shady practices. When there’s a leak, employers often 
institute a search for the leaker, sending the signal to all 
workers that they will be penalised severely if caught. 
Employers would not need to worry about leaks if they 
always operated ethically and listened receptively to reports 
from workers about possible problems.  
 If the organisational culture is less than ideal, what can 
be done? Without relying on authorities to fix problems, 
workers can develop their skills to become more effective 
change agents. The aim is not necessarily to become a better 
whistleblower — that can help — but more to get better at 
figuring out how to make things better and go about doing 
this. There are actually quite a few skills involved, and it’s 
useful to discuss them under several categories. Here, I 
outline six important skills. These are based on observa-
tions of what successful organisational activists have been 
able to do and on what unsuccessful ones seem to have 
lacked. Others might come up with a somewhat different 
list of skills. That’s fine. The key point is that skills are 
important. 
 
  
 
24 My own treatment: “Leaking: practicalities and politics,” The 
Whistle, no. 81, January 2015, pp. 13–18, 
https://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/rr/leaking.pdf. 
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Collecting information  
If there is a problem in the organisation, it is essential to 
obtain lots of documentation about it. This is one of the first 
recommendations in many whistleblower advice manuals. 
Documentation is essential because managers and agencies 
will try to explain away, discredit or destroy threatening 
information.  
 Chris worked for a government department. She 
noticed that contracts were being given to a friend of a 
senior manager named Jones, even though other contractors 
provided better value for money. So she reported the issue 
to her immediate superior, Helen, who said “Don’t you 
worry, because we always award contracts to the best 
offer.” Then the reprisals began, subtle at first. 
 If you see a problem and report it, you might be lucky 
if everyone agrees it’s a problem and starts addressing it. 
However, in a whistleblower scenario, reporting the 
problem is a trigger for cover-up and reprisals. Therefore, 
if there’s a chance that your reporting of a problem will be 
unwelcome, it’s vital to obtain as much high-quality 
information as possible. What this involves depends a lot 
on the problem, the organisation and the circumstances. 
 Imagine that you hear the boss say that surplus 
chemicals can just be put down the drain (a known health 
hazard). Twenty co-workers were there, so you think you 
can report this to the regulator. But the boss denies saying 
it, or says it was a joke, and all the co-workers say the same. 
You need a signed statement from several co-workers, or 
an audio recording, or a video of chemicals being put down 
the drain. Actually, you probably need much more than this, 
enough to convince even the most sceptical person, and 
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enough to stand up in the face of blatant lying, falsification 
of records and imaginative methods of explaining things 
away. 
 Collecting information thus is not a simple matter. It 
involves knowing what sorts of information are most 
revealing and credible, anticipating attempts to evade 
responsibility, and being prepared for efforts to destroy or 
falsify data. 
 There are several functions for the information you 
collect. One is to make sure there’s actually a problem. It’s 
not smart to make allegations when a bit more digging 
would reveal you’ve been mistaken. A second function is 
to provide solid documentation, sufficient to stand up 
against denials and destruction of evidence. A third func-
tion is to convince others that there is a problem that needs 
to be addressed, one serious enough to warrant attention. 
 Collecting information may sound obvious and 
straightforward, but actually it seldom is, because it is often 
undertaken in circumstances when others are trying to hide 
or obfuscate the information. Auditors are trained to study 
accounts, but seldom are they trained about collecting 
evidence of fraud when the fraud is being committed by 
those who employ them. 
 Chris still had her job. Luckily the reprisals were not 
serious. She kept a low profile and gathered lots more 
information about the contracting issue. 
 
Preparing accounts 
My phone rings. It’s about whistleblowing. The caller, who 
says her name is Chris, wants to tell me her story. I say go 
ahead. It turns out to be a very long story — a blow-by-
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blow account of events that started several years ago. That’s 
fine if I have the time, but often I don’t, and in any case 
when I’m listening I’m trying to figure out what it’s all 
about. I’d like to know answers to some basic questions: 
what was the problem, what did you do that triggered 
reprisals, who’s trying to shut you down, why, and who else 
have you approached about this? What I’d like most is a 
short summary so I can orient myself and be in a position 
to offer advice. 
 An email arrives. It’s someone who’d like me to help. 
The attachment is a 100-page transcript from a court 
hearing. Yes, I can read the transcript and try to identify the 
key issues. It would be so much easier if the correspondent 
listed them in dot-point form. 
 At some watchdog agencies, parcels regularly arrive. 
Thick parcels, with hundreds of pages of documents. Or 
they might contain a CD or DVD with hundreds of files.  
 To be effective in getting advice and winning support, 
it’s very useful to be able to tell your story or to explain the 
issues in a short understandable form. Writing is usually the 
best: a one-page or one-screen summary providing the 
context (who, what, where, when, why and how), what 
happened, why it’s important and what needs to be done.  
 After months or years in a highly stressful situation, 
it’s not easy to write a short summary. To do so requires 
skill in thinking and in expressing thoughts. Practice helps. 
So does getting feedback.  
 I advised Chris to write a short summary of the issues. 
She sent me a draft and I offered some comments. After a 
few more drafts, she was ready to show it to others. Which 
ones? 
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Understanding organisations 
I ask Chris which of her co-workers she thinks are involved 
in the scam: Obviously the senior manager Jones. What 
about her immediate superior Helen: is she just covering for 
Jones, or is she getting some additional personal benefit? 
Chris isn’t sure. 
 I ask her whether there are any co-workers she can 
trust. Are there any experienced and wise individuals who 
are honest and who can give her advice? She doesn’t really 
know. 
 Chris needs a better understanding of the place where 
she works: who has power, how people are connected, who 
works hard and is honest, who has favours to offer, who has 
insight and experience. She needs to get an idea of what 
happened to others who spoke out about problems. She 
needs to know some of the history of the organisation, and 
how workers reacted to events. With this sort of understand-
ing, she is in a much better position to decide on a course 
of action. She will know who is worth consulting, who to 
trust (maybe no one!) and how people will respond to 
actions she might take. 
 She would also benefit by understanding how other 
organisations operate, for example contractors, other 
government departments, and outside bodies that might 
take action.  
 Many workers just do their jobs, and many take pride 
in doing good work. They read policy announcements, meet 
other workers and hear some gossip. This is fine for doing 
what is required but may not be enough when there is a 
serious problem that needs addressing. It’s valuable to learn 
how the organisation works: the distribution of power, the 
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relationships between key individuals, the incentives and 
disincentives in play. It’s valuable to learn some of the 
history of the organisation, because the same patterns of 
individual and collective behaviour are likely to recur. 
 One of the best ways to learn about organisational 
dynamics is to talk with experienced and wise members of 
the organisation. They might still be working there, or they 
might be at another job or be retired. If you can track down 
a few such individuals, you can learn from their stories. If 
you decide you can trust them, you can ask for advice. 
 This is what Chris did. She found a senior figure, 
Alice, who was just about to retire. Alice enjoyed telling 
stories of what had happened in the department in previous 
years and decades. Chris asked whether anyone had ever 
tried to address favouritism in awarding contracts. Alice 
realised Chris needed guidance.  
 
Building support  
Alice told Chris about the only time there had been a major 
challenge to favouritism, one that made a difference. A core 
group of four workers started the process. They planned a 
campaign that involved talking to others to collect more 
information, raising awareness about the problems, using 
social media to circulate relevant articles and comments, 
and organising a petition and a delegation to management. 
It wasn’t easy but it did have an effect. Chris realised she 
needed to convince some co-workers to join her, and for the 
group to develop a strategy and follow through on it. 
 To bring about change in an organisation, it is far more 
effective when many people are involved. This includes 
overcoming corruption, abuses, bad policies, toxic culture 
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and many other challenges. A single worker who speaks out 
is vulnerable and usually has a low prospect of fostering 
change. Half a dozen workers acting together are less 
vulnerable to reprisals and have better prospects of success. 
Half the workforce acting together has even better odds. 
 Thus, when a single worker wants to promote change, 
it is useful to acquire and practise skills in building support. 
This means winning over others by talking to them, writing 
accounts, organising meetings, identifying and fostering 
others’ skills, and thinking strategically.  
 Few workers have such skills. Labour organisers often 
do — and they are not necessarily union officials. Commu-
nity organisers have these sorts of skills.25 To develop skills 
in building support, it’s worthwhile to identify organisers, 
observe what they do and, if possible, adopt them as 
mentors. 
 Some people have organising skills through their non-
work activities, for example in political parties, sporting 
clubs, religious groups and fund-raising efforts. These skills 
need to be adapted to the challenge of addressing problems, 
which is often difficult. 
  
 
25 The classic reference is Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals 
(New York: Random House, 1971). See also Chris Crass, Towards 
Collective Liberation: Anti-racist Organizing, Feminist Praxis, 
and Movement Building Strategy (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2013); 
Robert Fisher, Let the People Decide: Neighborhood Organizing 
in America (Boston: Twayne, 1984); Eric Mann, Playbook for 
Progressives: 16 Qualities of the Successful Organizer (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2011). 
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Using media  
Chris found a couple of others willing to work with her on 
a campaign. Their initial efforts helped raise consciousness, 
but their talks with other workers made them realise that 
bringing about change would probably require bringing 
some outside pressure to bear. Knowing that management 
was highly sensitive to the organisation’s reputation for 
fairness, they thought about contacting a journalist. But 
who? And how could they trust a journalist to be helpful? 
If they found a suitable journalist, what should they say?  
 Being able to use various types of media effectively is 
a valuable skill for anyone trying to address a problem. 
Media here refers to virtually any method of communica-
tion. Let’s say you’ve written an account of the problem, 
and you want to recruit some allies to help deal with it. You 
can talk to co-workers face-to-face, which is fine. You can 
also invite them to read your account and then discuss it. 
You can send the account to individuals via email or texts. 
You can post it on Facebook or some other platforms. You 
can set up a website and post it there, along with supporting 
documents. You can send it to journalists. 
 For using media effectively, it is important to under-
stand how they operate. If you want journalists to take an 
interest, you need to know how media companies operate, 
what sorts of stories are run, what sorts of examples and 
information should be highlighted, when to make contact, 
and so forth. If you decide to leak information anony-
mously, you need to know about leaking platforms, how to 
maintain your anonymity, how to check what’s happening, 
and how to lie convincingly about not being the leaker — 
if anyone asks. 
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 For using the media effectively, it is useful to learn 
from experienced practitioners, whether this is Twitter or 
television. As much as possible, it’s valuable to practise. If 
you are going to use Facebook, it’s worth having experience 
with making posts, publicising them, dealing with 
complaints and perhaps dealing with threats to sue. 
 Mass media are not necessarily the solution. Some 
whistleblowers are frustrated because journalists are not 
interested or because their revealing website is ignored. Or 
there might be stories published but the problem is not 
fixed. Part of understanding media is knowing their limita-
tions and knowing when some other approach is more 
promising. 
 
Understanding yourself  
Chris had to decide whether to be the one to talk to a 
journalist. This was a sensitive issue. She wanted to remain 
anonymous, but the journalist would probably want to 
include a personal profile — of Chris — because a story 
with a human interest is much more engaging. 
 Chris wasn’t sure about this. How would she fare if 
she became the centre of attention? What about reprisals? 
Could she cope with losing her job? What was really most 
important for her? 
 To be effective in challenging problems, self-
understanding is crucial. You need to know what drives 
you. Is it anger? Self-esteem? Altruistic concern for others? 
 You need to know your own skills, namely what you 
can do and what you can’t do. You need to understand your 
capacity to win support through personal connections. 
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 You need to understand how tenacious you are, and 
what you’re willing and likely to do in a crisis. You need to 
understand how you’ll cope with reprisals, including when 
co-workers shun you, when you are denounced in media 
stories, when you receive abusive messages, when you lose 
you job and when your relationships come under stress. 
 Part of self-understanding is knowing your own 
personality. Are you calm, conscientious, agreeable, 
curious and open to new ideas? These all sound good, but it 
depends on the circumstances. If you’re excessively consci-
entious, you may be obsessive. If you’re too agreeable, you 
may not be able to stand up against the crowd. The point is 
that self-understanding is vital. 
 
I’ve outlined six important skills for anyone who wants to 
take action about problems in an organisation. Many of 
them are relevant for activism more widely. With these 
skills, workers can make better judgements about identify-
ing problems and knowing how best to go about addressing 
them. What is striking about the discourse about whistle-
blowing is how seldom anyone talks about skill develop-
ment as an approach to dealing with organisational 
dysfunctions. It’s as if the people in charge — in organisa-
tions, in government — were saying, “You don’t need to do 
anything except speak out. We’ll protect you.” One of the 
key skills needed by workers is to see that this implicit 
message is misleading and dangerous. 
 
Collective action 
In India, many public officials expect to receive a bribe in 
order to do their job, for example to process an application. 
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Campaigners in the anti-corruption group 5th Pillar decided 
to produce a consciousness-raising piece of currency, the 
zero-rupee note.26 It looks like a regular piece of currency 
except that it says zero rupees and gives the source as 5th 
Pillar, which is well known. The group produced large 
numbers of these notes in five languages and encouraged 
people to hand over one of the notes in situations where a 
bribe is expected or demanded, for example at weddings 
and birthdays.  
 As the name indicates, the zero-rupee note has no legal 
standing or value but it does convey a powerful message: 
“I’m not going to pay a bribe.” In nearly all cases reported 
to 5th Pillar, officials given one of the notes backed off from 
their demands for bribes. As the campaign developed, some 
services displayed zero-currency notes. This is a convenient 
way of saying that they do not expect or accept bribes. A 
reputation for honesty can be a powerful magnet. 
 The zero-rupee note is just one of 5th Pillar’s initia-
tives. Others include training citizens in making right-to-
information requests that help to hold public officials to 
account, running education workshops for young people, 
organising protest actions, holding information stalls, and 
cooperating with social service camps in rural areas. The 
aim is to broaden involvement in efforts against corruption.  
 
26 5th Pillar, Zero Rupee Note, 
https://5thpillar.org/programs/zero-rupee-note/, described as “a 
non-violent weapon of non-cooperation against corruption.” 
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 This example is taken from Shaazka Beyerle’s reveal-
ing book Curtailing Corruption.27 She studied anti-corrup-
tion campaigns in 15 different countries. The message from 
these campaigns is that collective action by local commu-
nities can be a powerful force against corruption, including 
in places where it is dangerous to oppose authorities. When 
the authorities are deeply implicated in corrupt activities, it 
is obviously futile to appeal to them to fix the problem.  
 Collective action has several advantages. It harnesses 
the skills of many different individuals, draws on a variety 
of personal networks, reduces the danger of reprisals 
against individuals, and provides inspiration for others. 
When collective action becomes widespread and persistent, 
it is possible to talk of a social movement, in the tradition 
of anti-slavery, feminist, peace and environmental move-
ments. If corruption is a serious problem, then the best 
antidote is an anti-corruption movement. 
 All of Beyerle’s examples are from so-called develop-
ing countries, not the affluent industrial or post-industrial 
societies of Europe, North America, Japan and Australasia. 
This does not mean corruption has been eliminated from 
these societies.  
 Beyerle’s treatment is especially important because 
there are remarkably few investigations into the power of 
collective action against corruption. Similarly, there is 
 
27 Shaazka Beyerle, Curtailing Corruption: People Power for 
Accountability and Justice (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014). 
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relatively little research into workers’ challenges to 
oppressive organisational structures.28 
 Whistleblowers, as isolated individuals, may be 
powerless to bring about change, but can do a lot more by 
providing assistance to action groups. Imagine a worker 
inside an energy company or a government immigration 
department who wants to challenge some of the paths being 
taken. Speaking out internally is one option, likely to be 
disastrous. More effective would be providing information 
and advice to an outside action group, doing this separately 
from the job. Depending on the circumstances, the dissident 
worker might remain anonymous, providing information 
and advice via encrypted emails or phone calls. 
 The combination of insiders and outsiders can be 
powerful. The insiders have information about what’s 
happening and about responses to campaigning efforts. The 
outsiders have much more freedom to act because they are 
relatively safe from reprisals. 
 
 
28 There is a body of writing about workers’ control. See for 
example Immanuel Ness and Dario Azzellini, eds., Ours to Master 
and to Own: Workers’ Control from the Commune to the Present 
(Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2011). Sociologist Deena 
Weinstein likened bureaucracies to authoritarian states, lacking 
freedom of speech and the right to form opposition movements. 
See Bureaucratic Opposition: Challenging Abuses at the 
Workplace (New York: Pergamon, 1979). For a nonviolent-action 
perspective, see Brian Martin, Sharon Callaghan and Chris Fox, 
Challenging Bureaucratic Elites (Wollongong: Schweik Action 
Wollongong, 1997). 
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There are at least four approaches for dealing with social 
problems, in particular problems in organisations, the ones 
most commonly encountered by whistleblowers. The first 
is whistleblower protection, the second is changing the 
culture of organisations, the third is skill development and 
the fourth is collective action. Looking at these options, it 
is striking that there is so much emphasis on whistleblower 
protection when it has such a poor track record. This is no 
surprise, because whistleblower protection keeps workers 
in a more dependent position. Changing the culture means 
empowering subordinates, and so do skill development and 
collective action. The message is there should be less 
reliance on official channels and more emphasis and effort 
towards empowering workers and citizens. 
 
 
Four options for challenging problems compared on a 
number of dimensions 
 
 Official 
channels 
Culture 
change 
Skill devel-
opment 
Collective 
action 
 
Justice 
provided 
by 
Official 
bodies 
Changed 
attitudes 
and be-
haviours 
 
Individual 
efforts 
Social 
action 
Locus of 
action 
Official 
bodies 
Organisa-
tion 
Employee Social 
movements 
 
Impor-
tance of 
evidence 
 
Great 
 
Low Great 
 
Moderate 
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Role of 
media 
Nonexistent 
or 
incidental 
Usually 
low 
Potentially 
large 
 
Supplemen-
tary 
Links to 
others in 
the same 
situation 
 
Not 
necessary or 
common 
Inherent 
in bring-
ing about 
change 
Important Inherent in 
bringing 
about 
change 
Biggest 
costs 
Lawyers; 
agency staff 
time 
Involve-
ment in 
change 
processes 
 
Employee’s 
time and 
effort 
Organising 
Timing After 
blowing the 
whistle 
When 
managers 
are open 
to change 
 
Preferably 
before 
taking 
action 
When op-
portunities 
arise 
Learning 
spin-offs 
Official 
bodies learn 
how to 
handle 
cases 
Managers 
and em-
ployees 
learn new 
ways of 
relating 
 
Employees 
learn how 
to take 
action 
Citizens 
learn how 
to act 
together 
 
Conclusion 
A worker reports some problem, something that serves the 
public interest. Instead of the problem being addressed, the 
worker becomes the target of reprisals, ranging from the 
silent treatment through to dismissal and blacklisting. Then 
the worker goes to some watchdog agency or other official 
avenue for relief: a hotline service, an ombudsman, an 
auditor-general, an anti-corruption agency, a politician or a 
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court. Sometimes the official channel is helpful, but often 
not. Even the most supportive agencies and processes are 
slow and focus on technicalities. Furthermore, even when 
they provide some redress for the whistleblower, hardly 
ever do they bring about change in the organisation. The 
drawn-out processes of whistleblower protection thus serve 
to prevent or delay action against the problem while giving 
the appearance that justice is being served. 
 Meanwhile, many dedicated members of watchdog 
agencies do what they can to help badly treated workers. 
But the capacity of agencies to fix deep-seated problems is 
limited. They are constrained by limited budgets, narrow 
mandates, and bureaucratic rules for processing complaints. 
 Whistleblower protection is the mantra from managers 
and politicians, taken up by journalists and hence many 
members of the public. The experience of whistleblowers, 
if noticed at all, is seen as evidence that protection needs to 
be improved. Decades of legislative attempts to improve 
protection have not been enough to make a great deal of 
difference, but rather than this triggering a rethink, past 
shortcomings are seen as the rationale for continuing down 
the same path.  
 A few critics have pointed out that there are inherent 
flaws in the idea of whistleblower protection. Corruption 
and other serious problems in organisations often implicate 
higher management as either perpetrators or as knowing 
bystanders. So it seems idealistic to imagine that higher 
management should be the ones to provide protection to 
those exposing wrongdoing. 
 More deeply, it is implausible that any mechanism can 
allow a lowly worker, with only truth on their side, to 
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overcome powerful managers. If such a mechanism became 
available, it would overturn organisational hierarchies. The 
whole system, which involves power inequalities and the 
associated corruptions of power, would be in jeopardy. This 
suggests that whistleblower protection, while good when it 
occasionally works, is inherently flawed. 
 The persistence of the belief in whistleblower protec-
tion might make sense if it were the only option. But it isn’t. 
Other options are changing organisational cultures, devel-
oping the skills of workers, and engaging in collective 
action. Each of these involves more power for workers. 
However, few managers want subordinates to be so 
empowered that they could challenge management. No 
wonder whistleblower protection is the desired option. 
 The lesson from the experience of whistleblowers is to 
be sceptical of official channels, and instead look to worker 
empowerment as a more promising path. 
 
Appendix: Perpetual complainers 
I have described how some whistleblowers seek justice 
through official channels. They might start by reporting a 
matter to their boss, then the boss’s boss, then the board of 
management, then outside bodies such as ombudsmen, 
auditors-general, anti-corruption agencies, administrative 
appeals tribunals, politicians and courts. Whistleblowers 
who go to one agency after another, never being satisfied, 
see the shortcomings of official channels.  
 However, there’s another sort of individual who does 
exactly the same thing, an individual who has a personal 
grievance that hardly anyone else thinks has merit. It might 
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be an imagined or mistaken issue. Some people are 
delusional. 
 Then there are those who start off with a real issue, but 
make it into something much too large. They are cheated 
out of a few hundred dollars and pursue the matter through 
successive courts. 
 How do you tell the difference between those who 
have raised a serious public-interest matter and those who 
are pursuing a mistaken or pointless quest? Aren’t official 
channels the ones entrusted to figure this out? 
 There’s no easy answer to this. One option is an 
independent assessment by someone with no stake in the 
matter. Even better would be multiple independent assess-
ments. After the company Enron went bankrupt in 2001, the 
consensus by informed observers was that top management 
was corrupt, so Enron vice president Sharron Watkins, who 
had reported problems to the CEO, was seen as a whistle-
blower. The judgement about whistleblowing is made 
through a collective process involving many observers. 
Sometimes this judgement is a long time coming. For 
example, in some cases involving paedophilia by members 
of the clergy, complaints were made at the time but nothing 
was done until decades later, after major exposés. 
 In contrast to these prominent examples are some 
other types. A homeowner is distressed when his neighbour 
builds a wall half a metre higher than allowed by regula-
tions. The homeowner puts in a complaint about his view 
being affected, but it is dismissed. (The application of the 
regulation is a matter of interpretation.) He then goes to an 
appeal body, which also dismisses his complaint. He next 
takes the matter to a court, and then to a higher court. 
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Eventually, frustrated by his lack of success, he puts a giant 
sign in his front yard accusing his neighbour of fraud and 
accusing higher authorities of being corrupt. After further 
escalation, the homeowner is arrested and charged with 
various offences. Decades later, the standoff continues. 
(This example is modelled on an actual case.) 
 An undergraduate student is dissatisfied with a mark 
on an assignment, requests reconsideration, and is given a 
slight increase. Then he questions his mark for participation 
in class and is unhappy with the result. Next he appeals his 
overall mark in the class and, when unsuccessful, appeals 
the decision based on process. Having an occasional 
success isn’t enough. He claims that he was misinformed 
about the requirements for a major and demands that an 
exemption be granted. Eventually, despite a poor record, he 
is allowed to graduate. Even that is not enough: he puts in 
an appeal to be recorded as having a double major. The 
academics involved with his case say that if he had put as 
much energy into his studies as into his complaints, he 
would have graduated sooner with higher marks. (This 
example is also modelled on an actual case.) 
 I’ve talked with quite a few individuals who are have 
tried every possible avenue of appeal. In a few cases, they 
had been unsuccessful in court and tried to appeal, but the 
upper court refused to hear their case. From the materials 
they sent me, I could understand why: their matters were 
fairly minor. The next step: they were going to appeal to the 
Privy Council in London, something possible in principle 
because the British monarch officially remains the monarch 
of Australia. I always advised against appealing to the Privy 
Council because it was a waste of time. What would the 
78     Official Channels 
Privy Council care about some trivial legal dispute in 
Australia? 
 I’ve talked with a few individuals who make sweeping 
allegations about corruption, naming individuals and 
expecting me, and others, to follow up. All I can do is refer 
them to my book Whistleblowing and perhaps make a few 
specific suggestions. Then I start receiving copies of emails 
sent to dozens of politicians, watchdog agencies and 
journalists — and the emails keep coming, for weeks or 
months. Sometimes, receiving numerous emails every day 
from the same individual, I set up a filter to send their 
emails to trash.  
 Imagine looking at these sorts of issues from the point 
of view of high-level authorities. A senior government 
bureaucrat is not going to want to bother about a neighbour 
dispute over an alleged variation in a building. A senior 
academic administrator will not want to be involved in a 
student complaint concerning a few marks on an assign-
ment. Politicians, ombudsman’s offices and journalists will 
not want to deal with repetitive emails making numerous 
allegations about corruption. 
 Perpetual complainers can take up much of the time of 
senior officials. These complainers are one reason why 
official channels are set up with complicated sets of rules. 
Unless there are ways to screen out or deal with these sorts 
of complainants, agencies would be overwhelmed by 
relatively few such individuals, leaving insufficient time 
and energy to deal with more important matters. 
 What is the most useful way to understand the 
relationship between official channels and perpetual 
complainers? The usual thinking is that these individuals 
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are responsible for a monumental waste of time and 
resources. They demand attention and divert efforts from 
more worthy issues. 
 Another perspective is that official channels are 
especially needed to deal with perpetual complainers, who 
are in a desperate but fruitless search for acknowledgement 
and support. Official channels provide a convenient way of 
justifying a judgement that the quest has little or no 
substance. If official channels were not available, these 
complainers would just bother others, and there would be 
no end to the process. Because official channels are slow 
and highly procedural, they are ideal for slowing down 
these complainers and trapping them in technicalities, 
dampening their ardour.  
 Yet another perspective is that official channels, by 
promising to provide justice, give false hope to perpetual 
complainers. If there were no appeal bodies, in other words 
no one to whom to make a formal complaint, these individ-
uals would have to address the issue closer to its source, or 
perhaps simply to set it aside and get on with their lives. 
This is speculative, because no studies have been done 
comparing communities with and without particular 
agencies to see whether complainants are more or less 
active. A plausible hypothesis is that complaints will 
increase or expand to fill the capacity of grievance systems. 
 Could it be that perpetual complainers are intention-
ally gumming up the system so genuine complainants do 
not obtain a fair hearing? Although perpetual complainers 
may be deluded about their cases and their chances of 
success, there is little evidence that they are cynical manip-
ulators of the system.  
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 Undoubtedly, perpetual complainers need help. When 
their complaints are serious and legitimate — according to 
some impartial judgement — they should be listened to. 
When their complaints are imaginary, misguided or grossly 
inflated, they need help to find more productive ways to 
spend their time and energy. This might involve counsel-
ling, friends, a supportive community or other outlets for 
their efforts. It might involve different rules and systems so 
that their initial grievance does not arise. It’s hard to 
propose a comprehensive solution because there are so 
many different sources of complaint. What is apparent is 
that the system is not working for them.  
3 
Sexual harassment 
 
 
From 1976 to 1985, I worked in Canberra at the Australian 
National University and became interested in dysfunctions 
of academic life. One of them was academic exploitation: 
some academics take credit for the work of their students, 
subordinates and wives. I read about a few cases and heard 
various stories. 
 One day in 1982 I was talking about this with a friend, 
Robert, who said he knew someone I should talk to. I did, 
on 2 December, the one and only time I met her. I’ll call her 
Kay and call the professor she worked for Hill. Here is an 
edited extract from my notes taken immediately afterwards. 
 
Kay did four years of an undergraduate degree, then 
worked as a research assistant with Professor Hill in 
1981. He was over 60 years old. She had a 25-hour per 
week job funded by a research grant. Hill has had these 
grants for years, but has never completed the work 
intended, and some of Kay’s work was on one of these 
old projects. Hill expected her to read up on subjects 
on which he knew little, and write up summaries so he 
could understand the subject (or she could just tell him 
what he needed to know). Apparently he hasn’t 
published anything for years. In many cases Hill is far 
out of date, but doesn’t want to read the material that 
is current, preferring Kay to do this for him. In other 
cases, he wants to present a particular perspective, and 
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asks Kay to find a quote to illustrate it. The same thing 
has happened to previous research assistants, but there 
is no indication that any of them will receive any 
scholarly credit.  
 All of this is tied up with sexual dynamics. The 
three-hour discussions are partly to enable Hill to 
enjoy female company, and he asks about her private 
life, in particular when she was breaking up with her 
husband, a masters student in the same department. 
Hill would tell Kay things her husband had said, and 
tell her husband things she had said, and actively 
encouraged their separation. Eventually he reached the 
stage of overt sexual proposition. At this, Kay decided 
to leave, but returned so she could receive all her 
salary and bonus in lieu of sick leave.  
 Hill had also used physical affection, for example 
hugging. This has been going on for years with 
students and research assistants. In one case a women 
became pregnant by Hill. He paid half the expenses for 
an abortion in Sydney (and naturally did not go along), 
and broke up the relationship afterward. Kay didn’t 
really consider doing anything about this, since 
undergraduates have complained for years, and noth-
ing has been done. Hill has been removed from the 
headship of the department, but continues his activities 
nevertheless. Women would have to speak out to 
expose him, and this might mean losing any oppor-
tunity for doing a PhD in the department. In other 
cases, although their careers are destroyed or diverted, 
they do not want to do anything to hurt Hill. It is clear 
that in this case academic exploitation is closely tied 
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up with sexual exploitation: the academic power 
hierarchy is congruent with male dominance.  
 
Kay’s story was about academic exploitation, but it 
included a sexual element. Was this sexual harassment? 
 Sexual harassment refers to actions such as leering, 
offensive jokes, unwanted touching, requests for sexual 
favours, rape and sexual assault. To determine whether 
behaviour should be called harassment, it is helpful to 
consider three criteria: sexual harassment is unwelcome, 
unsolicited and unreciprocated. 
 Sexual harassment has been occurring for a very long 
time, but for centuries it didn’t have a name. Many women 
simply put up with it and tried to avoid it, but there was no 
organised campaign to oppose it. Then in the 1970s came 
the second wave of the feminist movement. Women were 
empowered and spoke out about harassment at work. In the 
US, laws were passed. Sexual harassment was treated as a 
form of discrimination. 
 Most cases involve men harassing women, but there 
are other combinations: women by women, men by men 
and men by women. 
 The effects of sexual harassment can be severe. It can 
cause stress and drive some targets out of jobs and careers. 
Harassment has been especially bad in male-dominated 
occupations such as truck driving and engineering. 
 At a university, there are several situations of concern: 
interactions between teachers and students, between staff 
and staff, and between students and students. Sexual 
harassment occurs in all these relationships, but with some-
what different patterns and dynamics. Power differences 
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are often involved. For example, a teacher might seek 
sexual favours from a student in exchange for giving a good 
mark (“an A for a lay”). In student residential colleges, 
harassment of female students can sometimes be a sort of 
game.  
 One common problem occurs when an individual is 
not told that their behaviour is unwelcome. If a man touches 
a woman, it is often a sincere gesture of support or affec-
tion. If a woman finds the touch unwelcome, she needs to 
communicate this to the man, but sometimes doesn’t 
because it is awkward. A department head might lean over 
the secretary while she sits at the desk. She finds this 
uncomfortable but is reluctant to say anything because he is 
her boss. She might think that her body language — recoil-
ing at his touch or presence — is enough, but some men do 
not notice. 
 The aims of campaigning about sexual harassment 
have included helping targets gain understanding and skills 
to resist and complain and helping potential perpetrators 
become more aware of the implications of their behaviours. 
 There is a lot more that can be said about sexual 
harassment. My focus here is on what I learned about 
official channels. 
 After becoming more aware of the issue, in 1983 I 
joined with another member of my trade union, the Health 
& Research Employees Association, to undertake a survey 
of sexual harassment among members. Peta and I obtained 
quite a bit of information and wrote a report. In retrospect, 
the survey was as much about raising awareness as obtain-
ing information. 
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 The next year, 1984, sexual harassment came onto the 
official university agenda. There were two main orienta-
tions to sexual harassment, exemplified by the two commit-
tees that were set up. One committee, mainly composed of 
academics and administrative staff, worked on developing 
procedures for handling formal complaints. Later, it set up 
the panel that would receive and handle complaints, and 
arranged for training of the panel members. This committee 
was oriented to formal procedures. Its task was not easy. It 
needed to provide redress for harassment but also to provide 
procedural fairness for those complained about. The 
committee procedures required all parties to maintain 
confidentiality. There had to be an appeal process for 
complainants and defendants alike. 
 The other committee, of which I was a member, 
focused on raising awareness. This small committee was 
mainly composed of undergraduate students, research 
students and me as a research associate. We produced and 
distributed a leaflet, produced posters, wrote articles and 
gave talks. 
 The two committees epitomised the contrast between 
official channels and what might be called publicity or 
education. The official-channel committee was heavy with 
procedures and protections. It was based on the assumption 
that, once the committee’s existence was known, com-
plaints would come to it, and addressing these complaints 
would operate to address the problem. 
 The publicity committee was based on the assumption 
that the most effective way to address sexual harassment 
was through heightened awareness and skills throughout 
the university community. We set out to explain what 
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sexual harassment is, how it affects targets, and the 
importance of opposing it. Our message was designed for 
everyone, including targets, perpetrators and bystanders. 
We wanted staff and students to be aware of the problem, 
for potential harassers to rethink their behaviours and for 
possible targets to be aware of ways to respond. 
 Ideally, these two committees would be complemen-
tary. The publicity committee would stimulate awareness 
with the result that complaints would be made to the official 
committee. The existence of the official committee would 
provide reassurance that something could be done about 
harassment. 
 It’s not possible for me to provide any data about the 
effectiveness of these two committees. Members of each 
were each doing what we thought was important and no one 
was monitoring the impact of our efforts. So far as I know, 
the official committee received no formal complaints. 
 For many, perhaps most, targets of sexual harassment, 
making a formal complaint is highly stressful. Often, 
episodes of harassment are embarrassing. After all, they 
involve sexual matters, often humiliating. It is a further 
humiliation to describe these to others. Another obstacle is 
that many targets blame themselves, even though this might 
be illogical.  
 The reluctance of women to report sexual harassment 
is well known in the case of rape. Surveys show that a 
relatively small percentage of rape victims make reports to 
police, and fewer still end up testifying in court. When they 
do, and are vigorously cross-examined, they can find this as 
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distressing as the rape itself. The court experiences of rape 
survivors are sometimes called the “second assault.”1 
 For same-sex harassment, there is an additional com-
plication. Because of the stigma attached to homosexuality 
in some circles, making a formal report about harassment 
can reveal an aspect of one’s behaviour that would other-
wise remain private.  
 For men harassed by women, there is the risk that 
others will not take their concerns seriously. A common 
joke by men dismissive of sexual harassment is to say, “I 
wouldn’t mind being harassed by her!”  
 Some instances of sexual harassment are quite serious, 
enough to justify going to the police and making charges of 
rape or assault. However, behaviours in the majority of 
cases, such as continued touching, requests for sex, stalking 
and sending of pornographic materials, are not recognised 
as criminal. In quite a few cases, to make a formal 
complaint escalates the issue, potentially breaking down 
relationships at work or in the classroom and sometimes 
making things worse for the complainant. This is another 
 
1 Elizabeth A. Stanko, Intimate Intrusions: Women’s Experience 
of Male Violence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). 
Angela K. Lawson and Louise F. Fitzgerald, “Sexual harassment 
litigation: a road to re-victimization or recovery?” Psychological 
Injury and Law, vol. 9, 2016, pp. 216–229, reported that 
“participation and persistence in litigation played a consistent role 
in psychological outcomes across time, over and above the impact 
of harassment itself. However, litigation did not appear to be the 
cause of psychological outcomes as posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) symptomatology, in particular, was the result of the 
original harassment experience.” 
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reason why so many women and men report being sexually 
harassed but not making a formal complaint. 
 Another problem with formal procedures occurs when 
there is a malicious complaint. Quite a few men fear being 
charged with harassment even though they haven’t done 
anything. This occasionally happens, though it is rare. More 
common is that a misjudged touch or proposition is taken 
badly, a complaint is made, leading to a process that for the 
alleged perpetrator is lengthy, arduous and damaging. The 
formal process turns what might have been sorted out fairly 
easily into an something excruciating for all involved.  
 A deeper problem is that nearly all sexual harassment 
laws and procedures are complaint-based. If a complaint is 
made, it is addressed. If there is no complaint, nothing is 
done. There is no mechanism to ensure or even to determine 
whether the complaints are about the most serious prob-
lems. Ironically, targets who are more confident, articulate 
and secure in their positions are in a stronger position to 
make formal complaints. Those who are the most vulnera-
ble and powerless may be left without support. 
 
The two approaches 
To have two approaches to sexual harassment — proce-
dures for handling formal complaints, and publicity and 
education — seems sensible. I was always comfortable with 
there being these two approaches, which complement each 
other. Publicity and education can help discourage harass-
ment and empower possible targets, while formal proce-
dures can deal with serious cases and apply penalties for 
serious or persistent harassment. In addition, the formal 
procedures offer an important symbolic statement about the 
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institution’s stand against harassment. My own personal 
preference was with the publicity side, whereas others 
ensured the operation and credibility of the procedures. 
 What I have observed over the years, though, is a 
continual emphasis on formal procedures and a neglect of 
efforts for individual empowerment and cultural change. 
The implication, for me, is that more effort needs to be put 
into prevention compared to procedures for dealing with 
harassment complaints.  
 Because of my involvement with sexual harassment, I 
started reading whatever I could find about it. There are 
numerous books and articles about the extent of the 
problem, patterns within occupations and the driving forces 
behind harassment. When it came to what to do about it, I 
found numerous treatments of laws and procedures. In 
contrast, there was hardly anything written giving advice to 
women about the practicalities of dealing with harassment. 
The assumption in most writing is that they should make 
complaints so that someone else can address the problem. 
Here, I look at several books that, in contrast, focus on non-
institutional responses. 
 
Georgie Porgie 
Sue Wise and Liz Stanley are feminist researchers. They 
wrote a book titled Georgie Porgie: Sexual Harassment in 
Everyday Life, published in 1987.2 This was very early in 
 
2 Sue Wise and Liz Stanley, Georgie Porgie: Sexual Harassment 
in Everyday Life (London: Pandora Press, 1987). Today’s feminists 
might disagree with Wise and Stanley in some regards. My focus 
here is on insights their work provides about official channels. 
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the emergence of sexual harassment as a social issue. The 
title of the book refers to a nursery rhyme, reproduced on 
the front cover: 
 
Georgie Porgie, pudding and pie —  
kissed the girls and made them cry. 
When the boys came out to play 
Georgie Porgie ran away. 
 
Wise and Stanley’s basic theme is that sexual harassment 
has been defined in a narrow fashion that leaves out the 
harassment of women in everyday life: the Georgie Porgies 
of the world. They use an approach called the “archaeology 
of knowledge” to show how sexual harassment has been 
packaged in a framework that assumes it can be understood 
as occurring in workplaces, that it involves blatant acts, and 
that it can be addressed through formal mechanisms. They 
use anecdotes and arguments to focus attention on more 
commonplace forms of harassment and some practical 
ways of responding to them. 
 One of their examples is Peter Sutcliffe, known as the 
Yorkshire Ripper, a feared killer of 13 women in the period 
1975–1980. The attention given to the Yorkshire Ripper 
made it seem like sexual violence was something done only 
by unusual men. Wise and Stanley think this is misleading, 
drawing attention away from violence by ordinary men. 
They assert that sexual harassment is part of everyday life 
and that many women are doing effective things to oppose 
it. Salvation does not come through male-designed formal 
procedures. 
 
Sexual harassment     91 
 
… we think that women’s experiences show very 
clearly indeed that actual sexual harassments range 
from the most subtle and ambiguous male behaviours 
to the most obscenely and grossly grotesque; and that 
“sexual harassment” is simply what women’s experi-
ence of life within sexist society consists of for much 
of the time.3  
 
 Wise and Stanley describe four strategies against 
sexual harassment. The first is active resistance. In 1974, in 
California, Inez Garcia was raped by a man while another 
held her down. Soon after, she went after the men, shooting 
and killing one while failing to find the other. (She was 
initially convicted of murder and went to prison, then 
released on appeal.) Wise and Stanley use this example to 
illustrate that sexual violence can sometimes cause anger 
and trigger a fierce response.  
 A second strategy is “joining in,” which in practice 
means giving the harasser a dose of his own medicine. Here 
is one of Wise and Stanley’s examples: 
 
Some women employees at a jewellery factory had 
many problems with a “randy Romeo” businessman 
who dished out “smutty jokes and nudge-and-wink 
suggestions” all the time accompanied by much grab-
bing and grappling and pinching. They felt they had to 
put up with him because he commissioned a lot of 
business from the factory and was therefore important 
to their continued employment. But “revenge came at 
 
3 Ibid., p. 62. 
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an office party” to which he brought his wife. What 
the women did was spend the whole evening giving 
him a taste of his own medicine; they made lewd 
suggestions which were accompanied by many “sexy 
nudges,” and all very carefully arranged so as to be 
almost within earshot of his wife. Their plan to get 
their own back and teach him a lesson worked, and 
“now he is a changed fella” when he appears at the 
factory.4 
 
A third strategy is to ignore the harassment. This can be for 
any of several reasons, including being too busy with other 
priorities to bother, being too tired to respond, and deciding 
it is a safer option. When women are routinely harassed, it 
requires effort to oppose inappropriate behaviours. Further-
more, after a while this becomes boring. When someone 
tells a sexist joke, sometimes it is easier just to let it pass 
without comment.  
 Wise and Stanley tell of a time when one of them — 
they didn’t say which one — was on a train late at night. 
She was the only passenger in a carriage until a large man 
came in, sat near her and put his dirty feet on a seat. In other 
circumstances she might have challenged him but given his 
behaviour and demeanour she decided that ignoring his 
actions was the safer course of action. 
 Wise and Stanley’s fourth option is avoiding situations 
when harassment is likely. This includes not going into 
pubs where most patrons are drunken men, avoiding certain 
streets at night, and not drawing attention to yourself with 
 
4 Ibid., pp. 167–168. 
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provocative clothes. This option might seem like capitula-
tion to male domination. After all, feminists often assert 
that they should be able to go where they want and wear 
what they want without having to put up with men’s 
unwanted attention. Wise and Stanley, however, argue that 
often it is better for women to avoid risk. They tell about an 
Iranian friend who found voluntarily wearing the veil was 
liberating because it freed her of unwanted advances from 
men. 
 Wise and Stanley give an example from their own 
experience. They tell how they do not wear skirts, in part 
because trousers are more “practical and comfortable” and 
can make a statement in some circumstances, like a 
courtroom.  
 
But at least as important in this positive selection of 
clothing is the certain knowledge that a show of calf, 
no matter how fat and hairy, would lead to hassles 
from intruding male eyes and comments. Jeans and 
dungarees are therefore a deliberate avoidance strat-
egy and constrainment, as well as being a positive 
choice.5  
 
In summary, Wise and Stanley offer four strategies for 
dealing with sexual harassment in everyday life: actively 
resisting it; engaging in mimicking behaviour to neutralise 
it; ignoring it; and avoiding it. They see sexual harassment 
as a day-to-day occurrence for many women, and therefore 
routine methods are needed for dealing with it. Having 
 
5 Ibid., p. 172. 
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formal procedures for reporting harassment seems nice but 
is ineffectual or too burdensome for the bulk of harassment. 
The preoccupation with official channels can make people 
think the problem has been addressed and divert attention 
from skills and strategies that are far more relevant to 
women’s experiences. 
 
Back Off! 
In 1993, Martha Langelan’s book Back Off! was published.6 
I had been reading many books about the problem of sexual 
harassment and about laws and procedures. In contrast, 
Back Off! was a systematic presentation of techniques by 
which women can oppose harassers. Langelan describes 
verbal techniques of dealing with sexist and demeaning 
comments and collective action by women to confront 
harassers. This approach seems to have a lot of promise: it 
gives women skills and confidence to directly deal with 
harassment. 
 A key insight of the book is that simply standing up 
and opposing harassment is remarkably effective. Group 
actions are immensely powerful. Collecting information 
and building support are important. 
 Langelan describes three types of harassment, and in 
all cases harassment is a learned behaviour. Sexually 
predatory harassment involves seeking sexual thrills via 
the act of harassing, as in the cases of flashing and making 
obscene phone calls. Harassment via social media could fit 
into this category. Some predatory harassment involves 
 
6 Martha J. Langelan, Back Off! How to Confront and Stop Sexual 
Harassment and Harassers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
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sexual extortion, rape-testing (seeing whether a woman is 
likely to resist) and rape. 
 Male-dominance harassment is an attempt to bolster 
the harasser’s male ego. Men seek to “assert their status, 
and reassure themselves that their masculinity commands 
respect and female deference.” Langelan says that, accord-
ing to women’s accounts, this is the most common sort of 
sexual harassment. 
 Strategic harassment serves to maintain male privi-
lege in jobs, facilities and elsewhere. “At the crudest level, 
the goal of strategic harassment is to force women out, to 
protect a male monopoly on jobs, educational opportunities, 
community facilities, or other economic resources.”7 When 
a woman is successful in a male domain, for example as an 
electrician or a surgeon, she may be targeted with rumours 
or have her work sabotaged. 
 According to Langelan, most harassers don’t try to 
justify their actions. They just say it’s all in fun and doesn’t 
do any harm. Only a few aim to humiliate their targets. 
 Langelan traces the roots of resistance to sexual 
harassment to nonviolent action by women, the US civil 
rights movement and feminist self-defence theory. She 
presents four criteria from feminist self-defence theory that 
can be used to judge action against sexual harassment. 
 
1. Does it reflect the realities of women’s lives? 
2. Does it build on and expand women’s abilities? 
3. Does it widen women’s mobility? 
4. Does it aid independence? 
 
7 Ibid., p. 45 and pp. 48–49. 
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These criteria can readily be applied to different responses 
to harassment. Avoidance and passivity don’t satisfy the 
criteria, but confrontation does. Confrontation is an imme-
diate response. It can surprise the attacker and creates 
maximum effects for minimum effort. Langelan: “a woman 
who confronts a harasser goes directly to the abusive 
behavior, labels it publicly as harassment, and holds the 
man accountable for it.”8 Langelan’s guidelines for self-
defence are to be alert, trust your instincts, be prepared, rely 
on your own resources, yell for support and help others 
under attack.  
 With this framework, Langelan proceeds to describe 
success stories of resistance to harassment, including 
resistance by children, in the workplace, in male-dominated 
jobs, against construction workers and other public har-
assers, ministers, academics, landlords, muggers and 
rapists. She gives examples of men who are allies against 
harassment. She also tells of cases in which groups of 
women confronted harassers, to powerful effect. 
 In one example, Martina arrived at a bus stop and 
witnessed the only man there making comments to each of 
the women waiting, directly in their faces, such as “Hey, 
mama, hey, bitch, you look good, I sure would like to lick 
you …” She asked the women whether he was harassing 
them. After they nodded yes, she confidently stood up to 
him, looking him in the face, and said “Stop harassing 
women! I don’t like it, no woman likes it! You get out of 
here!” Countering his responses, she kept up, ever more 
 
8 Ibid., p. 106. 
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strongly, until he moved away. The women at the stop 
cheered, and the group had a short intense discussion of 
self-defence against harassment.9 
 Langelan gives dozens of examples, showing how it is 
possible to have an immediate and effective response to 
harassment. To undertake this sort of response is not easy 
or automatic. It greatly helps to have been through self-
defence training, just like Martina had.  
 
Why managers neglect skill development 
Why has Langelan’s approach been neglected by organisa-
tion managers when they are developing and implementing 
policy? There are several explanations. One is a reluctance 
to put the onus on women to address harassment, because 
this seems like blaming the victim. It seems like blaming 
women who are raped for dressing provocatively, drinking 
alcohol and walking outside late at night. Feminists for 
many years have argued that, rather than blaming women, 
men must take responsibility for their behaviour. 
 This is a good point. However, Langelan’s approach is 
not about blaming women but giving them confidence and 
skills. Yes, it encourages them to take responsibility. The 
implication of the admonition against blaming the victim is 
to provide training for men too, especially in how to 
intervene against harassment and support targets. 
 Another reason why organisation managers have not 
adopted Langelan’s approach is that it takes power out of 
the hands of managers. By being expected to rely on laws 
 
9 Ibid., pp. 230–231. 
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and procedures, women need to put their trust in the 
institution. 
 Laws and regulations provide protection for the organ-
isation. If harassment occurs and a women goes to court 
demanding compensation, she can sue individual harassers 
or the organisation for having a hostile environment. Man-
agers can defend charges against the organisation by saying 
that policies have been adopted, procedures are in place, 
notices have been sent to all staff and posters placed on 
walls. By setting up policies and procedures, the organisa-
tion reduces its legal liability. It doesn’t matter all that much 
whether the policies and procedures are actually effective. 
What counts is that they are visible in case there is a 
complaint.  
 Grievance procedures are an easy option for adminis-
trators because they do not entail cultural change in the 
organisation. However, cultural change may be just what is 
needed. Carol Bacchi says that sexual harassment proce-
dures tend to place the responsibility for using them on 
individuals, yet when they do use them, they are put in the 
position of being attackers, of being complainers. Mean-
while, there seems to be no need to address cultures that 
facilitate harassment. Bacchi argues that some ways to 
change the usual masculine university culture and the 
power imbalance that underpins sexual harassment include 
increasing women’s representation throughout university 
structures, improving child care facilities, including more 
content on women in curricula, addressing the way peda-
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gogic practices affect women, and reviewing staff-student 
relationships.10 
 
Heterophobia 
Daphne Patai, in her book Heterophobia, provides a very 
different perspective on sexual harassment.11 As she 
describes in the preface, she is no stranger to harassment, 
having been pawed and propositioned on numerous occa-
sions, in several countries. While not dismissing these 
experiences as trivial, she nevertheless didn’t let them 
affect her too much. 
 Patai identifies as a feminist, but as a feminist who 
challenges what she calls the “sexual harassment industry.” 
She decries the way that the institutionalisation of sexual 
harassment rules has turned many organisations into no-
touch zones where men (and some women) are terrified that 
an incorrect gesture or word might bring down the wrath of 
some offended woman, leading to investigations and penal-
ties. She also decries the impact of the alarm about sexual 
harassment on many woman, making them think of them-
selves as victims or “survivors,” as if they had survived a 
major disaster. 
 
10 Carol Bacchi, “Changing the sexual harassment agenda,” in 
Moira Gatens and Alison Mackinnon, eds., Gender and Insti-
tutions: Welfare, Work and Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 75–89. See also Carol Lee Bacchi, 
Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems 
(London: Sage, 1999), chapter 10. 
11 Daphne Patai, Heterophobia: Sexual Harassment and the 
Future of Feminism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). 
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 Patai is aware that rape and sexual assault are major 
problems. Her concern is with forms of harassment not 
deemed criminal and the way that procedures for dealing 
with harassment have become tools in power struggles. Her 
argument is that the sexual harassment industry has been 
turned into an operation that is anti-male and anti-
heterosexual, hence the title of her book, Heterophobia.  
 Her main focus is on university campuses, where she 
sees these dynamics in starkest form. Most of her examples 
are from the US and may not be relevant elsewhere. Some 
of the examples are revealing. A non-criminal matter 
between two individuals becomes, after complaint proce-
dures are invoked, a major issue, sometimes leading to dras-
tic consequences for the alleged harasser, most commonly 
a man. Patai raises the issue of false allegations of sexual 
harassment, something she says is seldom addressed in 
feminist writings on the topic. 
 Patai’s perspective is open to question, of course. 
Here, I don’t propose to try to sort through the arguments 
pro and con, but only to comment on the implications of 
Patai’s views for understanding the role of official 
channels.  
 What Patai calls the sexual harassment industry is 
essentially the institutionalisation of the official-channel 
response to a social problem. Patai points to an important 
issue that is seldom mentioned in other accounts: that 
formal processes can have damaging impacts. One impact 
is that relationships between people in organisations, and 
beyond, are continually on edge because of the risk of being 
accused of harassment. Another is escalation of minor 
incidents into major issues. Then there is the encourage-
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ment for women to think of themselves as victims or 
survivors rather than as powerful. Yet another impact is that 
feminism is discredited because of the excesses of the 
sexual harassment industry. 
 Even without agreeing with all of Patai’s arguments, 
it’s possible to recognise that official channels can have 
damaging impacts. These need to be taken into account. 
More importantly, it’s worth looking into alternatives.  
 
The Revolution Starts at Home 
Consider this story. In a small town in Oklahoma, a highly 
conservative US state, there is a factory. Most of the 
workers are immigrant women without good English, and 
many of them are undocumented. 
 Their problem is sexual harassment, assault and rape 
by local men. The women fear going to the police because 
they may be deported. Furthermore, many members of the 
local community are racist, so the prospects for sympathy 
are limited. This is a situation in which the official channels 
won’t work, and their likely failure is apparent to all. 
 This situation comes to the notice of a social justice 
group, MataHari. A young trainee in the group documents 
the problem and takes the issue to a meeting of representa-
tives of several national advocacy organisations. After 
explaining the issues, the trainee and her ally are horrified 
that the discussion turns to how to organise the workers for 
better pay. The national organisations are so oriented to 
pushing for equal pay that they cannot focus on the more 
pressing issue of sexual assault. 
 In this case, there was the failure of a different sort of 
official channel: higher-level advocacy organisations. In 
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are not responsive to issues with which they have limited 
experience. 
 This story is one of many in the book The Revolution 
Starts at Home: Confronting Intimate Violence within 
Activist Communities. It is an edited collection of accounts 
of US activists dealing with abuse, exploitation and 
violence within their own ranks, and of groups developing 
their own ways of handling problems.12 
 Another case described in the book involved a couple. 
The man was a prominent figure in an ethnic community in 
the US. In the midst of a dispute between the couple, their 
son called the police. The wife, with poor English, was 
unable to clearly explain her position. The husband, a suave 
and articulate operator, blamed events on his wife, who was 
taken away in handcuffs. She would have been almost 
totally helpless except for a support network mobilised to 
provide legal and personal assistance, through court cases 
about assault (the charges against her were dismissed) and 
custody of the children (she lost). 
 When a group of women organise a feminist collec-
tive, it is typically designed to provide support for mem-
bers, for example to address discrimination, exploitation 
and harassment. But what should members do when these 
same problems occur inside the group, for example when 
one member is abusive, manipulative and violent with 
 
12 Ching-In Chen, Jai Dulani and Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-
Samarasinha, eds., The Revolution Starts at Home: Confronting 
Intimate Violence within Activist Communities, 2nd edition (Chico, 
CA: AK Press, 2016). 
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partners? They all know that reporting problems to the 
police or other agencies is unlikely to be effective. Further-
more, being committed to feminism, they are worried that 
speaking out about internal problems may hurt the cause. 
This situation has led some groups to seek other ways of 
responding. 
 Within activist communities, marginalised and stig-
matised groups — including women, queers, transsexuals, 
immigrants, ethnic minorities, sex workers, people with 
disabilities, and Native Americans — are especially vulner-
able to abuse, yet cannot reliably turn to authorities for help, 
because the authorities (especially police) are unsympa-
thetic and may take action against the complainant. Further-
more, when the abusers are part of the same community, 
reporting them to the police may lead to arrest or deporta-
tion of the abusers — yet they too have suffered in their 
circumstances. In this situation, targets of violence (called 
here survivors) have to develop their own methods of 
coping. An important method is collective support and 
action, helping survivors and occasionally dealing with 
perpetrators.  
 However, this isn’t easy, not least because intimate 
violence committed by activist comrades is covered up: “… 
domestic and sexual violence is a prevalent cancer, weak-
ening, limiting, and threatening to destroy our social justice 
movements. We know anecdotally that when it becomes 
known that intimate violence has been perpetrated by our 
activist comrades and committed within our activist 
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communities, silence, denial, and organizational and 
community self-protection often rise to the forefront.”13 
 The movement against violence within US activist 
communities has been influenced by anti-prison activists. 
There is an enormous prison population in the US, the high-
est in the world per capita, and there is a prison-abolition 
movement that challenges what is called the prison-
industrial complex. This abolition movement encourages a 
view that activist and marginalised communities are under 
threat from authorities, and therefore should not be relying 
on official systems to address their internal problems. 
 The keys to activist communities doing this are 
awareness of problems and collective support for survivors. 
The challenge is enormous. Although official channels — 
including police, courts and large NGOs — are often 
ineffective or part of the problem, they have established 
procedures and people experienced in using them. Some 
activist networks set up their own processes for dealing 
with intimate violence, using principles of restorative 
justice. Yet, as described in some of the accounts in The 
Revolution Starts at Home, activist alternatives are not 
necessarily effective or reliable. Just because you’re not 
using a flawed official system doesn’t mean everything is 
rosy. 
 The inspirational aspect is that there is hope in collec-
tive action, and some important successes. That is more 
than occurred before, when intimate violence within activ-
 
13 Meiver De la Cruz and Carol Gomez, “Ending oppression: 
building solidarity. Creating community solutions”, in Chen et al., 
pp. 24–55, at p. 27. 
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ist communities was covered up or, when reported to 
authorities, the cause of damage. 
 One of the implications of the accounts in the book is 
that neither official channels nor alternative processes are a 
full solution. The deeper problems are the inequalities, 
exploitation and systemic oppression in the wider society. 
Looking specifically at sexual abuse, there is no fundamen-
tal solution while social institutions based on systems of 
domination remain dominant. 
 
Harassment online 
With the advent of the Internet and social media, harass-
ment moved online — in a big way. Targets receive abusive 
messages, that they are ugly, useless and should be raped 
and murdered. Some attacks come from a single individual. 
Others involve a mob. 
 Some people say, “Words can’t hurt you. Just delete 
the messages and get over it. Don’t turn on social media.” 
That sounds plausible on a superficial level, but is totally 
unrealistic in practice. 
 One of the attack techniques is called doxxing. It 
involves posting personal details — name, address, phone 
numbers, employer, details about family members — and 
encouraging others to join in harassment. Another attack 
technique is posting “non-consensual intimate images” 
(NCII), sometimes called reverse porn: the attacker uploads 
photos or videos of nudity or sexual activity. The target 
might or might not have agreed to having the images taken, 
but definitely did not agree to posting them online. Yet 
another technique is to hack into someone’s accounts and 
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send messages and make posts that seem to come from 
them. 
 Imagine this. Your ex-partner initiates a vendetta 
against you. He posts a rant accusing you of vile behaviour 
and convinces a whole group to join in an attack. Some of 
the attackers hack into your email account and send nude 
photos of you to your family members and your colleagues 
at work. Half of the calls you receive on your phone are 
abusive threats to rape and murder. Manufactured claims 
about you are sent to your employer. Your family members 
also receive abusive messages. Anyone who stands up for 
you on social media is subjected to the same treatment. 
Their family members are targeted. 
 You are scheduled to speak at a conference. The 
attackers say they are going to kill you at the conference. 
You think this is unlikely, but you can’t be sure that one of 
the unhinged members in the mob might actually attempt 
murder. 
 In the US, there’s an attack technique called 
SWATting. An attacker calls the police and says that there 
is a hostage situation, or a big drug operation, at your house. 
The police sent a heavily armed SWAT team to your home. 
There’s no knocking on the door. People in the house are 
assumed to be involved in dangerous criminal activity and 
treated accordingly. It is a terrifying experience.  
 Meanwhile, the attackers think you deserve it. They 
are just having fun. Fooling the police to send a SWAT 
team is a success for them. 
 Who are the targets? Anyone, potentially, but some 
sorts of people are especially likely to be harassed. Any 
woman who becomes prominent, especially in a domain 
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that men consider theirs, is a prime target. So is any promi-
nent person who is openly lesbian, gay, transgender, ethnic 
minority, disabled … Then there are individuals who are 
not prominent who are targeted by an antagonist who is 
envious, offended or otherwise aggrieved.  
 Some attacks are limited and brief. Others develop a 
momentum, with new participants in the mob, so that 
attacks continue for years.  
 Harassment online is not always sexual harassment, 
just like harassment offline is not always sexual harass-
ment. On the other hand, most sexual harassment in the 
Internet age involves some online component.  
 There is much more that could be said about online 
harassment. Here I focus on the role of official channels. 
There are various official channels to which a target might 
appeal for remedies, including the police, social media 
companies, and politicians. A number of writers who have 
studied the problem in depth, with a focus on harassment of 
women by men, have examined the role of official 
channels. 
 Danielle Keats Citron is a US lawyer who has written 
extensively about online abuse. Her 2014 book Hate Speech 
in Cyberspace is a superb treatment of online harassment. 
She describes the problem and looks especially at legal 
options. Among other things, she says targets of cyber 
mobbing seldom go to the police because they expect not to 
receive support, and they’re right. Police may not have 
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sufficient training to give appropriate advice, or lack skills 
to track down perpetrators, or find it’s all too difficult.14 
 Bailey Poland, who was an online target, wrote the 
book Haters. It is a comprehensive treatment of cyberhar-
assment, covering the problem, major cases, rationales for 
harassment (and counters to them), impacts on targets, 
Poland’s own personal experience, shortcomings of official 
channels, and insights from cyberfeminists on responding. 
She writes that reporting abuse online is a thankless task 
because either the process is so automated as to be useless 
or there’s excessive work required to make a complaint.15 
About going to the police, Poland writes, “Local law 
enforcement agencies simply are not trained in how to 
respond to threats sent online — a threat sent via the mail 
or even made over the telephone is, at least, a known 
quantity. To many police officers, however, the Internet is 
a total mystery, threats are ephemeral, and they are unable 
or unwilling to do anything about it.”16 
 Emma Jane tells about misogyny online via her own 
experiences and via research findings, including her own. 
As an Australian journalist, she received hostile corre-
spondence for many years. In 1998, having included her 
email address with her articles, she started receiving grossly 
offensive messages, with rape and death threats/fantasies. 
At first she didn't know what to make of this but started 
 
14 Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 20. 
15 Bailey Poland, Haters: Harassment, Abuse, and Violence 
Online (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Press, 2016), p. 175. 
16 Ibid., p. 195. 
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saving the messages and gradually accumulated a huge file. 
There were great similarities in the messages: they threaten 
rape while calling the target a slut and ugly and even 
unrapeable. Many messages are internally contradictory.  
 Jane later became a researcher and wrote a number of 
insightful scholarly articles. Her book Misogyny Online 
provides the most graphic treatment of the sort of abuse 
women receive via the Internet. In a chapter titled “Epic 
institutional fails,” she describes how institutions have 
failed to deal adequately with online abuse. This includes 
police, policy-makers, corporations (especially those 
running social media) and academics.17 
 Zoë Quinn is a US video game developer. An ex-
partner of hers began a campaign against her that developed 
into the world’s most famous, or infamous, online abuse 
saga, called Gamergate. Quinn wrote a book, Crash 
Override, in which she tells her personal story and tells 
about her efforts to obtain relief and justice for herself and 
other online targets.18 
 Like other knowledgeable writers about online abuse, 
Quinn was frustrated with the failure of official channels. 
She had more experience than most. She went to the police, 
but that required enormous efforts for little result. She went 
to court to seek an order against harassment by her ex, but 
this turned out to be counterproductive because he used the 
 
17 Emma A. Jane, Misogyny Online: A Short (and Brutish) History 
(London: Sage, 2017), pp. 89–111. 
18 Zoë Quinn, Crash Override: How Gamergate (Nearly) 
Destroyed My Life, and How We Can Win the Fight against Online 
Hate (New York: PublicAffairs, 2017). 
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court process to interact with her more. She was trying to 
get him out of her life and the court interactions did the 
opposite.  
 By being the face of Gamergate, Quinn became 
prominent and so had access to tech companies. She found 
that they seemed sympathetic but their actions accom-
plished little. She even testified at the United Nations. 
Many authorities appeared to be concerned. But they 
weren’t taking the strong steps Quinn had hoped for. Maybe 
the authorities were content with appearing concerned, but 
not prepared to change their normal operations. 
 Quinn, in the space of a few years, had an intense 
personal experience of the failure of official channels. She 
writes: 
 
I appealed for help through official channels, early and 
often. I spent countless hours documenting everything 
that was happening in reports to tech platforms, only 
to be shrugged off. I talked to lawyers and took out 
restraining orders, only to find myself beating my head 
against the brick wall of a legal system ill-equipped to 
handle the idea that anything real happens on the 
internet. In courtrooms and judges’ chambers, I was 
told that my life online doesn’t really matter and that 
if I want to live without this treatment [harassment], I 
should abandon the career I worked so hard for and get 
offline.  
 
About companies such as Facebook and Google, she writes: 
 
When I started out as a newly hatched activist, I 
thought tech companies simply didn’t know how to 
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combat abuse on their platforms. I know now that they 
do know, or have the ability to learn, but the people in 
power who need to act just don’t care. The problem is 
not unique to tech; this apathy continues to be an 
unfortunate recurring theme in our interactions with 
other institutions. 
 
In summary, concerning police, legislators and corpora-
tions, she says: 
 
The longer I spent trying to change these systems from 
within, the more I found that they were constructed 
from the ground up to resist effective change. You can 
hear the same nonexcuses from people in power only 
so many times before realizing that they know how 
broken things are, and that they’re not going to 
change.19 
 
Because she became so well known, Quinn also heard from 
numerous others who were targeted online. Their experi-
ences were similar: massive abuse, highly damaging 
effects, and little support from authorities. 
 While never giving up on the possibility of change in 
the system, Quinn then decided on another option. She set 
up Crash Override, a network to support targets of online 
abuse. Much of the work, at least initially, was by Quinn 
and her ally Alex. 
 One of the most important supports provided by Crash 
Override was to help targets protect themselves online. 
Quinn would guide them through the steps needed to 
 
19 Ibid., pp. 19–20, 145 and 6. 
112     Official Channels 
change and improve their password protection, shut down 
accounts, make applications for demeaning images to be 
removed, and (if desired) prepare documentation for the 
police. This service was especially valuable in the initial 
stages of a mobbing attack, when targets often were so 
distraught that they found it difficult to think how best to 
respond. 
 Quinn knew all about the psychological impacts of 
persistent online harassment. As she recounts in her book, 
she was never particularly strong mentally, which is why 
the subtitle to Crash Override begins How Gamergate 
(Nearly) Destroyed My Life. One of the great benefits of the 
Crash Override support network was the reassurance that 
someone understood and cared about what was happening. 
 Crash Override, born out of abuse, is an alternative or 
supplement to official channels. It provides practical 
advice, helping clients to protect themselves and helping 
them acquire skills. It also provides the immensely 
important psychological support possible from others who 
have a detailed knowledge of the dynamics of online hate. 
Such support is rare within police, courts and tech compa-
nies — they are unlikely to have come under serious attack. 
 Some of the advice provided by Crash Override is 
about how to deal with official channels. For example, 
Quinn says that if you’re under attack and there is a risk of 
being SWATted, then it can be worthwhile contacting the 
police beforehand. But, she says, don’t mention the 
Internet, which can make them switch off. Instead, just ask 
them to be wary if they receive a call about nefarious 
dealings at a particular address: it might be a prank. 
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 Quinn is quite aware that Crash Override and similar 
support networks are not the full solution. They do not 
change the social and technical systems that give rise to 
online abuse. Ultimately, she hopes for cultural change. Her 
efforts to raise awareness, to talk to authorities and to 
support targets of abuse are just part of the wider change 
she sees as necessary. 
 
Conclusion 
Sexual harassment is a longstanding problem. Women, and 
some men, are harassed as an exercise involving power and 
sex. With the rise of the second-wave feminist movement, 
sexual harassment was named and stigmatised, yet in many 
places it continued. 
 In universities and many other workplaces, the 
primary means of addressing sexual harassment has been 
policies. However, complaint procedures are cumbersome 
and slow, and using them can make interactions more toxic. 
Also, as in the case of courts and rape, the procedures can 
be traumatising. So, despite formal procedures being avail-
able, few women make complaints. This suggests the 
procedures simply do not work very well. They are a 
symbol of the institution’s concern, but the symbol may not 
be an accurate representation of on-the-ground reality. 
 It is widely said that what needs to change is culture: 
organisational culture and the wider culture of interpersonal 
relationships. Undoubtedly there has been considerable 
change. Publicity about abuses plays a powerful role. 
 As well as gradual cultural change, there is a role for 
empowerment of individuals and groups. Individuals — 
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possible targets and bystanders20 — can learn skills in 
recognising harassing behaviours, warding them off, docu-
menting ongoing problems and working with others in a 
collective response.  
 
Postscript: #MeToo 
How does #MeToo relate to official channels? 
 In 2017, Hollywood actresses spoke out about sexual 
harassment and exploitation by movie mogul Harvey 
Weinstein. The initial claims triggered an outpouring of 
allegations. It was as if permission had been granted to 
speak out about something that had long been known to 
insiders but never openly challenged. This unleashing of 
willingness to name harassers spilled out across the country 
and the world and became identified by the Twitter handle 
#MeToo. 
 Although there had been laws against sexual harass-
ment for decades, it seemed that nothing had changed. 
#MeToo did change one thing: awareness that women were 
more willing to do something about it. 
 #MeToo showed the failure of official channels. If 
they had been working, more specifically if they had been 
 
20 On the value of bystander training, see for example Victoria L. 
Banyard, Elizabethe G. Plante and Mary M. Moynihan, “Bystander 
education: bringing a broader community perspective to sexual 
violence prevention,” Journal of Community Psychology, vol. 32, 
no. 1, 2004, pp. 61–79; Ann L. Coker et al., “Evaluation of the 
Green Dot bystander intervention to reduce interpersonal violence 
among college students across three campuses,” Violence Against 
Women, vol. 21, no. 12, December 2015, pp. 1507–1527. 
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effective in changing cultures of entitlement and harass-
ment, #MeToo would have been unnecessary. 
 #MeToo showed the power of collective action. 
Initially just a few women spoke out; this empowered 
others to do the same. There was power in numbers. One 
allegation might be dismissed, but a dozen were too many 
to ignore. In addition, many of those speaking out were 
prominent actresses. Their fame gave credibility and 
visibility to their claims. 
 The focus of #MeToo was on taking down perpetra-
tors. There was relatively little attention given to sharing 
the skills of those who had successfully resisted. 
 A damaging side effect of #MeToo was trial by 
allegation and by media. Some men may have deserved to 
be discredited, but the media’s feeding frenzy for stories 
about prominent harassers opened the door to a highly 
erratic set of claims and formal charges. Because the 
problems had not been addressed for so long, there was no 
consistency when the bubble of impunity finally burst. 
Critics of #MeToo could legitimately argue that media 
discrediting, without formal procedures, was unfair. 
 One positive effect of #MeToo — though this remains 
to be evaluated fully — is a change in culture. When women 
(and men) feel empowered to speak out and resist abuse, 
potential perpetrators were deterred. 
 Whether this applies outside high-profile arenas is 
unknown. Some targets of harassment, in organisations and 
venues out of the public eye, might feel they will have 
support if they make a complaint. Will they?  
4 
Plagiarism 
 
 
Official procedures for dealing with plagiarism have toxic 
effects when applied to students but are feeble when applied 
to powerful individuals. 
 Lord Acton famously wrote, “Power tends to corrupt 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Imagine a young 
student Chris, in high school, assigned to write an essay on 
power. Chris, not knowing any better, simply copies 
Acton’s sentence, including it in the essay without any 
quotation marks or any indication that it was originally 
written by Acton. As a result, it would seem to a reader — 
one unfamiliar with the quote — that it was Chris’s original 
idea. A reader familiar with the quote will realise that Chris 
copied the sentence and failed to give a suitable acknowl-
edgement. 
 In scholarly writing, it is considered important to give 
acknowledgement to authors whose writings and ideas are 
used. Chris didn’t give a suitable acknowledgement and is 
technically guilty of plagiarism, a failure to give such an 
acknowledgement. 
 Using Acton’s sentence is an example of word-for-
word plagiarism, the type that is easiest to identify. Suppose 
Chris wrote (without quotes), “Power corrupts and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely.” This draws on Acton, but is not 
an accurate quote. (Actually, it is a very common 
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misquote.) It also counts as plagiarism, because it is too 
close to the original. 
 Suppose Chris writes (without quotes), “A little bit of 
power corrupts, more power corrupts more, and over-
whelming power corrupts the most.” This is a quite 
different wording than Acton’s original, so it avoids word-
for-word plagiarism. However, it draws on Acton’s ideas, 
so it counts as plagiarism if Acton is not mentioned. It is 
plagiarism of ideas: taking the ideas of another writer and 
using them as if they were your own original ideas. A 
correct way to make this statement would be “Developing 
Lord Acton’s aphorism, it might be said that a little bit of 
power corrupts, more power corrupts more, and over-
whelming power corrupts the most.” 
 When Chris grows up and becomes an academic, it 
would be possible, in an academic treatment of power, to 
reproduce Acton’s statement without mentioning Acton, 
because it can be assumed that readers know it’s by Acton, 
so explicit acknowledgement is not needed. Still, academics 
will usually put the sentence in quotes or otherwise make it 
clear they realise it is not their own original formulation. 
 These examples show that giving appropriate 
acknowledgement is not easy or automatic. It is a practice 
based on scholarly conventions, often involving considera-
ble subtlety. It is a practice that needs to be learned, 
analogously to the way that table manners are learned. The 
correct way to acknowledge texts and ideas depends on the 
circumstances, such as the venue and likely readers. Even 
experienced writers can make mistakes in giving acknowl-
edgements. 
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 In writing, there are many conventions and expecta-
tions, varying somewhat according to the genre and con-
text. In scholarly writing, there are quite a few different 
referencing styles, ways of constructing sentences and 
approaches to structuring an article. For example, in some 
fields it is conventional to include, at the beginning of an 
article, an abstract, which is a summary of what’s in the 
article, and then to have a number of sections with headings. 
In essay style, there is no abstract and sometimes no 
sections. How to write in the appropriate style in a field 
needs to be learned. 
 Acknowledging sources is just one of the things to be 
learned, and would not be a very important issue except for 
one thing: it carries a heavy moral component. In the minds 
of many academics and others, not giving appropriate 
acknowledgement for the use of others’ words and ideas is 
seen as a serious transgression, as a mortal sin. It has a 
special name: plagiarism. It is often treated as equivalent to 
cheating.  
 In universities, students are warned against plagiarism. 
Serious penalties can be imposed, including given no credit 
for an assignment, failing a course or even being expelled. 
This is a heavy burden for some students who never learned 
conventions for referencing and quotation. 
 
Two approaches 
There are two contrasting approaches to plagiarism by 
students.1 One is the learning approach, in which copying 
 
1 There is a huge amount of research and commentary about 
student plagiarism, as well as a smaller amount about plagiarism in 
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of text without proper acknowledgement is seen as a 
problem to be rectified by learning the correct way to do 
things. In Australia, this is especially seen as an issue for 
international students from countries where it is believed 
there is more emphasis on repeating the ideas of the teacher 
and less on having original ideas, so that copying the words 
 
other arenas. Furthermore, plagiarism is just one aspect of a wider 
domain called “academic integrity,” which includes studies of 
honour codes, motivations for cheating, the impacts of 
commercialisation of education, and policy development and 
implementation. For research in the area, see Tracey Bretag, ed., 
Handbook of Academic Integrity (Singapore: Springer, 2016). See 
also, for example, Judy Anderson, Plagiarism, Copyright Violation 
and Other Thefts of Intellectual Property: An Annotated 
Bibliography with a Lengthy Introduction (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 1998); David Callahan, The Cheating Culture: Why 
More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead (New York: 
Harcourt, 2004); Robert A. Harris, The Plagiarism Handbook: 
Strategies for Preventing, Detecting, and Dealing with Plagiarism 
(Los Angeles: Pyrczak Publishing, 2001); Rebecca Moore 
Howard, Standing in the Shadow of Giants: Plagiarists, Authors, 
Collaborators (Stamford, CT: Ablex, 1999); Marcel C. LaFollette, 
Stealing into Print: Fraud, Plagiarism, and Misconduct in 
Scientific Publishing (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1992); Thomas Mallon, Stolen Words: Forays into the 
Origins and Ravages of Plagiarism (New York: Ticknor and 
Fields, 1989); Wendy Sutherland-Smith, Plagiarism, the Internet 
and Student Learning: Improving Academic Integrity (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). In the context of the vast amount of research and 
writing in this area, my treatment here is intended is illustrate a 
perspective on the role of official channels, namely formal 
processes for dealing with plagiarism. 
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of esteemed writers is seen as obeisance rather than 
stealing. A cultural shift is required.  
 In the learning approach, acknowledgement practice is 
taught as a craft or convention, and shortcomings are dealt 
with as matters to be addressed until the correct methods 
are followed. If a student hands in an assignment that 
contains paragraphs copied from a text without attribution, 
the student is shown how to paraphrase the text and give a 
citation, and this process is repeated until the assignment is 
satisfactory.  
 The second approach to plagiarism is punitive. Harsh 
penalties are applied to assignments containing significant 
passages not correctly acknowledged. For example, the 
assignment might be given a mark of zero. In serious cases, 
a formal process is initiated that potentially can lead to 
disciplinary action. 
  
Detecting plagiarism 
To implement the punishments, it is necessary to detect and 
document instances of plagiarism. In years gone by, before 
the Internet, teachers would act on their suspicions. If much 
of an essay was poorly written but some paragraphs were 
eloquent and sophisticated by comparison, copying was 
suspected and a search would begin for the source of the 
well-written paragraphs. If such a source could be found, it 
would provide proof of plagiarism. 
 These days, it is more common to search for sources 
online. One method is to paste a passage into Google and 
see if there is a source of the exact sequence of words. More 
systematically, there are now available several services, 
most prominently Turnitin, that enable searches of vast 
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databases looking for identical passages. These are 
sometimes called plagiarism checkers but they are better 
described as text-matching software. If there is a match 
between a paragraph in a student essay and a paragraph 
from Turnitin’s database, this might not be a problem. It 
might be that the student has explicitly quoted the 
paragraph and given a citation for the source.  
 In some classes, all assignments are put through 
Turnitin as a means of detecting plagiarism. One of the 
problems with using text-matching software is that it treats 
students as potential cheaters. A student, positioned as a 
cheater rather than as a learner, may decide to try to beat 
the system. It is certainly possible. 
 One of my colleagues, who does some tutoring of 
individuals, described the method some students use to 
write essays. They take a series of paragraphs from 
published works — hopefully relevant to the essay topic — 
and modify them so they aren’t exact quotes, for example 
by using the online thesaurus function to replace some 
words with synonyms. Another method is to run the 
paragraphs through Google translate into some other 
language and then back again (or perhaps into a third 
language first). This messes up the text, putting it into 
different words. Then it has to be edited to make it sound 
sensible. 
 This is an unfortunate perversion of the purpose of 
writing an essay, which is to develop a student’s capacity to 
understand the topic and to write text in their own words, 
without relying on published texts. When writing original 
material, I recommend doing it largely from memory, not 
having any published texts open at the time. This ensures 
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that none of what is written is copied from someone else’s 
writing. However, this is just a side benefit. The primary 
advantage of writing one’s own original words is that it 
develops thinking skills. Writing is a form of thinking. 
Using someone else’s text eliminates much of the valuable 
thinking that occurs during writing.  
 I’m not sure why some students originally start writing 
essays by taking published text and modifying it, but text-
matching systems to check for plagiarism can perpetuate it. 
The point of using a thesaurus to change some words or of 
translating text and then back again is to disguise the use of 
someone else’s writing: it is a way of fooling Turnitin. A 
better way of avoiding copying is to write original text, but 
somewhere along the way this is not learned. I have even 
met a few university graduates who use this method of 
starting with published text and modifying it so it is not 
quite the same as the original. 
 There is another way to fool Turnitin: purchase an 
essay written by someone else. Students can go online and 
order essays written to order, on specified topics and even 
at a requested grade level, because if an essay is too good, 
it might be suspicious. An advantage of purchasing an 
essay, from a student’s point of view, is that it will not show 
up as copied.2 
 Ironically, honest students who simply don’t under-
stand acknowledgement conventions are more likely to be 
accused of and penalised for plagiarism than students who 
cheat by purchasing essays. 
 
2 Buyer beware: some contract cheating companies attempt to 
blackmail students who buy their essays. 
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 Some teachers are kind and considerate and will try to 
help students to learn. When they discover that a student is 
copying text, they will offer opportunities to revise the 
assignment so that it is satisfactory in terms of originality 
and acknowledgements, without making students feel 
ashamed. However, other teachers take a more punitive 
approach, seeing plagiarism as evidence of cheating, 
especially when students are more advanced in their 
studies.  
 
Formal processes 
Being subject to formal processes for addressing plagiarism 
can be intimidating. A student may receive a written notice 
to attend a meeting at which they are confronted with 
concerns about their work. I have called a few such 
meetings and soon learned that they can be traumatising for 
students. Being accused of being a cheat is distressing and 
can make students break down in shame or become 
defensive. Whatever the response, it is unlikely to be 
conducive to learning. Depending on the student’s re-
sponse, there can be further stages in the process, perhaps 
involving a disciplinary committee. Some of my colleagues 
complain that the process is too soft: students may be let off 
lightly, claiming they didn’t understand requirements or 
giving some other excuse. However, the outcome of the 
formal processes is less important than the impact on both 
students and teachers. Not following the expected conven-
tions for writing, in particular in quotation and citation, are 
seen as disciplinary issues. Even for students who are not 
cheating, this can cause fear and inhibit learning. Teachers 
are put in the role of being cheat-detectors. 
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 Quite a few teachers dislike the formal procedures. 
Teachers who are not full-time permanent employees are 
seldom paid for the extra time and effort involved. The 
result is that many teachers will not bother filing formal 
complaints about plagiarism. The procedures can end up 
being symbols of institutional concern about cheating 
without doing much to address the problem. 
 Meanwhile, the existence of procedures to address pla-
giarism, because they seem to address the problem, do little 
to encourage creative approaches that help students learn. 
My own approach has been to try to design assignments that 
are both interesting and that make copying difficult. For 
example, I sometimes request that assignments be written 
in the form of a dialogue between two individuals, in the 
style of a play. This requires students to express their ideas 
in a format different from what is available in the usual 
writings on the topic. However, this does not prevent 
students submitting assignments written by friends or paid 
essay-writers. To deal with cases of suspected plagiarism, 
my course outlines state that I retain the option of request-
ing an additional oral examination on any assignment. 
However, I never felt the need to exercise this option.  
 Formal procedures for dealing with student plagiarism 
focus largely or exclusively on copying of words without 
proper acknowledgement. The related problem of present-
ing someone else’s ideas as one’s own, namely plagiarism 
of ideas, is seldom addressed. It might be argued that 
students aren’t often expected to have original ideas, but 
this is unfair. In some cases, students have thoughts original 
to them, even if they have been expressed by others previ-
ously. In any case, when a student draws on ideas from 
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published authors but doesn’t give proper acknowledge-
ment, this hardly ever leads to sanctions. The reason is that 
it is difficult to prove plagiarism of ideas, whereas proving 
word-for-word plagiarism is straightforward and relatively 
easy to document. This results in a curious inversion: 
plagiarism of text, which is often a fairly superficial type of 
copying, is prioritised over the more serious plagiarism of 
ideas. 
 One of the problems with mass education is classes so 
large that it is difficult for teachers to get to know all their 
students personally. Without personal knowledge, it is 
tempting to resort to text-matching and other schemes to 
detect cheating. Students who are treated as potential cheats 
then may feel it is fair to try to game the system. The goal 
of learning is displaced by the goal of getting passing 
grades, so the symbols of learning become more important 
than actual learning.  
 To pick just one study out of many that make the same 
point, consider a paper about the use of Turnitin at univer-
sities in South Africa.3 The authors examined policies at 
several universities and found wide variations between 
them. They also interviewed academics on plagiarism 
committees. What they found is that Turnitin was often 
used in a crude way, with text similarity scores used as 
surrogates for plagiarism, while education of students into 
proper acknowledgement practice was usually secondary. 
 
3 Amanda Mphahlele and Sioux McKenna, “The use of Turnitin in 
the higher education sector: decoding the myth,” Assessment & 
Evaluation in Higher Education, vol. 44, no. 7, 2019, pp. 1079–
1089. 
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Most policies gave far more attention to penalties for 
plagiarism than to ways to help students learn. The plagia-
rism policies sent the wrong message to students, suggest-
ing that their aim should be to reduce Turnitin similarity 
scores, which sometimes can be done by substituting 
synonyms for words used — and there is computer software 
that can do this. In short, policies ended up putting learning 
second to compliance with text-matching scores. 
 In this context, formal procedures may provide only an 
illusion of achieving educational goals. When applied, they 
can traumatise students who are not trying to cheat but who 
simply do not understand how to reference properly. In 
other cases, students know their assignments are improper 
but are nonetheless offended when they are caught and 
singled out for penalties when they know many classmates 
are doing the same thing. Meanwhile, anti-plagiarism 
policing can promote defensive styles of writing in which 
escaping alerts in text-matching checks becomes more 
important than developing a confident approach to writing. 
 
Institutionalised plagiarism 
So far, I’ve been describing problems with formal proce-
dures for dealing with student plagiarism. There is a related 
problem when it comes plagiarism by professionals such as 
academics, lawyers, politicians, doctors and judges.4 Proce-
dures often don’t work at all.  
 
4 Brian Martin, “Plagiarism, misrepresentation, and exploitation 
by established professionals: power and tactics,” in Tracey Bretag, 
ed., Handbook of Academic Integrity (Singapore: Springer, 2016), 
pp. 913–927. 
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 Consider the case of a university president who gives 
a talk or writes an article. Some presidents do their own 
work, but many rely on support staff to undertake research, 
prepare slides, and write speeches and articles. When a 
university president or other official gives a speech or is 
listed as the author of an article, and someone else prepared 
part or all of the text, this is plagiarism: the taking of the 
ideas of another and using them as one’s own. There are no 
penalties for this form of plagiarism. Instead, it is standard 
practice, sometimes seen as a double standard given that the 
same behaviours by students are treated as serious trans-
gressions. 
 Plagiarism by university presidents is one example of 
what has been called institutionalised or bureaucratic 
plagiarism.5 It is a feature of organisational hierarchies. In 
government departments, it is commonplace for top offi-
cials to sign their names to work done by subordinates. At 
a trivial level, a letter signed by a department head may 
actually have been written, in part or whole, by lower-level 
employees. The same thing happens in companies, in 
churches and many other organisations. Because it is stand-
ard practice, there are no procedures for dealing with 
institutionalised plagiarism.  
 Then there is “competitive plagiarism,” which can 
occur in domains in which credit for ideas is normally 
 
5 Brian Martin, “Plagiarism: a misplaced emphasis,” Journal of 
Information Ethics, vol. 3, no. 2, Fall 1994, pp. 36–47; Gavin 
Moodie, “Bureaucratic plagiarism,” Plagiary: Cross-Disciplinary 
Studies in Plagiarism, Fabrication, and Falsification, 2006, pp. 
66–69. 
128     Official Channels 
expected, such as scientific research and creative writing. 
Consider this scenario: you are a research student and have 
been giving drafts of your thesis chapters to your supervi-
sor. You and your supervisor attend a conference and you 
listen to your supervisor give a keynote address. Lo and 
behold, he uses your ideas and findings but never mentions 
your name. Or you are looking through a journal and 
discover an article authored by your supervisor, drawing on 
your research but only mentioning you in the acknowledge-
ments. Or you discover that a grant application draws on 
your work, but you aren’t mentioned in it. What do you do?6 
 You could raise your concerns with your supervisor, 
but that could be risky, because completing your degree 
depends on his support. If, after you’ve sought advice, you 
conclude that your supervisor has for years been exploiting 
research students and then not even helping them complete 
their degrees, you may decide to make a formal complaint. 
But to whom? There are no standard procedures to follow. 
You might write to the organisers of the conference where 
he gave the talk you heard, to the editor of the journal where 
his article appeared, or to the grant body where he submit-
ted his application. However, these are unlikely to address 
your concerns. They are not set up with investigatory 
powers and seldom have protocols for tackling plagiarism 
allegations. Furthermore, they may be unwilling to support 
a student against an established researcher, especially if he 
is prominent in the field.  
 
6 Brian Martin, “Countering supervisor exploitation,” Journal of 
Scholarly Publishing, vol. 45, no. 1, October 2013, pp. 74–86.  
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 You might approach senior administrators in your 
university. Good luck. They are unlikely to take action. 
Your supervisor can claim he is responsible for the ideas 
and findings, even though you know they are the result of 
your own efforts. After all, a supervisor is supposed to be 
providing guidance, which means being involved with the 
ideas. So it sounds plausible when the supervisor says that 
actually he had all the original ideas and that you were just 
incorporating them in your drafts. Having talked to a 
number of research students whose work has been 
expropriated by their supervisors, my impression is that 
hardly any of them make formal complaints and that even 
when they do, the response from university officials, 
journal editors and research grant administrators is seldom 
helpful. 
 Consider a different scenario. You are a published 
author and you discover that another author has used your 
ideas, but not your exact words, in their own stories. This 
wouldn’t bother you so much except that the other author is 
getting a lot of recognition for originality. What can you do 
about it? The answer is “very little.” If challenged, the other 
author can say that they developed the ideas independently. 
This is plausible because creators often have similar ideas. 
Because you know your work intimately, you are able to 
see the similarities, but they will not be so obvious to others. 
 Now imagine you are a scientist who has published a 
respectable number of papers. You submit a manuscript to 
a leading journal. The review process takes unusually long 
and then you are surprised to receive a rejection notice with 
picky comments from the reviewer. Meanwhile, an article 
appears in a rapid-publication journal presenting the key 
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ideas in your submission. Your research findings are no 
longer original and are more difficult to publish, and 
anyway the prior article will get nearly all the credit for the 
idea. You ask around and discover that the author of the 
published article, a prominent figure in the field, is 
suspected of being a repeat offender, taking ideas from 
submissions he reviews and publishing them quickly. What 
can you do? In one case I know about, the main response 
by scientists was to avoid this person: never send him 
articles in draft, never reveal new ideas at seminars he 
attended, and warn others about him. 
 To deal with the problem of “guest authorship” — 
when a scientist is made co-author of a paper despite having 
done little or nothing towards the research — some journals 
now require that authors sign a statement specifying what 
each co-author has contributed to a paper. Unfortunately, 
this process often gives only the appearance of overcoming 
the problem, because co-authors simply lie about the 
contributions of guest authors, thereby compounding the 
deception. Junior co-authors may do this to keep in good 
graces with senior figures with power over appointments 
and promotions. Few journals requiring co-author contribu-
tion statements have any reliable way of verifying their 
truth. The statements thus provide an illusion of protection, 
reducing the urgency of addressing the underlying power 
imbalances behind the problem. 
 Often the only way to effectively challenge plagiarism 
by professionals is through publicity. In a famous case, the 
Vice-Chancellor of Monash University, a major Australian 
university, was accused of plagiarism in writings going 
back decades. Reporting to the university’s governing body 
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did not produce any results. It was only after the allegations 
were taken to the mass media that the VC was pushed to 
resign.7 The implication is that official channels are 
unlikely to work unless prodded by publicity or the threat 
of publicity. 
 
Conclusion 
When writing, it is a courtesy to acknowledge the contribu-
tions of others who have come before. When using the ideas 
and words of others, there are conventions for the way to 
express acknowledgements. In the scholarly domain, these 
conventions can require time and effort to master. Failure 
to fully acknowledge prior work is commonplace. In many 
cases this simply represents lack of understanding. In some 
cases it is due to sloppiness or laziness. In a few cases it 
results from a conscious attempt to claim credit where it is 
not due. 
 Failure to follow acknowledgement conventions is 
given the label “plagiarism,” and has acquired severely 
negative connotations. For some, plagiarism is a grievous 
sin, in the same league as scientific fraud. The formal 
procedures for addressing plagiarism are a curious mixture 
of intimidation and omission. 
 Students who are just learning acknowledgement 
conventions are most likely to be guilty of plagiarism. A 
few of them are subject to accusations and penalties. 
Unfortunately, the punitive approach to plagiarism has 
 
7 Brian Martin, “Plagiarism struggles,” Plagiary: Cross-
Disciplinary Studies in Plagiarism, Fabrication and Falsification, 
vol. 3, 2008, https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/08plagiary.html. 
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several damaging consequences. It humiliates students who 
are accused and encourages a mentality of not getting 
caught. Text-matching software can pick up superficial 
copying but often misses the most serious method of cheat-
ing: buying essays. The worst consequence of the punitive 
approach is to trap students in poor ways of writing that 
limit its educational value. 
 Meanwhile, outside the student context, there are no 
formal penalties for plagiarism. When one author uses ideas 
from another, without acknowledgement, there is seldom 
any way to obtain redress. Only when text is copied can 
action be taken, but even then it can be difficult to get 
publishers to do anything. The most potent method of 
addressing this sort of plagiarism is publicity. The most 
common sort of plagiarism occurs in hierarchical organisa-
tions, when superiors take formal credit for the work of 
subordinates. This is treated as standard practice and is 
seldom stigmatised. It is not normally called plagiarism. 
 Consider three roads to improving appropriate 
acknowledgement practice. The first road is skill develop-
ment, which means helping people learn the conventions 
for giving acknowledgement for the work of others. The 
second road is changing cultures so good acknowledgement 
practice is valued and expected, and hence everyone feels it 
natural to aspire to best practice. The third road is relying 
on procedures for detecting and penalising plagiarism. 
 The downsides of the third road are many. Focusing 
on plagiarism detection positions students as cheaters, 
encouraging a mentality of beating the system. Worse than 
this, focusing on plagiarism undermines the alternatives of 
skill development and fostering a culture of respectful 
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acknowledgement. Finally, procedures against student pla-
giarism leave completely unaddressed the serious problem 
of institutional plagiarism: the most powerful plagiarisers 
escape censure, and indeed their actions are not even called 
plagiarism. 
 Imagine an alternative world in which students are 
trained both in how to give appropriate acknowledgements 
and in how to expose and confront institutionalised plagia-
rism. That would be a double whammy of skill develop-
ment, but one that would be threatening to many of those in 
positions of power. 
 What can be done about institutionalised plagiarism? 
A system-level approach is to promote egalitarian institu-
tions, with fewer power differences, but this has to be a 
long-term project. In the short term, it can be worthwhile to 
give credit to speechwriters and ghostwriters whenever 
possible, and to expose exploitation of the work of subordi-
nates. To do this, collective action is the safest option and 
usually the most effective. 
5 
Wikipedia 
 
 
Wikipedia, the online encyclopaedia, is a remarkable 
achievement. It is produced entirely by unpaid volunteers 
who add text and references, revise or delete previously 
posted text, and negotiate their disagreements. Within a few 
years of its creation, Wikipedia was larger than traditional 
encyclopaedias written by experts, and far more dynamic. 
In some current affairs, Wikipedia editing occurs more 
rapidly than mass media coverage. Wikipedia has versions 
in dozens of languages. It has become one of the most 
frequently visited sites on the web.1 
 Behind the scenes, however, there are problems. The 
idea behind Wikipedia is that the contributions of different 
editors will lead to information that is accurate and reliable, 
without serious biases. In many areas, where facts put out 
by authorities are hard to contest — like populations of 
cities or the atomic weights of elements — Wikipedia is 
usually quite reliable. Problems can arise, though, in areas 
 
1 On Wikipedia generally, see for example Dariusz Jemielniak, 
Common Knowledge? An Ethnography of Wikipedia (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); Andrew Lih, The Wikipedia 
Revolution: How a Bunch of Nobodies Created the World’s 
Greatest Encyclopedia (London: Aurum, 2009); Joseph M. Reagle, 
Jr., Good Faith Collaboration: The Culture of Wikipedia 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010); Nathaniel Tkacz, Wikipedia 
and the Politics of Openness (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015).  
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where there are disagreements about the importance of 
topics and the perspective from which they are approached. 
 Most people who read Wikipedia don’t bother with 
several of the tabs on each page. There is a “view history” 
tab through which you can look at every edit ever made on 
a page. There is a talk tab that allows you to look at discus-
sions among editors about a topic. Exploring these sides to 
Wikipedia reveals a landscape quite different from the 
calm, authoritative exterior. Wikipedia is not as easy to 
understand as it might seem at first. 
 Anyone can edit Wikipedia. All you have to do is click 
on the edit tab and make changes. You can set up an account 
if you wish, so there is continuity to your profile and edits. 
However, very few users of Wikipedia ever try to edit even 
a single entry. Those who do quickly learn that making 
lasting changes is not as easy as it might seem. 
 Most Wikipedia editors, including those with well-
established profiles, are anonymous, in the sense that they 
are not linked with a clear offline identity. Despite anonym-
ity, many editors put in large amounts of time and are proud 
of their contributions. Quite a few of them, in addition, have 
strong views about the topics they edit. This is a source of 
problems. 
 Think of a topic about which there is serious disagree-
ment, such as abortion, euthanasia, feminism, inequality, 
population control, socialism or vaccination. How can 
Wikipedia produce an entry that is accurate and impartial? 
It might be said that it is not possible to be impartial, so the 
most that could be done is to present different perspectives 
on a topic, each given appropriate space and fair treatment. 
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But obtaining agreement on appropriate space and fair 
treatment is not easy. 
 One consequence of disagreements on Wikipedia is 
editing wars. One editor adds a sentence to a page. Another 
one deletes it. The first editor adds it again. The second one 
deletes it again. Then other editors become involved. It can 
seem like a free-for-all. But it isn’t, because some editors 
have more power and authority than others. Experienced 
editors can be promoted to be administrators, and these 
admins can overrule lower-level editors. 
 
Peake’s story 
Bryce Peake was alarmed about incidents of sexual assault 
at the University of Oregon. He decided to help raise aware-
ness of the problem by setting up a Wikipedia page listing 
all US universities under investigation for sexual violence 
policy violations. After a great deal of effort investigating 
the issue and making changes to Wikipedia, within a few 
hours all his edits were reversed.2 
 Peake pursued the issue through Wikipedia talk pages. 
What he encountered was a sustained and sometimes 
vehement hostility to any content supportive of women or 
feminism. Peake was a white male, but this didn’t help his 
cause. He described what was happening on Wikipedia as 
the domination of anti-women viewpoints or, in his delight-
ful terminology, as “misogynist infopolitics.”  
 
2 Bryce Peake, “WP: THREATENING2MEN: misogynist 
infopolitics and the hegemony of the asshole consensus on English 
Wikipedia,” Ada: A Journal of Gender, New Media, and Society, 
Issue no. 7, 2015, https://adanewmedia.org/2015/04/issue7-peake/. 
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 Perhaps this was not surprising given that a large 
majority of Wikipedia editors, perhaps 80% or 90%, are 
male. But editors do not necessarily edit according to their 
demographics. Peake noted that information about alleged 
racism was quickly added to Wikipedia pages, without 
challenge, although most Wikipedia editors are white. 
However, information about alleged sexism was met with 
resistance. 
 The way in which content supportive of women or 
feminism was excluded was via the invocation of rules. 
Wikipedia has a great number of rules that editors are 
supposed to follow. A prominent one is to maintain a neu-
tral point of view (labelled WP:NPOV). Others are not to 
give too much emphasis to recent events (WP:RECENCY) 
and to use reliable sources (WP:RELIABLE). Each of these 
rules seems sensible, in the abstract. Trouble arises when 
rules are applied selectively in order to achieve a preferred 
outcome. 
 Peake encountered editors who referred to this rule or 
that rule, all to justify opposing his additions. But there was 
a double standard. These same rules weren’t applied to 
entries on other topics. The rules were tools of censorship, 
applied to edits disliked by the misogynist editors but not 
applied to other edits, even including their own. 
 Peake was dismayed to find that Wikipedia editors 
were not very concerned about reality, namely whether 
sexual assaults actually occurred. The editors instead 
focused on whether there were sources they could cite to 
support statements made in the text. For Wikipedia editors, 
what counts is not whether something actually happened 
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but whether there is a credible source they can cite to say 
that it happened. 
 Sexual assault has been occurring on university 
campuses for decades. However, for a long time it was 
largely undocumented. Only with the rise of the feminist 
movement did sexual harassment and assault become a 
public issue, and even then there were various processes 
that dimmed awareness. In response to Peake posting infor-
mation about sexual assault investigations on the Wikipedia 
pages of universities, editors justified removing the addi-
tions by citing policies, including that the information was 
not “defining” of the university (WP:UNDUE), came from 
an unreliable source (WP:RELIABLE) or was written in a 
seemingly biased way (WP:POV).  
 The editors ignored research indicating that sexual 
assault was a longstanding problem, instead demanding 
citations of actual assaults in an institution over its history. 
The fact that the problem had not been publicly visible was 
treated as irrelevant. That Wikipedia didn’t report the 
problem was seen as definitive.  
 From Peake’s point of view, Wikipedia was domi-
nated by editors hostile to any questioning of male 
privilege. The editors wrote entries on the histories of 
universities that did not mention sexual assault. Then these 
Wikipedia histories were invoked to say that evidence 
suggesting sexual assault on campus today is unrepresenta-
tive of the universities and so shouldn’t be included. In this 
way, misogyny on Wikipedia became a self-referential 
system, because Wikipedia itself was treated as a reality to 
justify continued misogynist representations of reality. 
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 Why are Wikipedia editors so fixated on following 
rules? Peake and others note that most editors are not 
experts on the topics they deal with. In an argument with an 
actual expert on sexual assault, they would have no special 
credibility. However, experienced editors become experts 
in using Wikipedia policies to defend their edits. They can 
increase their status and exercise power by turning editing 
into a contest over the application of rules rather than a 
discussion about the reality supposed to be represented on 
the encyclopaedia. Here is how Peake summarises this. He 
says that the “lawyeristic manoeuvres” by editors — 
namely the ways they use the rules to get their way —  
 
are the most effective weapons for individuals who do 
not know very much about facts, as they allow 
Wikipedia editors to replace expertise about subject 
matter with expertise about Wikipedia’s rules. The 
image of Wikipedia I describe here, through empirical 
grounding in my work writing campus sexual violence 
into Wikipedia, is a space where the primary focus is 
on the mastery of policy as a tool for domination — 
and not on the production of, or debates about, verifi-
able facts and actually existing knowledge. 
 
WP: NOR 
One of the important rules on Wikipedia is that there should 
be no original research. Albert Einstein made numerous 
pioneering contributions to physics, but the Wikipedia 
entry on Einstein, according to the rules, should not cite 
Einstein’s publications to make this statement but instead is 
supposed to cite someone else saying Einstein’s work is 
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important. Einstein is an easy case because numerous others 
have written about him, but for others, especially in more 
contentious areas, finding what someone else says may not 
be straightforward.  
 The no-original research rule is a powerful deterrent to 
people who might like to edit Wikipedia in their own areas 
of expertise. They are not supposed to cite their own works, 
because that would be a conflict of interest, so they have to 
find someone else who has commented on their works. 
Taking the conflict-of-interest rule to a greater extreme, no 
expert should edit Wikipedia on what they know best, 
because knowing a lot about a subject means you are 
biased. This is one way that editors who are not subject-
matter experts can hold sway over those who are. 
 Suppose there is some disagreement, in published 
comment, about what someone believes. By selecting some 
comments rather than others, it’s easy to create a bias in a 
Wikipedia entry. 
 
A personal experience 
My own interest in Wikipedia politics and bias was stimu-
lated when the Wikipedia entry about me was massively 
rewritten and turned into an attack piece. This was in 
January 2016, as part of a massive attack on the PhD thesis 
of my PhD student Judy Wilyman. Here I won’t try to give 
the whole story but just mention one small element that 
shines a light on the dynamics of Wikipedia editing. 
 Here is one of the statements added to my Wikipedia 
entry: 
 
Wikipedia     141 
 
and Agence Science Presse reports Martin “also 
defends the idea of a vaccine-autism link.”  
 
Actually, I have never defended this link, and Agence 
Science-Presse provides no evidence to back up its state-
ment. A Wikipedia editor can add this claim because it’s 
made by a third party, namely not by me and not by the 
editor. So how can this sort of false claim be challenged?  
 It’s unrealistic for me to have to publicly deny every 
false statement that someone might make about me, and 
even more unrealistic to expect to find some other source 
that reports my denial.  
 I decided to write an article analysing persistent bias 
on Wikipedia using my own entry as a case study.3 Publi-
cation of the article led to renewed interest in the entry. 
Some editors wanted to delete the passage about the Agence 
Science-Presse report, but others tried to keep it, saying it’s 
a credible source. Then some editors argued that a citation 
should be given to my denial of the Agence Science-Presse 
claim, with others opposing this.  
 The battle over this one passage consumed time and 
effort by various editors, all waged in terms of Wikipedia’s 
rules. The rules prevent original research, such as analysing 
my writings to assess my views about vaccines and autism. 
Other rules were cited to argue for or against including the 
passage. 
 
3 Brian Martin, “Persistent bias on Wikipedia: methods and 
responses,” Social Science Computer Review, vol. 36, no. 3, June 
2018, pp. 379–388, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/18sscr.html 
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 It would also be possible to refer to a Wikipedia policy 
to say that this particular issue — whether or not I defend a 
link between vaccines and autism — is not central to a 
balanced treatment of my life and work. But this angle did 
not succeed because too many editors, including a powerful 
administrator, were intent on denigrating me via my 
Wikipedia entry. 
 
Conclusion 
Disagreements on Wikipedia are waged via interpretations 
of rules, and there are so many rules that can be interpreted 
in different ways that editors who are persistent can often 
get their way even though they do not know all that much 
about the topic. 
 As Peake and others have argued, Wikipedia’s rule-
based system has been used by those who are experts at 
using the rules to dominate over those who are content 
experts. The result, in some cases, is information that 
diverges from Wikipedia’s own goal of being neutral and 
balanced. 
 There are two ways of looking at Wikipedia in relation 
to official channels. The first is to say that there aren’t any: 
there is no appeal body with the authority to adjudicate 
disputes or to handle complaints. It is possible to write to 
the Wikipedia Foundation, but this is unlikely to have any 
effect on disputes over particular entries. 
 The second way of looking at Wikipedia in relation to 
official channels is to say that Wikipedia rules operate as de 
facto official channels. In editing an entry, you can cite a 
rule to justify your action. In this sense, Wikipedia editing 
is about negotiating your way using or getting around the 
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rules. This has the two consequences that reflect the short-
comings of official channels in other domains. First, the 
development of people’s skills becomes secondary: specif-
ically, knowledge of the topic becomes secondary to oper-
ational use of Wikipedia rules to promote one’s preferred 
treatment of the topic. Second, the task of cultural change 
on Wikipedia is marginalised. The focus on following the 
rules, and the investment of experienced Wikipedia editors 
in learning and deploying the rules, means that putting more 
emphasis on cooperative enhancement of learning and 
recognition of expertise is off the agenda.  
 In the case of Wikipedia, as in many other areas, there 
is nothing inherently wrong with official channels. Prob-
lems arise when they become seen as the only avenue for 
fixing problems. 
6 
Backfire 
 
 
In 2001, I had one of the best insights in my research career. 
In part, it drew on my understanding of official channels 
and then it led to new angles on their roles. 
 Two colleagues and I had written a paper about repres-
sion and resistance in Indonesia. We looked at three case 
studies: the 1998 popular resistance to Suharto’s repressive 
government that led to the downfall of Suharto and the 
introduction of elections; the struggle in East Timor; and 
the 1965–1966 genocide. The point of the case studies was 
to point out that studies of nonviolent action normally 
focused on situations where there was significant resistance 
to repression but that it was also important to study situa-
tions where there was little or none. 
 We sent the paper to the journal Pacifica Review. In 
our original submission, we had written that during the 
genocide there was no resistance. However, the reviewers 
didn’t like this, saying that there is always some form of 
resistance. To address this, we changed our phrasing to 
refer to “lower-profile resistance.” In the revised version of 
our paper, I added a discussion of “political jiu-jitsu.”1 
 
 
1 Brian Martin, Wendy Varney and Adrian Vickers, “Political jiu-
jitsu against Indonesian repression: studying lower-profile 
nonviolent resistance,” Pacifica Review, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2001, 
pp. 143–156. 
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Political jiu-jitsu 
Political jiu-jitsu refers to when violent attacks on peaceful 
protesters lead to greater support for the protesters. The 
term was introduced by nonviolent-action researcher Gene 
Sharp in his epic book The Politics of Nonviolent Action. In 
part three of the book, Sharp laid out a set of stages or facets 
of nonviolent campaigns that he called “the dynamics of 
nonviolent action.” The first three stages are laying the 
groundwork, challenge brings repression and maintaining 
nonviolent discipline.2  
 Sharp had observed that in campaign after campaign, 
the first requirement was to build support, networks and 
capacity, before taking action. This is the stage of laying the 
groundwork. Then, when ready, activists would challenge 
the opponent, for example with a rally, strike or boycott. 
This was the stage of “challenge brings repression,” 
because authoritarian governments usually attempted to 
squash any expression of resistance. If campaigners used 
violence in response, they were usually crushed, quite 
easily, because governments have an overwhelming 
advantage in armed struggle. Therefore, to be effective, 
campaigners needed to remain nonviolent, namely not to 
use violence when attacked. 
 This set the stage for political jiu-jitsu. When police or 
troops attack peaceful protesters, this can be seen as grossly 
unfair. The attack can lead to greater support for the 
protesters from what Sharp calls the “grievance group” 
(people who share the same concerns as the protesters), 
 
2 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter 
Sargent, 1973). 
146     Official Channels 
from people not involved, and even from some on the side 
of the government. 
 
East Timor 
In 1975, East Timor, formerly a Portuguese colony, was 
invaded and occupied by the Indonesian military. The East 
Timorese mounted an armed resistance and in the following 
decade perhaps one third of the population died from 
famine or Indonesian military attacks. In the late 1980s, the 
East Timorese resistance movement changed strategy, 
downplaying armed resistance in the countryside and 
emphasising peaceful protests in urban areas. From the 
point of view of a nonviolent campaign, this was laying the 
groundwork. 
 In 1991, following clashes in which a young East 
Timorese man was killed, there was a funeral procession in 
Dili, the capital. The mourners used the occasion to express 
their political views. Indonesian troops surrounded the 
procession, which remained peaceful. As the procession 
entered Santa Cruz cemetery, the troops opened fire, killing 
large numbers of East Timorese. The funeral protest and the 
killings fit into Sharp’s stage “challenge brings repression.” 
Throughout the protest, the East Timorese refrained from 
violence. In Sharp’s terms, they maintained nonviolent 
discipline. This set the stage for political jiu-jitsu.  
 Western journalists were present at the protest. They 
witnessed the killings and took photos. Filmmaker Max 
Stahl recorded the massacre on video. Their testimony and 
visual documentation enabled a powerful communication 
to outside audiences. This gave an enormous boost to 
international campaigners for East Timorese independence. 
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The massacre, intended to repress the independence move-
ment, inadvertently increased its support dramatically. This 
counterproductive result is the essence of political jiu-jitsu. 
 So far so good: political jiu-jitsu is an important part 
of many nonviolent campaigns. However, having written a 
paper about repression by the Indonesian government that 
did not lead to a jiu-jitsu effect — especially the genocide 
of 1965–1966, when perhaps half a million people were 
killed — I asked myself what was different between these 
two sorts of cases. Why did some massacres lead to political 
jiu-jitsu and some not? 
 My insight was to think of reasons in terms of what the 
perpetrators did. I identified several methods that perpetra-
tors could use to reduce public outrage and thereby make 
political jiu-jitsu less likely. These methods included 
covering up the action, devaluing the targets, reinterpreting 
what happened, and using intimidation and rewards. There 
was one other important method, probably inspired by my 
experiences with whistleblowers: using official channels to 
give an appearance of justice but without the substance. 
 Pursuing this insight, which was initially inchoate and 
incomplete, I started looking at case studies. One of them 
was East Timor.3 Reading various accounts of the history 
of the Indonesian invasion and occupation, I learned that 
there had been other major massacres of East Timorese 
civilians. However, these were little known outside East 
Timor. The only surviving witnesses were East Timorese, 
and only later did some of them leave the country. For 
 
3 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 23–33. 
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Western audiences, their stories lacked the credibility of 
journalists: in a war, the accounts of those on one side or 
the other may be suspected of being self-serving. Most im-
portantly, the East Timorese witnesses had no photographic 
evidence. For these little-known massacres, cover-up was 
the primary tool used by the Indonesian government.  
 If cover-up is enough to prevent political jiu-jitsu, then 
other techniques need not be deployed. So I thought, let’s 
look at the Dili massacre to see what techniques the 
Indonesian government used to dampen public outrage. 
Although the massacre turned out to be counterproductive 
for the Indonesian government, that doesn’t mean it didn’t 
try to prevent outrage. Ironically, by studying cases of 
dramatic political jiu-jitsu, I found the most evidence of 
efforts to prevent this outcome. 
 After the Dili massacre, Indonesian authorities tried to 
prevent information about it getting out of the country. 
Australian officials assisted: they searched Max Stahl’s 
baggage looking for the videos he had taken. Cleverly, he 
had hidden them in the cemetery, later returning to retrieve 
them and give them to a supporter to smuggle out of 
Indonesia. The Indonesian government tried to cover up the 
massacre, and creative means were needed to expose it. 
 The next technique was devaluation. Indonesian 
government and military leaders disparaged the protesters. 
However, this had little impact in other countries. 
 The technique of reinterpretation involves explaining 
away events by lying, minimising, blaming and framing. 
Indonesian officials initially claimed only 17 East Timorese 
lost their lives, later increasing the figure to 50. A 
subsequent independent investigation said the total was 
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271. Indonesian officials claimed that East Timorese 
protesters had weapons and had initiated violence. This was 
denied by surviving protesters and Western journalists.  
 The technique of intimidation was also used. After the 
massacre, Indonesian troops rounded up independence 
supporters and assaulted them. Within East Timor, repres-
sion became even worse. However, this had no impact on 
Western audiences except to increase their concern. 
 This brings me to the technique of official channels. 
What formal procedure or official body could address a 
complaint about mass murder? The East Timorese had no 
access to appeal bodies. But there was no need for them to 
act, because the Indonesian government and military each 
set up inquiries into the massacre. This can be understood 
as a response to international concern about the killings. 
After previous massacres that were unpublicised, the Indo-
nesian government had never set up an inquiry. The purpose 
of the inquiries established following the Dili massacre thus 
seemed to be to address international concern. 
 The two inquiries actually found a few officers guilty 
and sentenced them to a few years in prison. This symboli-
cally showed that the government and military were follow-
ing procedures designed to provide justice. The officers 
served just part of their sentences before release: it was very 
lenient treatment for mass murder. They were scapegoats 
for higher authorities.  
 There is a revealing contrast between the ways perpe-
trators were treated. Higher authorities were responsible for 
years of bloody repression in East Timor, causing a scale of 
death that some have called genocide. However, no action 
was ever taken against these higher authorities. Only after 
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the international outcry following the Dili massacre was 
any official investigation undertaken into any of the killings 
in East Timor. The implication is that the official investiga-
tion and the token penalties meted out to a few individuals 
were seen as helpful in reducing outrage. 
 In summary, the Dili massacre is a prime example of 
political jiu-jitsu: it stimulated greater resistance from the 
East Timorese and their international supporters. The re-
sponse to the massacre also shows the importance of 
protesters remaining nonviolent. The images of unarmed, 
defenceless protesters being shot in cold blood were crucial 
in triggering outrage. Previously, thousands of East 
Timorese had been killed during the guerrilla war against 
the Indonesian invasion, but this did not cause the same 
outrage because deaths are expected in wartime, even when 
the war is between highly unequal sides. 
 The Dili massacre triggered political jiu-jitsu, but 
there was more to it than just a counterproductive outcome 
for the Indonesian government. The government had used 
five techniques that can reduce outrage over injustice: 
cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, intimidation and 
official channels. However, in this case, these methods 
were not enough to prevent a huge increase in international 
support for East Timor’s independence. 
 If the Indonesian government could use five methods 
to reduce public outrage from the massacre, then it makes 
sense that others — East Timorese, their supporters, 
journalists — could try to counter each of these methods. In 
other words, corresponding to the five types of methods for 
reducing outrage are five types of methods for increasing it. 
These are exposing the action, validating the target, 
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interpreting the events as an injustice, avoiding or discred-
iting official channels, and resisting intimidation and 
rewards.  
 All of these methods were used following the Dili 
massacre. The massacre was exposed to wider audiences 
via eye-witness testimony, photos and video. For audiences 
outside Indonesia, the East Timorese were just as deserving 
of human rights as anyone else: the Indonesian govern-
ment’s attempts at devaluation had little international 
resonance. The massacre was presented to outside audi-
ences as a gross injustice, and the claims by the Indonesian 
government about protesters being violent and only a few 
dying were countered. The East Timorese continued to 
resist: they were not thwarted by intimidation.  
 Consider especially the role of official channels. The 
Indonesian government and military had set up inquiries 
into the massacre, giving the appearance that justice was 
being done. However, for outside observers these were 
quite inadequate, because they were carried out by the 
groups responsible for the killings. It would have been more 
credible for the Indonesian government to invite a respected 
international organisation, for example Amnesty Interna-
tional or the United Nations, to hold an inquiry. However, 
this would not have served the purposes of the Indonesian 
government, because the findings would most likely have 
been damning. The in-house inquiries were not going to be 
so damning, but they also had little external credibility in 
the face of the eyewitness and photographic evidence. 
 The setting up of inquiries in the aftermath of the Dili 
massacre is an example of the use of official channels in 
response to a sudden injustice. Rather than rely on existing 
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procedures, special-purpose ones are created. This suggests 
that when there is some urgency in countering perceptions 
of injustice, official channels are brought into being.  
 So far, I’ve told just about the Dili massacre. Equipped 
with a framework for making sense of outrage manage-
ment, I started looking at all sorts of injustices. Remarka-
bly, I found the same sorts of tactics being used in all sorts 
of areas, from sexual harassment to genocide. Because this 
framework, with the five types of methods to reduce 
outrage and five types to increase it, was more elaborate 
than Sharp’s political-jitsu, and applied to injustices well 
outside the violence-versus-nonviolence template studied 
by Sharp, I gave it a new name: the backfire model. In 
retrospect, it might be more accurately called the outrage 
management model. 
 
The Sharpeville massacre 
Sharp described several cases of political jiu-jitsu. To see 
whether the backfire framework applied, I looked in more 
detail at the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, 
during the era of apartheid when the white minority ruled 
over the majority black population. In 1960, there were 
nationwide protests against the pass laws, a type of internal 
passport system used to control the black population. This 
was during a period when the opposition was committed to 
nonviolence. Due to a combination of circumstances, police 
opened fire on a peaceful protest in the town of Sharpeville, 
killing perhaps a hundred blacks, many of them shot in the 
back while running away. White journalists were present, 
and the story became front-page news internationally, 
puncturing the illusion that the South African government 
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was a respectable parliamentary democracy committed to 
the rule of law. 
 On reading more about the massacre, especially Philip 
Frankel’s authoritative book,4 I discovered evidence of all 
five methods for reducing outrage: cover-up, devaluation, 
reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation.5 Of 
special interest here is the role of official channels. After 
the massacre and the massive adverse publicity, the South 
African government set up a commission of inquiry. This 
gave the appearance of providing an independent assess-
ment that would deliver justice. According to Frankel, 
though, the inquiry was selective in the way it collected 
evidence, assessed it and came up with findings. The 
commission gave the appearance of being neutral while 
delivering a report that largely exonerated the police and the 
government. 
 
The beating of Rodney King 
I also started examining case studies that were well outside 
of Sharp’s domain of violence versus nonviolence. One of 
them was the 1991 beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles 
police.6 King was driving, probably drunk, and speeding, 
 
4 Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and its 
Massacre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). 
5 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 9–21. 
6 Brian Martin, “The beating of Rodney King: the dynamics of 
backfire,” Critical Criminology, vol. 13, no. 3, 2005, pp. 307–326. 
For an expanded version of this article, see Martin, Justice Ignited, 
pp. 43–64. 
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and was followed by police in a long chase late at night. 
When King’s car was finally stopped, King was arrested, 
but only after being tasered and then brutally beaten. This 
would not have been anything special except that the 
commotion — including a police helicopter hovering above 
and shining a light on the proceedings — awoke many 
people living nearby, including George Holliday, who had 
just bought a video camera. He recorded four police hitting 
King dozens of times, and kicking him. Eventually 
Holliday took the videotape to a television station. The 
broadcast stunned viewers. The pressure on the government 
and the police was immense. 
 Along the way, the police used the predictable ways to 
reduce outrage, seeking to cover up the beating (that was 
before the video was broadcast), to discredit Rodney King 
(at the time and for years afterwards), to explain the beating 
as legitimate and to intimidate witnesses. My focus here is 
on official channels. 
 Immediately after the broadcast of the video — it was 
screened repeatedly — the Los Angeles Police Department 
set up an inquiry, and the city government set up its own 
inquiry. Soon they were merged into what became known 
as the Christopher Commission. 
 It’s useful to pause here and ask why inquiries were 
set up. As known to anyone familiar with police matters in 
Los Angeles, there had been numerous previous police 
beatings, some of them far worse than King’s. There had 
even been some citizens killed by the police in circum-
stances that warranted criminal investigation. However, the 
police and the city government did not set up inquiries 
concerning any of these cases in which police allegedly 
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used excessive force. The usual official channels could be 
used: police complaint procedures and the courts. Only 
after the King beating were special inquiries set up. 
 The obvious explanation is the television broadcast of 
the videotape of the beating. For previous beatings and 
shootings, the police version of events was dominant. The 
police and government officials had the advantage of being 
authority figures, usually given more credibility than those 
who were labelled or positioned as lawbreakers. Further-
more, the mass media normally reported the police version 
of events, which meant that police beatings were seldom 
reported at all, or just as arrests.7 
 After the beating of King, but before the video was 
broadcast, King’s brother went to a local police station to 
report it. Making a report or complaint to the police is a 
typical official channel. However, the officer at the station, 
instead of filing a report, started asking questions of King’s 
brother, implying he had been in trouble. In the end, no 
report was filed. So far as the police incident file was 
concerned, the beating of King would never have been 
included except for the video. 
 The broadcast of the videotape changed everything. 
Members of the public, instead of having to rely on media 
reporting to make a judgement, could view the video 
themselves — and many were shocked. It was the shock-
wave that led the leaders of the police and the city govern-
 
7 Regina G. Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and the 
Construction of Police Brutality (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000). 
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ment to set up inquiries. It was a way, intuitively grasped, 
of letting people know that justice would be done.  
 As well, there were other official channels deployed: 
the courts. Without the videotape, King would have had no 
prospect of suing the police. With the videotape, lawyers 
took on his case. In addition, and more importantly, there 
was a criminal case launched against the four officers 
directly involved in the beating. 
 Because the King beating received saturation media 
coverage, it led to a great expectation for justice to be done. 
The court case against the four officers involved dragged 
on for a year, with machinations that are a story in 
themselves. Everyone, even the defence lawyers, expected 
a jury verdict of guilty. When the actual verdict of not guilty 
was announced, this triggered rage in the black population, 
which can be interpreted as due to justice denied. People 
had seen the video and made up their own minds, so the not-
guilty verdict was incomprehensible. In South-Central Los 
Angeles, a massive three-day riot ensued, resulting in over 
50 deaths, hundreds of buildings burnt and nearly a billion 
dollars of damage. 
 Government officials felt the need to act to deal with 
the perception of injustice. Their response: set up another 
official channel. As the riot proceeded, President George H. 
W. Bush announced a federal trial of the same four officers. 
This time the government did what it could to ensure a 
different outcome. Two of the officers were found guilty 
and went to prison. There were no riots after this verdict 
was announced. 
 The beating of Rodney King shows the importance 
and limits of official channels. The clamour for justice was 
Backfire     157 
 
extraordinary because people saw for themselves what they 
believed was a gross injustice, the beating of a defenceless 
black man by white police officers. (Blacks and whites, on 
average, responded differently to the beating.) The police 
used methods of cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation and 
intimidation to reduce outrage, but these were not enough. 
The Christopher Commission was set up, but the greatest 
expectations were put on the court case against the police 
officers. When it came up with an unacceptable outcome, 
rage boiled over. This suggests that official channels, to 
effectively reduce outrage, need to provide sufficient 
symbolic redress for the perceived injustice. 
 For many viewers, the beating of King exemplified the 
longstanding racism of the Los Angeles police. The 
Christopher Commission, by making recommendations to 
counter this racism, arguably addressed the underlying 
feelings of the black population, but whether the commis-
sion’s findings would result in actual change was not easy 
to determine. In contrast, justice for King himself was more 
tangible, hence the expectations for the trial. 
 The story of the King beating suggests that the role of 
official channels in reducing outrage from injustice is most 
significant when other methods for reducing outrage — 
cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation and intimidation — 
are inadequate. 
 
Conclusion 
Backfire analysis involves studying injustices in which the 
perpetrators are powerful, and looking at the methods used 
by the perpetrators to reduce public outrage. The most 
commonly observed methods are cover-up, devaluation, 
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reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation/rewards. 
Of these five types of methods, the one most counter-
intuitive for most people is official channels. After all, 
official channels are supposed to provide justice, and many 
people turn to them to address obvious injustices. Yet in 
case after case, powerful perpetrators use or create official 
channels that serve to reduce outrage. 
 The key to this apparent discrepancy is that although 
most people expect official channels to provide justice, in 
practice they often do not, especially when perpetrators are 
powerful. 
 In the case of the Dili massacre, the Indonesian 
government used all five types of methods to reduce 
outrage, including instituting inquiries, which led to limited 
sanctions against a few scapegoat soldiers. What is reveal-
ing is that no inquiries had been set up after previous 
massacres. That was because other methods, especially 
cover-up, were sufficient to reduce outrage. 
 In the case of the beating of Rodney King, the Los 
Angeles police and city government used all five types of 
methods to reduce outrage. Several official channels were 
pursued subsequently: a commission of inquiry was set up 
and there were multiple trials. There was a widespread 
expectation that the first trial of the four police officers 
would lead to a guilty verdict. When this expectation was 
dashed, a major riot ensued, which can be attributed to 
collective outrage over injustice. This is a powerful 
emotion, pointing to the importance of methods used to 
reduce anger. 
 There are numerous other examples, in all sorts of 
domains, of powerful perpetrators and their allies using 
Backfire     159 
 
methods to reduce outrage from their actions.8 My focus 
here has been on the use of official channels. They dampen 
outrage by promising justice but then, due to slowness, 
technicalities and dependence on experts, doing little to 
deliver it. The slowness of most official channels gives time 
for outrage to die down. The technicalities and dependence 
on experts mean that most people do not take the effort to 
try to understand the proceedings, instead often just accept-
ing or rejecting the outcome.  
 In terms of understanding the role of official channels, 
the study of backfire dynamics offers several insights. The 
first and most obvious is that when perpetrators are more 
powerful, official channels are more likely to be useful to 
them, especially by reducing outrage over injustice. A 
second insight is that official channels may only be brought 
into play when other methods of reducing outrage — cover-
up, devaluation, reinterpretation and intimidation/rewards 
— are inadequate. When these methods are falling short, 
authorities may sometimes set up special official channels 
just for the occasion. In the case of the beating of Rodney 
King, the establishment of the Christopher Commission 
was an instance. Police racism and police assaults had 
persisted for years, with no need for a special commission. 
What triggered a need to invoke formal processes was the 
broadcast of the video of the beating. 
 
8 See “Backfire materials,” https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/backfire.html. 
Topics include censorship, climate change, corruption, defamation, 
lying, protest, refugees, sexual harassment, torture, war, whistle-
blowing and workplaces. 
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 The implication is that understanding the role of 
official channels requires understanding the wider patterns 
of power and how power is exercised, and wider patterns of 
belief and how belief can be transformed. 
 The backfire model can be thought of as a way of 
looking at outrage management. It is most obvious when 
there are sudden instances of apparent injustice that come 
to public notice, such as the King beating and the Dili 
massacre. However, the same processes occur in less 
dramatic circumstances. Official channels can dampen 
outrage over minor injustices, ones that seldom generate 
widespread publicity, in much the same way.  
 
Increasing outrage 
Given that powerful perpetrators of injustice regularly use 
five types of methods that reduce outrage, it makes sense 
for people concerned about injustice to take counter-
measures. The aim is to increase outrage, to a level that is 
enough to trigger action for justice. How to do this? In terms 
of tactics, it is worth looking for ways to counter each of 
the methods used by perpetrators. For most of the methods, 
this is straightforward. 
 
• To counter cover-up, expose the actions. 
• To counter devaluation, validate the targets. 
• To counter reinterpretation, interpret the actions as 
unjust. 
• To counter intimidation and rewards, resist. 
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In each of these cases, the way to increase outrage is to 
directly counter the outrage-reducing tactics. However, for 
official channels, the counter is not so obvious. 
 
• To counter the use of official channels to reduce 
outrage, what should you do? 
 
One option is to try to discredit the official channels. 
Another is simply to ignore them. However, neither of these 
options directly fosters outrage. My preferred option is to 
mobilise support.  
 Official channels serve to put the issue in the hands of 
official or expert bodies, giving the impression that they 
will handle the problem. In contrast, mobilising support — 
encouraging people to become concerned and take action 
themselves — does not rely on official channels. It means 
people take matters into their own hands. To do this, they 
need to have information and skills, for example in 
communicating, networking, protesting and building 
alternatives. 
 The backfire model thus provides a basis for formulat-
ing tactics against injustice. But does it imply that official 
channels should never be used? No — there are often 
practical or strategic reasons to appeal to or apply pressure 
on official channels. What the backfire models says is that 
to increase outrage about injustice, it is usually better to 
mobilise support.  
7 
Elections 
 
 
It’s election time. There’s lots of news coverage of the 
upcoming election, and advertisements for candidates and 
parties. You talk to some of your friends about the 
prospects. The social media are filled with views. If you’re 
conscientious, you read the statements made available by 
candidates and parties in order to understand the options 
and make a reasoned choice. Perhaps you’re even more 
active, campaigning for your preferred candidates. 
 On election day, you attend the polling booth and cast 
your vote, along with many others. Afterwards, you might 
watch media coverage of the election results. On the other 
hand, you might be one of those who don’t really care, and 
don’t bother to vote, because the parties are all the same and 
you can’t trust politicians. However, even if you’re indif-
ferent or cynical, at election time it’s hard to avoid the 
pervasive attention to voting and politicians. 
 Even if there’s no election imminent, there’s usually 
plenty of media coverage of politics. Indeed, it is one of the 
staples of news, along with crime and sports. Politicians 
make pronouncements that are reported. Maybe there is 
speculation about power struggles within parties, or about 
new policies.  
 When there is some sort of crisis — a financial 
meltdown, involvement in a war, or a natural disaster — all 
eyes turn to the response of the government. Even in normal 
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times, the government is often the focus of attention. People 
are supposed to pay taxes, but many try to limit their 
payments. On the other hand, people expect the government 
to provide services, including schools, hospitals and roads, 
and get upset when these are not as good as they could be. 
 It is reasonable to say that there are two official 
channels involved here. One is the government itself, 
including legislative and executive branches, plus all sorts 
of government departments and agencies. The other official 
channel is elections, which provide a process for changing 
the government. Indeed, elections are touted as the essence 
of democracy. They are said to give a mandate to govern-
ments to implement policies, and to give voice to “the will 
of the people.” 
 
Elections as liberating 
In Britain, elections were introduced in the 1600s as a 
restraint on the power of the monarchy. In the beginning, 
only a few people were allowed to vote: men who were 
property owners. This was a very restricted franchise. 
However, after elections were introduced, the idea of voting 
became associated with opposition to arbitrary rule. The 
result was that as other groups mobilised and demanded fair 
treatment, one of their expectations or demands was to be 
able to vote. 
 The result has been a gradual expansion of the 
franchise. The feminist movement exerted pressure to allow 
women to vote. Associated with this expansion of the vote 
was pressure to allow any man or woman to run for office. 
 Elections are threatening to powerful groups that want 
to maintain their power, so various means have been used 
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to control outcomes. One method is the gerrymander: 
electoral boundaries are drawn to advantage one party over 
another. The counter to the gerrymander is an independent 
electoral commission that draws boundaries in a fair, non-
partisan manner. Gerrymandering continues to be important 
in some countries, notably the US. 
 Another way to rig outcomes is to prevent or discour-
age some people from voting. This includes legal re-
strictions (for example to deny prisoners the right to vote), 
difficult or confusing processes for registering to vote, and 
the use of guile or force to prevent some people from 
voting. 
 The presence of fair elections is often taken as an 
indication of how free a society is. However, there is a 
curious blinkering of views of the relevance of elections. 
Many people work in large organisations with hundreds or 
thousands of employees. This includes corporations, 
government departments, hospitals, universities, churches, 
militaries and international bodies. These organisations are 
as large as the electorates of many towns, yet these large 
organisations do not have elections. The contrast is stark: if 
you are a citizen, you are entitled to vote for rulers, but if 
you are an employee, you have no such right. Furthermore, 
in many large organisations there are no political parties nor 
rights of free speech.1  
 
1 Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule 
Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It) (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017); Bruce Barry, Speechless: The 
Erosion of Free Expression in the American Workplace (San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2007); David W. Ewing, Freedom 
Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil Liberties to the Workplace 
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 Nearly all large organisations are bureaucracies: they 
are structured as hierarchies with a division of labour, in 
which workers are interchangeable cogs. “Bureaucracy” 
here refers to a system of organising work, and is not 
restricted to government. Corporations are just as bureau-
cratic as government departments. Sociologist Deena 
Weinstein argued that bureaucracies are like authoritarian 
states: they restrict free speech and assembly, do not have 
elections for senior positions and do not allow groups to 
campaign against the leadership. The main difference is that 
bureaucracies operate without the use of physical violence: 
there are no organisational police or troops used to quell 
criminals or rebels.2 
 If having elections is a liberating process, the absence 
of elections in large organisations shows liberation has a 
long way to go.  
 
Challenging unfair elections 
Compared to dictatorship, representative government is a 
great leap forward towards citizen participation and govern-
ment accountability. Although some dictatorships are 
benevolent, in many cases they lead to exploitation, 
economic stagnation and denial of human rights, in line 
 
(New York: Dutton, 1977); Alan F. Westin and Stephan Salisbury 
(eds.), Individual Rights in the Corporation: A Reader on 
Employee Rights (New York: Pantheon, 1980). 
2 Deena Weinstein, Bureaucratic Opposition: Challenging Abuses 
at the Workplace (New York: Pergamon, 1979). 
166     Official Channels 
with Lord Acton’s saying, “Power tends to corrupt and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely.”3  
 Even short of dictatorship, governments can be author-
itarian and repressive. In some cases they are sham democ-
racies, holding elections that are rigged in various ways, in 
order to give legitimacy to their rule. Sham elections are a 
classic example of official channels as facades. 
 Around the world, citizen campaigners seek to 
challenge authoritarian governments, and some of the most 
striking successes have been challenges to fraudulent 
elections. In 1986, Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos 
called an election, intending to legitimise his authoritarian 
rule. Supporters of his opponent, Cory Aquino, refused to 
accept the official result, apparently obtained by falsifying 
voting returns. In the capital Manila, hundreds of thousands 
of citizens joined a massive rally demanding that Marcos 
resign — and eventually he did, when it became apparent 
that police and troops were defecting to the opposition.4 
 In the late 1990s, Serbian president Slobodan 
Milošević ruled with an iron hand, suppressing opposition 
through a combination of techniques. Opponents of 
 
3 For research that supports Acton’s aphorism, see David Kipnis, 
The Powerholders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); 
David Kipnis, Technology and Power (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1990); Ian Robertson, The Winner Effect: How Power 
Affects Your Brain (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). 
4 See for example Stephen Zunes, “The origins of people power in 
the Philippines,” in Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth 
Asher, eds., Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical 
Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 129–157.  
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Milošević, led by the group Otpor, stimulated resistance 
through broadcasts and protests, including humorous 
stunts, and building grassroots opposition throughout the 
country. In 2000, Milošević called a snap election to 
legitimise his presidency in the face of opposition. He then 
claimed victory, apparently through falsifying the results: 
independent observers recorded a different outcome. 
Following strikes and rallies, opponents from across the 
country mobilised in a massive march to the capital 
Belgrade. Troops were no longer willing to support 
Milošević, and he was ousted.5 
 The pattern in the Philippines and Serbia was repeated 
elsewhere, including in the Ukraine and Georgia. In each 
case, struggles over elections played a crucial role. Govern-
ments used, and often manipulated, elections to give 
themselves legitimacy. Challengers monitored the voting, 
questioned the election results and used claims about 
electoral fraud to mobilise popular resistance. 
 In these cases, honest elections served as an oppor-
tunity for social change. Elections are an official channel 
for political decision-making, and active citizens see them 
as crucially important. That is why they put so much effort 
into all sorts of activities connected with elected politicians: 
lobbying, fundraising, meetings of political party branches, 
media commentary, candidate selection, opinion polling, 
advertising and encouraging supporters to vote. Aside from 
 
5 See for example Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Humor and Nonviolent 
Struggle in Serbia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
2015). 
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major sporting events, elections are one of the biggest 
shows in town and expectations are high. 
 
Elections offer legitimacy to rulers 
Because elections give citizens a chance to participate in 
decision making, the results of elections appear to reflect 
the will of the people. This gives enormous legitimacy to 
those who are elected. They are not there because of having 
connections, money or ruthlessness, but because voters 
chose them. Being seen to be elected is a source of strength 
to rulers. 
 This is the reason why some dictators organise sham 
elections. In the former Soviet Union, elections would be 
held, and the Communist Party candidates would win 
overwhelming victories, sometimes with 99% of the vote. 
On the face of it, this had no credibility. Most Soviet 
citizens knew the results were fraudulent, and so did foreign 
observers. Despite widespread awareness that Soviet 
elections were shams, with pre-determined outcomes, the 
process nevertheless offered some additional symbolic 
advantages to Soviet rulers. The public rhetoric of 
communist states was filled with references to democracy.  
 Some governments make voting compulsory, includ-
ing Australia’s. Although critics oppose compulsion on the 
grounds of individual liberty, compulsory voting can serve 
to increase the legitimacy of the government. In Australia, 
it is compulsory to attend a polling station and cast ballots 
— the penalty for non-compliance is a small fine — but it 
is quite legal to spoil the ballot, for example to leave it 
blank. Technically speaking, the compulsion is to attend the 
polling station, not to cast a valid ballot. However, few 
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voters choose this option. Once they are at the polling 
station, they go ahead and vote. By participating in the 
voting process, they give greater legitimacy to it: they 
didn’t have to express a preference, but they did. Collec-
tively, the high percentage of valid votes gives legitimacy 
to the electoral process.  
 Compulsory voting in Australia can be compared to 
voluntary voting in the United States, where in many parts 
of the country some groups face barriers to voting. The 
combination of barriers and apathy leads to low voter 
turnout, sometimes less than 50%, reducing the legitimacy 
of the outcome. If only half of citizens vote, those elected 
have a harder time claiming a mandate from the electorate.  
 Compulsory voting raises an intriguing clash between 
rights and legitimacy. Supporters of individual rights often 
say voting should be voluntary. However, when the turnout 
is low, this reduces the credibility of the electoral system. 
Compulsory voting makes it easy to obtain a high turnout, 
giving greater legitimacy to the system. Furthermore, citi-
zens who vote, even when compelled, can feel a greater 
psychological commitment to the outcome. 
 
Conclusion 
Elections can be thought of as an official channel, namely 
as a formal way of dealing with an issue or problem. The 
issue is choosing rulers — political decision-makers — and 
the related problem is authoritarian rule. When elected 
rulers do the wrong thing, citizens can toss them out of 
office, at least if the system is sufficiently fair to allow this. 
 Because elections are seen to provide a proper way of 
choosing decision-makers, this can lead to pressures to 
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make them fair, including the expansion of the franchise, 
removal of discriminatory barriers to voting, and popular 
challenges to rigging of elections. One result of these efforts 
is to turn elections into an end-stage goal. Rather than elec-
tions being seen as one technique for citizen participation 
in the decision-making process, they become the only goal 
thought to be important. 
 This brings up the other side to elections as official 
channels: they restrain moves for greater participation. One 
aspect of this is that elections are normally seen as appro-
priate for only one domain, called politics. Elections are 
seldom used to choose leaders within large organisations — 
government departments, corporations, churches, universi-
ties, militaries — which are supposed to be meritocracies 
but have many elements of autocracy. What is called 
politics represents just one arena.  
 There are various possible ways in which citizens can 
play a role in public decision-making, including referen-
dums, forums and random selection of decision-makers. 
More fundamentally, the system of rule, with a few at the 
top having far more decision-making power than ordinary 
citizens, can be questioned. There are various alternatives 
that devolve this power to neighbourhoods and workplaces, 
but these are usually off the agenda.6  
 
6 For example, Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, Random Selection in 
Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); David Van Reybrouck, 
Against Elections: The Case for Democracy (London: Bodley 
Head, 2016); Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1973). 
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 In this context, elections provide legitimacy to the 
system of rule. They restrain moves to give more power to 
people at the grassroots.7  
 Elections, as official channels, thus have a dual role, 
both enabling citizen input into political decision-making 
while limiting the scope and immediacy of this input. 
Elections, in their liberating role, can capture the imagina-
tion of those seeking greater freedom from tyranny. 
Elections, in their restraining role, limit the prospects for 
introducing more participatory alternatives. 
 
7 The best treatment of this is Benjamin Ginsberg, The 
Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control and Popular 
Acquiescence (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982). 
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A miscellany of  
official channels  
 
 
When you start looking, official channels are everywhere, 
and so are people’s beliefs that they are the solution to 
social problems. Here I’ve collected a few cases to illustrate 
different angles and arenas. 
 
Australian banking regulators 
In Australia, for decades serious abuses occurred in finan-
cial services, such as fraudulently signing customers up for 
risky loans, denying insurance claims based on outdated 
medical definitions, and charging fees for no service. 
Journalist Adele Ferguson played a major role in exposing 
misconduct. Whenever her newspaper stories about prob-
lems in banking were published, she received lots more 
information from whistleblowers and customers. In her 
2019 book Banking Bad, she tells about the consequences 
of the industry’s ruthless search for profits at the expense 
of customers.1 Part of her story is about the failures of the 
regulators, especially the Australian Securities and Invest-
ments Commission (ASIC). From her book, it’s possible to 
extract a checklist of methods for a regulator to be ineffec-
 
1 Adele Ferguson, Banking Bad (Sydney: ABC Books, 2019).  
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tual in its nominal job, and for a government to help in 
achieving this goal.2 
 
• Seek appointment of tame regulator heads.  
Alan Fels, while chair of the Prices Surveillance Authority, 
had been effective in using the media to expose companies. 
Companies tried to prevent his appointment to head the 
Trade Practices Commission (page 41). 
 
• Denounce effective regulators.  
The Trade Practices Commission, under Fels, ran an 
inquiry, reporting in December 1992. Opponents attacked 
its recommendations, saying it was “anti-business and anti-
competition” (45). 
 
• Investigate the journalist. 
ASIC was slow to slow to respond to problems in the banks, 
but after one of Ferguson’s articles appeared, within a day 
ASIC considered making an investigation into Ferguson 
herself (84–86). 
 
• Take no action. 
ASIC investigated the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. 
It found problems but took no action (89). 
 
• Delay. 
Despite being alerted to serious problems, ASIC took 16 
months to launch an investigation (93). 
 
 
2 For modes of regulatory failure in other countries’ financial 
institutions, see Kate Kenny, Whistleblowing: Toward a New 
Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019).  
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• Make false promises. 
Whistleblower Jeff Morris met with ASIC staff in February 
2011 and was assured that someone would investigate, but 
four years later nothing had been done (150). 
 
• Do not release criticism of regulators. 
A “capability review” of ASIC contained serious criticisms, 
especially in an “aide memoire.” The government did not 
release the aide memoire (183).  
 
• Go easy. 
ASIC reported on banks’ charging fees for no service — a 
form of robbery — by suggesting the cause was poor 
systems and that all efforts were being made to repay cus-
tomers (221). In ten years, it initiated no civil proceedings 
against financial advisers, made no prosecutions for not 
reporting breaches in time, investigated less than half of 
“significant” breach reports, and took nearly two years on 
average to make decisions concerning customer complaints 
about poor financial advice (232). 
 
• Collaborate with the institutions being regulated. 
The Australian Prudential Regulatory Agency collaborated 
with financial institutions and did not address their miscon-
duct (262–264). ASIC asked the Commonwealth Bank 
whether the penalty to be imposed was acceptable (274). 
ASIC, when dealing with civil or criminal breaches, often 
did deals before finishing its investigations (320). 
 
• Impose inadequate penalties. 
Penalties imposed by ASIC did not have a deterrent effect 
(288). 
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• Use a revolving door.  
Many of ASIC’s staff had previously worked at the finan-
cial institutions it regulated and afterwards obtained jobs at 
those institutions (321).  
 
• When an inquiry seems inevitable, try to limit its impact. 
For years, the banks and the Australian government resisted 
calls for a royal commission. When, in part due to Fergu-
son’s exposés, some politicians initiated moves to instigate 
a royal commission, the banks urged the government to set 
up a commission itself, so it could set limited terms of 
reference and choose the commissioner. The commissioner, 
Kenneth Hayne, didn’t recommend any changes in the 
financial system. Hayne, to address the failures of regula-
tors, gave them more powers and more work, and hoped 
they would do better (366–369). 
 
The First Amendment 
The First Amendment to the US Constitution is supposed 
to protect free speech. It is taken for granted as being vital 
for free speech, indeed almost a form of holy writ. Yet it is 
possible to question the role of the First Amendment on two 
grounds: it doesn’t work, and it’s not necessary. 
 Does it work? There are many examples in which the 
freedom of speech, including the freedom of the press, has 
been defended in court using the First Amendment. Less 
often noticed are the many cases in which free speech is 
restricted, yet the First Amendment provides little or no 
protection. 
 Some US real estate developers have been challenged 
by citizen protesters, who write letters and sign petitions 
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against developments. To counter the opposition to their 
plans, some of these developers sue the protesters for 
defamation. This is one common scenario. Legal action for 
defamation has been used by police, government officials 
and numerous corporations to deter and attack critics. 
 Imagine you are an ordinary citizen who signed a 
petition against a proposal to build a casino. Then you 
receive a writ. You are expected to go to court to defend a 
legal action for defamation of the developer. This can be 
frightening. You might lose lots of money. The result: you 
become much more wary about speaking out about the 
casino. 
 Researchers George W. Pring and Penelope Canan 
dubbed these sorts of legal actions SLAPPs, standing for 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. SLAPPs 
were first named in the US, where they had become a 
common phenomenon. Pring and Canan reported dozens of 
examples involving defamation and other torts.3 
 The First Amendment protects press freedom. Less 
well known is that it protects the right to petition the gov-
ernment. When people sign a petition or make a complaint 
about police abuse, they are constitutionally protected. This 
means that SLAPPs violate the Constitution.  
 This means that when you’re sued for speaking out, 
you can cite the First Amendment in your court defence. 
That’s fine, except that the process may require quite a bit 
of time and money. Pring and Canan found that most 
SLAPPs were never intended to be successful in court. 
 
3 George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for 
Speaking Out (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996). 
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They worked by intimidating their targets, even when they 
nearly always failed legally. 
 What should be done about SLAPPs? One solution has 
been for US states to pass anti-SLAPP laws. Yes, there are 
laws against initiating legal actions that violate the consti-
tutional rights of defendants. When there are anti-SLAPP 
laws, these are sometimes effective. Still, it seems that 
defending the right to speak in the US can be an onerous 
business, requiring time, money and angst. Free speech is 
protected on paper, in the Constitution, but this is not much 
consolation if it costs too much. 
 SLAPPs are just one example of the limitations of the 
First Amendment. There are lots of other examples. In his 
book titled Freedom Spent, Richard Harris detailed several 
cases in which constitutionally protected freedoms were 
denied, yet it proved almost impossible to challenge this 
through the courts. Harris concluded that the freedoms 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights are seldom upheld and that 
those who make personal sacrifices to push for their rights 
guarantee them for everyone else.4  
 Several US state governments passed laws making it 
illegal to defame foods, such as hamburgers. Absurd? 
Commentators suggested that such laws would probably be 
found unconstitutional, but to do this would require 
someone appealing to the Supreme Court. The process 
would be onerous and hasn’t been pursued. The laws 
remain on the books. They serve as a deterrent. 
 Speaking out in public is one thing. When you go to 
work, or rather as soon as you walk through the factory or 
 
4 Richard Harris, Freedom Spent (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976). 
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office door, your ability to speak freely without penalty is 
greatly diminished. As discussed in chapter 7, there’s no 
free speech at work,5 and workplaces, in this way, are 
similar to authoritarian states.6  
 Speaking freely outside of work can be risky too, if 
you value your current job or your future job prospects. 
When you make a comment on social media, or post a 
photo, it may be visible indefinitely. Criticising your 
employer can be way to become jobless. Making political 
or religious comments that offend employers is also risky. 
What is safe to say depends a lot on the person, the 
employer and the circumstances. The main point is that the 
First Amendment doesn’t offer much protection to the 
ordinary citizen in such circumstances. 
 So far, the point is that the First Amendment doesn’t 
work nearly as effectively as might be imagined. Mean-
while, it provides opportunities for hordes of legal scholars, 
lawyers and judges to try to interpret the voluminous legal 
commentary on the Amendment. At least this is a pretty 
safe way to exercise free speech: talk about constitutional 
protection for free speech. 
 
5 Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule 
Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It) (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017); Bruce Barry, Speechless: The 
Erosion of Free Expression in the American Workplace (San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2007); David W. Ewing, Freedom 
Inside the Organization: Bringing Civil Liberties to the Workplace 
(New York: Dutton, 1977). 
6 Deena Weinstein, Bureaucratic Opposition: Challenging Abuses 
at the Workplace (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). 
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 Adam Benforado, in his excellent treatment of biases 
in the US legal system, highlights the limitations of relying 
on regulations related to Constitutional protections guaran-
teed in the Bill of Rights. He concludes: 
 
The complexity of our procedural rules — and the 
work we have put into developing them — creates the 
illusion of fairness. And that makes it all the more 
difficult to address the problems that plague our 
system. Ironically, it may be harder to eliminate false 
confessions when there is an ineffective set of proce-
dural rules aimed at preventing them than it would be 
if there were no protections at all. With elaborate struc-
tures in place, it appears that we’ve addressed the is-
sue, and anything that is not barred at the gates is given 
little or no scrutiny — it’s assumed to be legitimate.7 
 
 The second point is that constitutional protection is not 
necessary for free speech in practice. Australia’s constitu-
tion does not mention free speech, and there is no bill of 
rights or other legislation that guarantees the rights of the 
press or citizens. Yet speech in Australia does not suffer 
greatly, at least not because of lack of constitutional 
protection. 
 In some ways, Australia is not a good example, 
because there are all sorts of restraints on speech. Defama-
tion laws are draconian: they strongly favour plaintiffs, and 
defendants have to fork out tens of thousands of dollars to 
defend in court. There are oppressive laws concerning 
 
7 Adam Benforado, Unfair: The New Science of Criminal Injustice 
(New York: Crown, 2015), pp. 247–248. 
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national security that criminalise whistleblowing and 
reporting on corruption. There are hate speech laws (which, 
however, are rarely invoked and don’t do much to limit hate 
speech).   
 Despite the lack of constitutional or other legal protec-
tion, it can be argued that the ability to speak openly in 
Australia is not systematically different than in the US. No 
one has made a careful comparison. There is a lot of top-
notch investigative journalism in Australia, lots of public 
protest, and vigorous public debates on a range of issues. In 
free speech terms, things are not wonderful by any means, 
but they’re not terrible. 
 Would an Australian bill of rights make a difference? 
Undoubtedly, but perhaps the effect would not be nearly as 
dramatic as envisioned by advocates. 
 If there’s no constitutional protection, then how is free 
speech, such as it is, maintained? The answer is through 
expectations and campaigns. When an academic is dis-
missed from a tenured position because of their public com-
ments, there are two responses that can be effective. One is 
legal action for breaching the terms of employment. 
Australian universities, like other workplaces, have enter-
prise agreements between management and the union, and 
breaching these agreements is a basis for court action. The 
other effective response is publicity. In prominent academic 
freedom cases, there may be considerable media coverage. 
The very prospect of adverse media stories is sufficient, 
most of the time, to deter university administrations from 
taking retaliatory actions. 
 In 2019, Gerd Schröder-Turk, a mathematician at 
Murdoch University in Western Australia, commented on 
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television about inadequate standards for admitting interna-
tional students. The university administration sued him for 
loss of international student income due to his comments, 
and demanded access to information about his contacts with 
journalists. This retaliatory action generated an enormous 
show of support for Schröder and free speech, with over 
25,000 people, including many prominent academics, 
supporting a statement condemning the administration’s 
action. The resulting bad publicity for the university, which 
would probably hurt student recruitment, provided a warn-
ing to any other administration about the likely response to 
attempted gags. 
 There are SLAPPs in Australia. They can’t be 
countered by appealing to the constitution, so instead 
campaigners use publicity to mobilise support, in conjunc-
tion with legal defences.8 
 The fixation on constitutional protection of free speech 
often overshadows other methods for enabling free speech 
and public deliberation. A lot of the commentary about the 
First Amendment assumes that laws and courts are all 
important. They can be important, to be sure, but it is also 
important to understand the dynamics of free speech strug-
gles and for more people to engage in these struggles. 
 
  
 
8 Greg Ogle, Gagged: The Gunns 20 and Other Law Suits (Sydney: 
Envirobook, 2009); Brian Walters, Slapping on the Writs: 
Defamation, Developers and Community Activism (Sydney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2003). 
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Human rights agreements 
The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights covers a wide range of human rights, for 
example the right of peaceful assembly, freedom from 
torture, the right to marry and equality before the law. Most 
of the world’s governments have pledged to uphold these 
rights. Does this make a difference? According to an 
empirical study, a government becoming a party to this 
human rights agreement seems to have had little observable 
impact on its actions.9 One reason is that there are no 
enforcement provisions. The result is that signing up to this 
UN agreement may, in many cases, give only an illusion of 
increased protection of human rights. 
 
Research ethics review 
Some researchers investigate chemicals. Others investigate 
archaeological specimens. Some undertake research on 
animals. And some investigate living, breathing humans. 
For example, medical researchers study surgical tech-
niques, psychologists study mental illness, education re-
searchers study teaching techniques and sociologists study 
family dynamics. A lot can be learned about crime, health, 
 
9 Linda Camp Keith, “The United Nations International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: does it make a difference in human 
rights behavior?” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 1, 1999, 
pp. 95–118. For a more comprehensive analysis, which reveals 
many complexities, see Linda Camp Keith, Political Repression: 
Courts and the Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012). 
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education, leadership, compassion and a host of other 
topics. 
 Social scientists who study humans can use a variety 
of techniques, including observation, interviews and 
surveys. There are also some less familiar techniques. In 
participatory action research, researchers join with 
members of the community to undertake projects with a 
dual purpose, to promote beneficial change and to learn 
about social dynamics. For example, a researcher might 
work with former prisoners to see how reintegration into 
the community can be fostered. 
 Some research raises ethical concerns: subjects might 
be harmed. In the 1970s and 1980s, a movement developed 
to require university research involving humans to be 
approved in advance by a research-ethics committee.  
 In the late 1980s, I interviewed leading Australian 
proponents and opponents of fluoridation. I identified indi-
viduals I wanted to interview, contacted them and talked to 
them in person or over the phone. It was straightforward. 
The challenges involved deciding on the purpose of the 
research, figuring out who to interview, deciding what to 
ask and then using the information gained in research pub-
lications. Initially I planned to write a history of fluorida-
tion in Australia. After the first two interviews, I changed 
my plans. My interviewees couldn’t remember dates and 
actions, but I learned a lot about the way they thought about 
fluoridation issues. 
 By the 2000s, there would be an extra challenge: 
obtaining approval from a human research ethics committee 
to undertake the interviews. This would involve filling out 
an application over 20 pages long (only some questions are 
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relevant) and preparing an information sheet for interview-
ees plus a consent form for them to sign, as well as listing 
typical questions that I would ask. Very likely, I would be 
asked to make revisions in the application, for example 
putting the university logo on the information sheet, and 
asked for additional information about what would be done 
with interview notes and what to do if interviewees became 
distressed. Aside from the time to prepare the application, 
the approval process could take a month, or several months. 
For one of my PhD students, it took over a year to obtain 
approval from two different committees to talk with groups 
of youth about community engagement.  
 Research-ethics review has become standard in nearly 
every research field, and seems to be especially important 
in English-speaking countries. In the US, the committees 
are called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs).  
 Criticisms of research-ethics review are common-
place. Researchers complain about excessive delays, about 
petty bureaucratic requirements, and about the difficulty of 
undertaking research on sensitive topics. 
 Will van den Hoonaard had experience on research-
ethics committees in Canada, and then had second thoughts 
on their value. He undertook an ethnographic study of 
research-ethics review in Canada, focusing on the social 
sciences.10 He noted that the model for research ethics was 
taken from biomedicine and imposed on the social 
 
10 Will C. van den Hoonaard, The Seduction of Ethics: 
Transforming the Social Sciences (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2011). 
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sciences.11 Some productive research methods in the social 
sciences, for example community-building participatory 
research, do not mesh with the biomedical model, and have 
gone into decline. Van den Hoonaard says research-ethics 
review is “impoverishing the social sciences.” 
 He found that committees gave certain topics more 
scrutiny, or rejected applications entirely: “research on 
vulnerable people, students studying children, pedophilia, 
Aboriginal research and child or wife abuse, minors, the use 
of medicinal (herbal) plants, sexuality, drug users, illegiti-
mate activities, or infidelity among professors.”12 
 Disturbingly, he observed that the review process did 
not make researchers more ethical: “Among all the inter-
views I conducted with researchers, there was not one who 
said that complying with the review process led him/her to 
more thoughtful, ethical research, and many saw the 
process as torturous.”13  
 Carl Schneider undertook a comprehensive analysis of 
the effect of IRBs in the US.14 His assessment is damning. 
He provides numerous revealing examples and offers 
cogent arguments showing that the system: 
 
  
 
11 For a history, see Zachary M. Schrag, Ethical Imperialism: 
Institutional Review Boards and the Social Sciences, 1965–2009 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
12 van den Hoonaard, p. 262. 
13 Ibid., p. 223. 
14 Carl E. Schneider, The Censor’s Hand: The Misregulation of 
Human-Subject Research (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015). 
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• causes harm (including deaths)  
• does not prevent unethical research  
• hinders research  
• is unaccountable (there are no appeal procedures)  
• inhibits free speech  
• is ever expanding (from government research to 
university research, from academic to postgraduate to 
undergraduate projects, from work by scholars to work 
by non-scholars) 
• provides no evidence to support its mandate  
• is highly bureaucratic and procedural  
• is erratic (different IRBs come up with different 
requirements), and  
• undermines ethical behaviour and effective profes-
sional controls over unethical behaviour.  
 
IRBs prioritise protecting subjects over all other considera-
tions, even when research benefits subjects, when subjects 
are quite willing to participate, and when informed-consent 
procedures distress subjects more than they protect them. 
 The IRB system is based on not trusting researchers, 
which in turn undermines researchers’ commitment to 
ethical behaviour. A fundamental problem is the reliance on 
event licensing, in which a separate application is needed 
for each research project, by people who are less expert than 
the researchers. 
 Research-ethics committees are an official channel, 
one set up to deal with harms to research subjects. Accord-
ing to critics such as van den Hoonaard and Schneider, 
committees often exaggerate these harms, meanwhile 
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preventing or distorting research agendas with subsequent 
harm to the very groups that may benefit from the research. 
 Like many other official channels, research-ethics 
committees are slow, procedural and deal with technicali-
ties rather than substantive issues. The irony is that the rise 
of this bureaucratic empire has undercut traditions of 
professional ethics that had been well developed in many 
disciplines.  
 
Corporations versus activists 
Some corporations become targets for activists. Think for 
example of campaigners against smoking, protests against 
arms manufacturers and climate-activist blockades against 
coal exports. In response, corporations have used various 
techniques, from public relations to getting police to deal 
with protesters. One of the techniques sometimes used by 
corporations is infiltration. Company employees or paid 
agents join activist groups and build relationships with 
members, thereby gaining information about activist plans 
and strategies. The most insightful source about corporate 
infiltration is Eveline Lubbers’ book Secret Manoeuvres in 
the Dark.15 
 Lubbers examined the long-running campaign against 
infant formula products, such as powdered milk, promoted 
and sold in poor countries. Breast milk is nearly always 
better for babies: it is designed by evolution to provide the 
right sort of nutrition, and also provides protection against 
 
15 Eveline Lubbers, Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark: Corporate 
and Police Spying on Activists (London: Pluto Press, 2012). 
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disease. However, some mothers cannot breastfeed, so 
there is a legitimate role for purchased milk. 
 Some companies, however, promote infant formula as 
superior even in circumstances when breastmilk is better. 
In many poor communities, furthermore, the water used to 
reconstitute powdered milk is contaminated, making chil-
dren ill. For decades, activists have campaigned against 
sales of powdered milk to poor people in developing 
countries. 
 The campaigners’ primary target has been the com-
pany Nestlé. Opponents, a coalition of activists, churches 
and health professionals, organised a boycott of the 
company’s products. To deal with the opposition, Nestlé 
hired various public relations companies. In 1981, Nestlé 
hired Rafael Pagan, who set up an operations centre. Pagan 
implemented a four-stage campaign. One of his aims was 
to create divisions among the opponent groups by building 
links with moderate groups. To help achieve this goal, he 
set up the Nestlé Infant Formula Audit Commission 
(NIFAC), a formal body for receiving public enquiries and 
monitoring Nestlé’s commitment to World Health Organi-
sation codes. Lubbers writes,  
 
The creation of NIFAC served as an effective deflec-
tion shield for Nestlé. Rather than having to deal with 
complaints directly, the company could plausibly 
claim that NIFAC was studying the situation.16 
 
 
16 Ibid., p. 54. 
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Some of the groups involved in the boycott, especially 
churches, wanted to give the formal process a chance. 
Others wanted to continue the boycott. Pagan’s tactic 
succeeded in splitting the boycott campaign, at least for a 
while. 
 Lubbers notes an additional benefit to Nestlé of talking 
with opponent campaigners: it gave insight into their think-
ing. “The Pagan case study illustrates that dialogue between 
a company and its critics is a vital element of the corporate 
counterstrategy and needs to be understood as a tactical 
information-gathering exercise too.”17 
 The Pagan story illustrates how an official channel can 
be set up for the express purpose of disrupting effective 
campaigning. 
 
Tax havens 
Few people are eager to pay taxes, but most appreciate the 
services supported by taxation such as roads, schools and 
hospitals. Even when people don’t like paying taxes, often 
they dislike even more tax avoidance by wealthy individu-
als and companies.  
 One of the methods of avoiding or minimising tax is 
to put money in a “tax haven,” which is a country or juris-
diction with very low tax rates and high secrecy.18 For 
example, a multinational corporation can establish its 
 
17 Ibid., p. 80. 
18 Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men 
Who Stole the World (London: Bodley Head, 2011); Gabriel 
Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax 
Havens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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central office in Switzerland, Hong Kong or the Cayman 
Islands and use transfer pricing to reduce its apparent 
income in higher-tax places like France and Sweden. A 
company that makes a lot of money in France will sell some 
of its output to the headquarters in Switzerland at a very low 
price. On paper, the French branch ends up losing money, 
so tax in France is minimised, while the Switzerland head-
quarters makes a lot of money, but this is okay because the 
tax rate is low. 
 The existence of tax havens serves wealthy individuals 
and companies, preserving and increasing their wealth, 
which means taxpayers and governments elsewhere lose 
out. What should be done about tax havens?  
 The problem has been around a long time. You might 
imagine that governments around the world would get 
together and figure out a way to eliminate them. But they 
don’t, because that would mean challenging wealthy 
companies and individuals. However, because tax havens 
are such an obvious source of unfairness, governments need 
to be seen to try to do something about them. So they set up 
a process of negotiation. It’s a classic official channel.  
 Gabriel Zucman, who calculated that the amount of the 
world’s “hidden wealth” was over $2 trillion, wrote a book, 
The Hidden Wealth of Nations. He has a chapter on dealing 
with havens. It could be a primer on the failure of official 
channels: regulations set up in the European Union almost 
seem designed to fail (and perhaps they were). Zucman 
writes,  
 
Fifteen years of negotiations in Europe — the first 
discussions began at the beginning of the 1990s — to 
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end with this: a directive filled with holes that shows 
absolutely no serious will to fight against financial 
dissimulation.19 
 
 Yet Zucman remains optimistic that something will be 
done. He shows the logic of using direct action (trade sanc-
tions and tariffs) against tax havens like Switzerland to 
force action against the banks. He assumes that the logic of 
the argument will win the day, though he admits that 
“Although solutions exist, governments have not been 
stellar up to now in their boldness or determination.” Based 
on past lack of action, it seems more likely that delaying 
actions will postpone the reckoning indefinitely. 
 Citizen action is a better hope. As Zucman says, “To 
turn the page on large-scale fraud, the battle that must be 
fought is not just a battle between governments. It is above 
all a battle of citizens against the false inevitability of tax 
evasion and the impotence of nations.”20 
 
Israel-Palestine 
For centuries, Jews in Europe were persecuted by Christian 
rulers. This culminated in the Nazi genocide, called the 
Holocaust, in which millions of Jews were murdered. 
 Even before the Holocaust, some Jewish figures were 
searching for a homeland where they could be free of 
persecution. They were called Zionists, and they mostly 
focused on Palestine, the spiritual home of the Jews. After 
 
19 Zucman, p. 72. 
20 Ibid., p. 116. 
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the Holocaust, the Zionist cause had much greater 
legitimacy.  
 After World War I, the League of Nations gave the 
British government a mandate to administer Palestine. Most 
of the people living there were Palestinian Arabs. Jewish 
immigration caused resentment and resistance among the 
Palestinians. Tensions increased after the end of World War 
II. To address the conflict, in 1947 the newly formed United 
Nations recommended partitioning the territory. A war 
ensued between Jews and Palestinians, who were supported 
by forces from neighbouring Arab states. By 1949, the 
newly formed state of Israel covered most of the former 
British mandate of Palestine, and three-quarters of a million 
Palestinians became refugees living in neighbouring coun-
tries. Some of them wanted to return. This was the basis for 
a seemingly intractable conflict. 
 In 1967 and 1973, Israel fought wars against its Arab 
neighbours, in the process occupying more land. The Pal-
estinians remained exiled. 
 The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), 
formed in 1964, became the most visible source of 
resistance. In line with the concurrent Third World strug-
gles against imperialism, the PLO endorsed armed struggle 
and the transformative power of revolutionary violence. 
However, this approach did little to advance the cause of 
the Palestinians.  
 As the years went by, Palestinians in the occupied 
territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank increasingly 
questioned their prospects of being liberated by an outside 
organisation, the PLO, and in 1987 there emerged a popular 
unarmed Palestinian resistance from within the occupied 
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territories, called the intifada. This resistance involved 
boycotts, symbolic protests, self-run schooling and throw-
ing of stones. The intifada could be called unarmed. It was 
far more effective than armed struggle in uniting Palestini-
ans and generating international support.21  
 Eventually, the Israeli government agreed to negotia-
tions with Palestinian leaders in what was called a peace 
process, which led to the Oslo agreement in 1993. The 
peace process promised to address Palestinian grievances, 
and so the intifada ended. However, the Oslo accord did not 
actually resolve the longstanding problems.  
 The conflict continued. There was a second intifada. 
There were clashes between the Israeli military and Pales-
tinian groups, with thousands killed, most of them Palestin-
ians. There have been many peaceful protests by Palestini-
ans and Israelis, though international news normally reports 
only violence. 
 
21 See for example Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country: 
Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1994); Marwan Darweish and Andrew 
Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of 
Unarmed Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015); Maxine 
Kaufman-Lacusta, Refusing to Be Enemies: Palestinian and Israeli 
Nonviolent Resistance to the Israeli Occupation (Reading, UK: 
Ithaca Press, 2010); Mary Elizabeth King, A Quiet Revolution: The 
First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance (New York: 
Nation Books, 2007); Andrew Rigby, Palestinian Resistance and 
Nonviolence (East Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2010); Andrew Rigby, The 
First Palestinian Intifada Revisited (Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene 
Publishing, 2015).  
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 There is much more that could be said about the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict evokes strong emo-
tions, with views highly polarised. Here, my focus is on the 
role of official channels. 
 Some official channels helped, in particular direct 
negotiations between governments of Israel and neighbour-
ing countries. However, for solving the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, official channels have been ineffectual. Numerous 
resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly have 
been ignored by the Israeli government. Most disappoint-
ingly, the so-called peace process, including the Oslo 
accords, gave only an illusion of providing a resolution.  
 
Rwanda and the UN 
Rwanda is a country in central Africa. Small by African 
standards, it has a population of about seven million, most 
of them Christians: it is the most Christian country in 
Africa. Rwanda was previously a Belgian colony. The 
Belgians had assigned most of the people to one of two 
groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. There is not all that much 
physical difference between them, and many lived near 
each other and intermarried. The Belgian administrators, by 
relying on Tutsis for administration, laid the groundwork 
for ethnic antagonism. On independence in 1962 the Hutus, 
the much larger group, took control of the government.  
 Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were forced out of the 
country. Some of them joined an army called the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF), which launched attacks over the 
border from Uganda in the north. In the early 1990s, the 
United Nations became involved. It helped negotiate a 
truce, and a UN peacekeeping force — soldiers from 
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several countries — was assigned to Rwanda. Relations 
between the Rwandan government and the RPF remained 
tense. The government encouraged racial hatred against 
Tutsis. 
 On 6 April 1994, a plane carrying the president of 
Rwanda was shot down by a missile near the airport in 
Kigali, the capital. Hutus in the Rwandan government 
blamed this on the RPF and immediately launched a 
campaign to kill Tutsis throughout the country. Most 
Western governments evacuated their citizens. The UN 
peacekeeping force remained. However, according to its 
mandate, it could not use force except for self-defence. 
 The commander of the peacekeeping force was a 
Canadian, Roland Dallaire. He was appalled at the scale of 
the killing. He pleaded desperately for reinforcements, and 
for official permission to intervene against the killings. 
 By chance, at the time the Rwandan government was 
a member of the UN Security Council, and Rwanda’s 
representative said there was no problem. Instead of 
reinforcing the peacekeeping force, the Security Council 
ordered that most of the troops be removed. 
 Despite increasing reports about mass killings, 
members of the Security Council were reluctant to label the 
events as genocide. The same scenario played out in several 
member countries. In the US, the government avoided the 
word genocide, thereby avoiding the necessity to intervene. 
 More than half a million people were killed, both 
Tutsis and so-called moderate Hutus. The genocide was 
only stopped by the RPF which, after the killings began, 
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relaunched its military attacks, eventually overthrowing the 
government.22 
 
Disarmament 
Massive military establishments, arms races, war: many 
people see these as major sources of human misery and 
death. What should be done about them? Governments, 
heeding popular pressure, have entered into negotiations to 
regulate arms, reduce armaments and ban certain types of 
weapons. Regulating arms is called arms control, and 
reducing armaments is called disarmament.  
 There has been some progress. There have been 
treaties about nuclear weapons, and bans of land mines, 
biological weapons and chemical weapons. It sounds posi-
tive. The trouble is, this gives only the impression of serious 
efforts to eliminate the means for war. 
 
22 African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance 
(London: African Rights, 1995, rev. ed.); Michael Barnett, 
Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Roméo Dallaire with 
Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of 
Humanity in Rwanda (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004); Alison 
Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda, 
2nd ed. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Jean Hatzfeld, 
Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2005); Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: 
The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 2004); Samantha Power, 
“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New 
York: Basic Books, 2002); Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: 
Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
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 For decades, some informed observers — those who 
pay close attention to disarmament negotiations — have 
been critical of the whole process. Decades ago, Alva 
Myrdal wrote a book titled The Game of Disarmament in 
which she exposed disarmament negotiations as a sham.23 
They gave only the appearance of addressing the problem. 
 Look for example at nuclear weapons, which have the 
potential to kill hundreds of millions of people and devas-
tate the environment. The states with the most nuclear 
weapons, the United States and Russia, have reduced the 
number of weapons in their arsenals. That sounds promis-
ing. However, they have continued to “modernise” their 
weapons and delivery systems, making them more effective 
for war-fighting. None of the governments that acquired 
hundreds of nuclear weapons beginning in the 1960s — 
Britain, China, France — have renounced them, and several 
other governments have joined the nuclear “club”: Israel, 
India, Pakistan and North Korea. The only country to 
develop nuclear weapons and then shut down its 
programme was South Africa, and that was after the peace-
ful political revolution that ended apartheid. 
 In the 1970s, most of the world’s governments signed 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was intended to do two 
things: to discourage governments that did not have nuclear 
weapons from acquiring them, and to prompt nuclear 
weapons states to disarm. Basically, the treaty was a 
 
23 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United 
States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon, 1976). 
See also Johan Galtung, “Why do disarmament negotiations fail?” 
Gandhi Marg, nos. 38-39, May-June 1982, pp. 298–307. 
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bargain between the nuclear weapons states and the others: 
“Look, if you promise not to get any nuclear weapons, we’ll 
do our part by gradually getting rid of ours.” The trouble is 
that the second part of the agreement was quickly forgotten. 
Nuclear weapons states have sat on their arsenals without 
any intention of disarming.24 Meanwhile, leaders of these 
states try to create alarm about other governments getting 
nuclear weapons. Think of the uproar about North Korea’s 
small arsenal and about the possibility that the Iraqi or 
Iranian governments might obtain nuclear weapons. 
 The Non-Proliferation Treaty turned out to be a sham. 
It might have been effective in discouraging some govern-
ments, like Australia’s, from seeking nuclear weapons, but 
it has been completely ineffective in promoting disarma-
ment by the major nuclear states. 
 The implication is not to put any trust in disarmament 
negotiations. Governments are the ones that have built up 
military systems. In most countries, militaries are more 
likely to be used for aggression or repression than for 
defence. Why should anyone expect that governments, the 
cause of the problem, would also be the solution? Disarma-
ment negotiations are more about regulating military races 
than about serious steps towards disarmament. 
 In contrast, popular movements have made a differ-
ence. Lawrence Wittner made a massive historical study of 
the movements against nuclear weapons. He found that 
when movements were weak, arms races proceeded apace, 
whereas when movements were strong, this limited arms 
 
24 Paul Rogers, Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-
first Century (London: Pluto, 2000). 
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races. He found evidence that governments were influenced 
by protest movements, but they never admitted this in 
public.25 
 Here’s what has happened over and over. There is 
popular agitation for peace. Leaders in some governments 
feel the pressure, so they enter into arms negotiations. This 
gives the impression they are addressing the problem. 
Unfortunately, the impression is often misleading. This 
would be amusing except that so many lives are at stake. 
 
25 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, 3 volumes 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993–2003).  
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Conclusion 
 
 
When was the last time you saw someone urinating in 
public — someone who wasn’t drunk? In Australia at least, 
there are laws against it, but laws aren’t the main reason it 
has become uncommon. The reason is that public attitudes 
have changed. Public urination is considered disgusting. 
Laws might be helpful to deal with a few cases, but the main 
deterrent is public pressure. 
 Another example is chewing tobacco. There used to be 
spittoons in public venues. No more. 
 Centuries ago in Europe, there were no flush toilets. 
Instead, guests at a castle would find a convenient corner or 
use curtains.1 These days, it would be the height of bad 
manners for a guest to pee on their host’s carpet. No law is 
needed. Social pressure is enough. 
 Here’s a different example. You receive a call from a 
stranger. The voice on the line says there’s a problem with 
your Internet connection. Or they have detected some 
malware on Windows. Or perhaps the caller talks about car 
insurance, roof repairs or some other topic. After you’ve 
received a few of these calls, you probably know they are 
scams, attempting to get you to provide your credit card 
number and password.  
 
1 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners, 
volume 1 (New York: Urizen Books, 1978; originally published in 
1939). 
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 Do you hang up immediately? Shout abuse? Listen 
politely and say your Internet connection is fine — or that 
you don’t have Internet? Ask the caller for a number to ring 
back? Have a conversation with the caller and ask whether 
it’s a hard job when so many people they call are nasty? 
 There are laws against scammers, and a few of them 
are prosecuted. However, the most important method of 
resistance is an informed public. As people become skilled 
at recognising scams, scammers have to become more 
sophisticated. Fake emails, asking for your password, 
become ever more convincing, but gradually most users 
become better at recognising scams or taking precautions 
like checking with someone knowledgeable. 
 The point of these examples is that laws, like other 
official channels, are not the only way to deal with undesir-
able behaviours. Cultural change, skill development and 
collective action are also important.  
 
What to do about official channels? 
Four possibilities are to use them, reform them, oppose 
them and ignore them. These are not mutually exclusive: 
you might want to use an official channel to show its 
weaknesses, and use this evidence to push for reform. 
 Let’s look first at using official channels. Based on the 
experiences of whistleblowers and others, here are three 
lessons. 
 
1. When perpetrators are powerful, official channels are 
more likely to serve to reduce outrage over injustice. For 
example, when there’s a brutal attack on peaceful protest-
ers, and it’s publicised, the government might set up an 
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inquiry. Many people think the inquiry will provide justice, 
so everything will be okay. The inquiry takes the issue out 
of the public arena. It relies on experts, such as lawyers and 
doctors, and slows things down. Only rarely does such an 
inquiry bring down high-level officials: usually functionar-
ies are blamed. It is even rarer for such an inquiry to foster 
systemic change. 
 
2. In deciding whether to use an official channel, look at its 
track record. How many complaints about sexual harass-
ment are vindicated? How often do whistleblowers succeed 
when they take legal action against their employers? 
 In many cases, it’s hard to find evidence of an 
agency’s track record. You can’t rely on media stories, 
because they typically report exceptional cases, like the 
whistleblower who is awarded $10 million in compensa-
tion. It’s not news when a hundred whistleblowers, in 
separate cases, receive nothing or a pittance. You can try to 
talk to others who have used the same official channel. That 
may not give you an accurate estimate of your chances of 
success, but it is better than nothing and can give some 
indication of the time, effort and money that will be 
required. 
 You know your case is very strong, so even though 
others haven’t succeeded, you think you will. The trouble 
is, all the others thought their cases were strong too. Even 
when you believe the evidence is overwhelmingly in your 
favour, it’s still quite possible you will fail. 
 
3. In deciding whether to use an official channel, compare 
it to alternatives, in particular mobilising support and 
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developing skills. Think about using an official channel in 
conjunction with these alternatives. 
 One of the biggest traps is to go immediately to an 
official channel — whether the police, ombudsman, 
experts, politicians or senior management, among others — 
without considering alternatives. This is a trap because of 
points #1 and #2: the official channel may end up reducing 
outrage about an injustice or it may have a bad track record 
in dealing with cases such as yours. 
 How do you make a comparison with alternatives? It’s 
not easy, because often there’s insufficient information. It’s 
valuable to talk to people who’ve been through it 
themselves. For official channels, talk to people who’ve 
used them. For mobilising support, talk with people in 
activist groups or who have run campaigns. For skill 
development, again talk with people who have made this a 
priority. 
 One of the common illusions about official channels is 
that they will provide a prompt solution. This only happens 
rarely. Even if there is a major government investigation 
into a social problem, it may not lead to much change. 
Social change takes time. So, when comparing official 
channels with alternatives, think long term. Nothing is 
likely to provide a quick fix. The fair comparison will 
consider the long-term effects of using official channels, 
mobilising support and developing skills. 
 
Rather than just using official channels, another option is to 
reform them. This might be improving whistleblower laws, 
sexual harassment procedures or United Nations processes. 
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If laws and processes can be improved, that will help a lot 
of people in the long run. 
 Again, it’s important to compare efforts to promote 
reform with alternatives. Furthermore, sometimes the alter-
natives are roads to reform. When employees become 
skilled at anonymous leaking in the public interest, employ-
ers and governments may feel impelled to introduce better 
whistleblower protection schemes — better on paper, at 
least. Massive protests against war provide pressure on 
governments to seriously discuss disarmament.  
 A third option is to oppose official channels. This is 
worth considering when they serve as a dangerous façade. 
For example, quite a few authoritarian governments run 
fake elections, in which opposition movements have no 
chance due to corruption in vote counting, hindering of non-
government parties, preventing opposition figures from 
being on the ballot, or arresting them. In some such circum-
stances, it may be better to denounce the elections as a 
sham. Opposing an official channel can help to highlight its 
deficiencies, and sometimes to lead to improvements. The 
point here is that opposing an official channel is worth 
considering as an option. 
 Finally, sometimes it is better just to ignore official 
channels, especially when they don’t work very well. 
Rather than spending energy in trying to use them or to 
reform them, it can be more effective to look for other ways 
to achieve the same goals. Alternatives include finding or 
developing ways to address problems directly. This often 
involves helping people acquire skills and act together 
without relying on someone else to take action on their 
behalf. 
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Final thoughts 
Many people look to authorities for protection. They want 
to believe that government agencies, experts, politicians, 
courts and upper management, among others, will address 
problems. Sometimes they will. My argument here is that 
often they don’t or won’t. My central message is not to rely 
on official channels. Be sceptical. Investigate performance. 
Check out alternatives. 
 Most of the people working in official channels are 
doing their best. To question reliance on official channels 
is not a reflection on individuals in the system. 
 At one level, this advice is obvious. Of course official 
channels don’t always work. Nevertheless, belief in salva-
tion from on high is widespread. If one agency won’t help, 
then find another. If the government is corrupt, elect a new 
government. To counter this automatic tendency to turn to 
official channels, it is important to keep in mind other op-
tions: developing skills, changing cultures, acting collec-
tively and developing alternatives. 
Epilogue 
A different perspective 
 
 
The golden rule: he who has the gold makes the rules 
 
Official channels often give only an illusion of addressing 
problems. Rather than relying on official channels and 
expecting them to deliver fair outcomes, it is important to 
consider alternative options, including developing skills 
and changing cultures. That is the argument in this book. 
But before concluding, it is worth examining quite a differ-
ent angle on official channels. Perhaps they serve to main-
tain the system — not by failing but by succeeding. 
 In the study of US regulatory systems — especially 
systems to regulate commerce, for example railways, elec-
tricity and manufacturing — the dominant voice has been 
criticism of government interventions on the grounds that 
they discourage innovation and entrepreneurialism. This is 
the “big government is bad” theme in US political culture, 
exemplified by President Ronald Reagan’s comment that 
“Government is not a solution to our problem, government 
is the problem.” 
 However, there is another perspective on the regula-
tory impulse in US politics and economics. According to 
some scholars, regulation enables the system to survive, 
and gives advantages to big business.1 Without regulation, 
 
1 Classic treatments of the US progressive era include Gabriel 
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of 
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small businesses could undercut big businesses through 
nimble innovation and lower prices. The result would be 
ruthless competition, driving down profits. Big business 
needs government intervention to thwart competition, in 
other words to protect monopolistic and oligopolistic 
operations.2 
 An example is the patent system. Patents are a restraint 
on trade, preventing competitors from producing similar 
goods for the duration of the patent protection. In a truly 
free market, there would be no patents and prices would de-
cline, sometimes precipitously. The cost of pharmaceutical 
drugs, for example, would quickly drop to just above the 
price of production, just as with generics now. 
 Regulations, like patents, benefit larger companies, 
because complying with regulations takes up a smaller 
proportion of their overall expenses. Big companies may 
complain about regulations but actually need them to 
ensure larger profits. That is why the push for greater 
protection of intellectual property comes primarily from the 
 
American history, 1900–1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963) and 
James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900–
1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). For a more general critique of 
institutions, including regulatory bodies, see Butler D. Shaffer, 
Calculated Chaos: Institutional Threats to Peace and Human 
Survival (San Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1985). 
2 Economist John Kenneth Galbraith distinguished between two 
components of the economic system: the market system and the 
planning system. In the planning system, big businesses control the 
conditions for surviving and thriving. See for example Economics 
and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). 
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largest companies in software, publishing, biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals. 
 From this perspective, ensuring that regulations are in 
place and have an effect enables the economic system to 
continue to give the greatest rewards to those with the most 
power and money. 
 Another way to look at this is to observe that the rules 
governing activities are not neutral but instead are usually 
biased in favour of those with the most power to shape the 
rules. Progressive income taxes, for example, seem to 
penalise those who make more money, but this is in the 
wider context of income inequality. If the head of a 
company makes ten or a hundred times as much as a shop-
level employee, it doesn’t really matter that the head has to 
pay a higher percentage of income tax. (Various forms of 
tax avoidance for the rich are an added advantage.) The 
rules, in this case, are the various processes that create 
inequalities in income. The income distribution is often 
treated as natural, as unbiased, rather than the result of 
pressures and power plays that advantage some groups and 
disadvantage others. It is not part of nature that a doctor 
earns more than a cleaner or that a school principal earns 
more than a childcare worker. 
 In this context, regulations help maintain a system 
built around inequality, exploitation and unfairness. In 
short, the system is rigged even when everyone follows the 
rules. Those who benefit most from the rigged system need 
regulators to keep upstarts in line. 
 Consider how this perspective applies to the case 
studies in this book. Much whistleblowing, namely speak-
ing out in the public interest, concerns various forms of 
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cheating: people or organisations getting an unfair 
advantage by stealing, bending the rules and causing harm 
without penalty. If there were no such cheating, neverthe-
less the rules could be biased. Someone who challenges 
economic inequality, or who challenges environmental 
degradation, is not usually called a whistleblower, but 
might be called a reformer or activist. The implication is 
that whistleblowing is vital for challenging some forms of 
corruption but seldom enough to challenge institutionalised 
unfairness and harm. 
 Imagine that sexual harassment procedures worked 
ideally, so in workplaces there was no overt harassment. 
However, this would not be enough to challenge power 
inequalities associated with organisational hierarchies. Nor 
would it get rid of sexual harassment, which regularly 
occurs outside of workplaces, for example on the street. 
Inequalities in power are vitally important, and enable 
harassment.  
 Getting rid of student plagiarism sounds fine, but this 
does not address more fundamental features of schooling 
that can undermine learning, including the system of grades 
with its associated assumption that learning is a competitive 
endeavour and that status hierarchies are legitimate.  
 Rules governing the editing of Wikipedia are intended 
to ensure a good quality product, namely accurate and 
useful information. The trouble is that these rules can be 
used by editors to promote their own preferences and push 
out or discourage others. Following the rules is insufficient 
to address this problem. 
 There are many problems with the system of electoral 
politics. In some countries, such as the US, certain catego-
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ries of people are excluded or discouraged from voting. 
Many voters may be ill-informed, swayed more by slogans 
and attention to personality than by careful consideration of 
policies. Campaigners regularly make promises that, when 
elected, they do not fulfil. Politicians are influenced by 
campaign donations and lobbying. Imagine that all these 
shortcomings could be overcome: all citizens are enabled 
and encouraged to vote, candidates cannot campaign but 
can only provide standardised information about them-
selves, and the boundaries for electorates are assigned by 
an independent body. Even in such an ideal system there 
would still be the inherent limitations of representation, 
including that a small number of individuals make 
decisions on behalf of an entire community.  
 In these and other examples, ensuring that rules are 
followed is worthwhile but not the end of the story. Official 
channels can only do so much when the rules underpin a 
system that is less than ideal. The implication is that part of 
the struggle for a better world is questioning the rules and, 
when needed, trying to change them. 
Appendix 1 
Roles of official channels 
 
 
Official channels can be understood from various perspec-
tives. Here, I discuss several roles they can play. 
 
• As organisations or processes 
• Doing the right thing 
• Under attack 
• Serving as tools 
• Attacking 
• As misleading symbols 
• As theatre 
 
Many people assume official channels do just what they say 
they do: the right thing. That’s good when it occurs. 
However, it’s useful to imagine that other things are going 
on, and this is where the different perspectives can be 
helpful. In practice, many official channels operate differ-
ently at different times, or have several different processes 
going at the same time. It’s risky to accept or dismiss an 
agency on the basis of a single perspective. It can pay to 
investigate with an open mind. 
  
As organisations or processes 
Official channels can also be understood as organisations, 
with internal power dynamics, including dissent, suppres-
sion, factions and so forth. In this they are no different than 
other organisations. However, people tend to think of 
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organisations — some of them, anyway — as unitary 
entities, for example when referring to “the government” or 
“Canberra” or “they” as if government is a monolithic 
whole. It can be useful to remember that not everyone 
inside an organisation agrees with the views expounded by 
those at the top, and indeed some may be actively trying to 
change directions. 
 Some official channels are more processes than organ-
isations, for example elections. Even so, processes require 
people to work together towards an outcome, so there are 
some human dynamics, often inside organisations or more 
widely through networks. 
 
Doing the right thing 
Imagine an organisation that does everything the right way: 
it does its job the way it’s supposed to, and the way it says 
it does. This is the ideal. 
 An ombudsman’s office, for example, might deal with 
all submissions promptly, efficiently and fairly, according 
to publicly available processes and criteria. No special 
favours are done, and no one is brushed off without proper 
treatment.  
 When organisations do the right thing, often this 
means they are professional and even harmonious inter-
nally. Each member does their job well, without interfer-
ence from ambition or idiosyncrasies or personal vendettas. 
There might well be disagreements, even fierce ones, but 
these are dealt with in an open and honest manner, using 
conflict resolution techniques if necessary. Conflicts are in 
the service of performance and improvement, not to their 
detriment. 
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 Ideally, a high-performing watchdog agency has 
ample resources to deal with all relevant matters, even with 
some spare capacity to handle emergencies or major cases. 
However, having ample resources is unlikely, especially 
because a high-performing agency is likely to develop a 
reputation and attract more “business.” 
 Even an organisation that is woefully underfunded can 
still do the right thing, with the qualification that this is “to 
the best of its ability.” Performance needs to be judged in 
relation to capacity. 
 It is natural to imagine that this hypothetical organisa-
tion — ethical, efficient and high-performing — will have 
a sterling reputation. However, this may not be the case. A 
good watchdog agency is bound to offend powerful 
individuals and groups, who may attempt to discredit, 
hinder or defund the agency. Those who are powerful are 
likely to judge an organisation not by how well it is doing 
its job but by how well it is serving their interests. Various 
means can be used against an effective agency. 
 Furthermore, no agency should be expected to do 
everything well. A more realistic expectation is that it does 
some things well, especially the most important things. An 
example is a court that makes wise decisions on the most 
significant cases. 
 Curiously, there seems to be relatively little writing 
about organisations doing the right thing. Most of the 
attention is on problems, shortcomings and failures. There 
are relatively few news stories about well-functioning 
organisations, and relatively little scholarly attention to 
explaining how they do as well as they do. 
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Under attack 
Sometimes agencies come under attack, for various 
reasons, including for doing the right thing. This occurs 
when judges make rulings that politicians or people don’t 
like, so there is talk about limiting the autonomy of judges, 
for example with mandatory sentencing laws.  
 When a watchdog agency actually does its job well, 
this can be threatening to corrupt groups and so there is 
pressure to rein in the agency, for example by cutting its 
funding, changing its staff, imposing controls over its 
powers or even shutting it down. 
 Indonesia’s anti-corruption body KPK (Corruption 
Eradication Commission) has been highly effective, and as 
a result has had a high degree of public support. Legislators 
have made many attempts to muzzle the KPK.  
 
As tools 
Many government-funded agencies are nominally inde-
pendent. They are required to operate according to legal 
mandates. In practice, some agencies operate as tools of 
others. An example is a corporate regulator that, instead of 
dealing with illegal and unethical business activities, 
protects the corporations it is supposed to monitor and 
sanction. There’s a body of writing about “captured bureau-
cracies” and “regulatory capture.”1 These terms refer to 
regulatory agencies that serve the interests of the industry 
 
1 For example, Ernesto Dal Bó, “Regulatory capture: a review,” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 22, no. 2, 2006, pp. 203–
225. 
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groups they are supposed to regulate: the agencies have 
been “captured” by the industry. 
 Also fitting in here are front groups, for example 
corporate-funded groups that look like they are grassroots 
environmental groups but actually have little or no citizen 
involvement. These are different in that they were never 
intended to be independent. 
 It’s not clear whether or how to distinguish captured 
bureaucracies and front groups. The origin of the capture 
and how the capture operates may be different but the result 
is much the same: what appears to be an independent group 
is actually serving a master, and the service to the master is 
all the more effective the more the group is perceived as 
being independent. In both cases, exposure is an effective 
way to challenge these groups. 
 In many cases, there is direct sponsorship, for example 
of front groups. However, captured bureaucracies are not 
usually formally dependent on the relevant industry group: 
there is a process of accommodation, interaction and 
sharing of worldviews. Finally, there are instances in which 
groups can be “captured” even without any action by the 
industry that benefits. The classic treatment is Matthew 
Crenson’s The Un-politics of Air Pollution.2 Crenson 
documented that a local government body made decisions 
in support of the dominant corporation in the area, US Steel, 
even though US Steel apparently did nothing overt to influ-
 
2 Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-politics of Air Pollution: A Study 
of Non-decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1971). 
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ence the decision-making process. Just by being there, it 
seemingly shaped the agenda of the government. 
 
Attacking 
Sometimes agencies go on the attack against anyone posing 
a threat to the groups they are supposed to regulate. For 
example, a police force, instead of pursuing organised 
crime, might instead attempt to harass and frame whistle-
blowers who are challenging organised crime. 
 
As misleading symbols 
In many cases, agencies and processes appear to be doing 
something when actually little or nothing is happening. This 
serves to reassure people.  
 Courts and prisons give the appearance of protecting 
society from transgressions. This occurs in some cases, but 
in a very selective fashion. Some sorts of transgressions, 
especially some crimes of violence, are treated severely, 
whereas others, like massive corporate corruption, are 
implicitly approved.3 There are numerous other examples, 
including whistleblower laws and other cases in this book. 
 In many of the cases in which official channels serve 
as misleading symbols, they are also serving as tools of 
others. In most of the backfire cases, that is the whole point. 
After a massacre that causes a tremendous outcry, govern-
ments set up investigations as a means of showing that the 
 
3 Thane Rosenbaum, The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal 
System Fails to Do What’s Right (New York: HarperCollins, 
2004). 
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problem will be fixed, even though not much change may 
happen.  
 
As theatre 
Official channels sometimes operate as a type of theatre for 
observers. One example is royal commissions that seek 
publicity, turning the formal part of the investigation into a 
show. The New South Wales royal commission into police 
corruption, held in the mid 1990s, was able to turn one 
corrupt policeman to become an informant, and he covertly 
videoed some of his dealings, which had tremendous 
impact when broadcast on television. A few of the investi-
gations of the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
in NSW have followed the same path (see appendix 3). 
 However, not every royal commission seeks or 
achieves a high public profile and becomes a drama in this 
sense. According to Rodney Tiffin in Scandals, only a few 
royal commissions go down this road.4  
 There’s a complication in talking about official chan-
nels as dramas, in that nearly anything in life can be treated 
as a drama. Indeed, drama is a common metaphor, and one 
can point to actors, stages, plots and so forth.  
 If everything can be thought of in dramatic terms, what 
is different about the dramas involving official channels? 
One is the outcome, the denouement of the plot, which is 
supposed to dispense justice. Another is the plot line, which 
is the process of dispensing justice. A key difference 
 
4 Rodney Tiffen, Scandals: Media, Politics and Corruption in 
Contemporary Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales 
Press, 1999). 
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between different cases is the size of the audience, small in 
many instances but occasionally huge. The NSW Police 
Royal Commission and Soviet shows trials were intended 
to have large audiences, and did. The performers in the OJ 
Simpson episodes probably didn’t want a large audience, 
but the media ensured that they did. 
 
The next two appendices are case studies intended to illus-
trate some of the categories outlined above. 
Appendix 2 
Watching the doctors? 
 
 
If you live in the Australian state of New South Wales and 
you want to make a complaint about a doctor or nurse, the 
obvious place to go is the Health Care Complaints Commis-
sion (HCCC). It was set up by the state government to deal 
with shortcomings in the health professions. According to 
its web page, the HCCC “acts to protect public health and 
safety by assessing, resolving, investigating and prosecut-
ing complaints about health care.”1 
 The HCCC is a classic sort of official channel. It is a 
watchdog body, aimed keeping practitioners in the health 
system under scrutiny. 
 Here, I quote media reports about the HCCC, espe-
cially about its inadequacies. The purpose of this is to 
illustrate some of the roles of official channels.  
 
A health watchdog with no fangs 
It was April Fool’s Day, 1 April 2004, but the front-page 
headline in the Sydney Morning Herald was no joke. The 
Herald is one of Australia’s quality newspapers, well re-
spected and not given to scandal-mongering. The unusually 
long headline read: 
 
 
1 Health Care Complaints Commission, 
https://www.hccc.nsw.gov.au, 1 March 2020. 
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They entered hospital full of trust. Now they are dead 
or damaged. And no case was properly investigated. 
Not one. 
 
In the centre of the front page was a box titled “16 cases 
that demand answers.” The first one read: 
 
A visiting surgeon who was given the okay from the 
relative of a patient to perform a mastectomy. The con-
sent form was incomplete and referred to the incorrect 
operating site. The wrong breast was removed. 
 
This is the sort of case that the HCCC was set up to deal 
with. There was a serious failure of procedures that needed 
to be investigated. The problem was that the HCCC wasn’t 
investigating properly. The main story began this way: 
 
As many as 16 doctors working at Camden and Camp-
belltown hospitals face further investigation and 
possible disciplinary action after an inquiry found that 
the NSW health watchdog had botched investigations 
into every complaint it considered. 
 The interim report, prepared for a special 
commission of inquiry by Bret Walker, SC, identified 
10 patients whose cases were mismanaged. 
 They include a woman who lost the wrong breast 
in a mastectomy and a patient who broke her pelvis 
when she fell out of bed but whose condition was not 
recorded in notes. 
 In all, 70 complaints were examined but Mr 
Walker said not one of them was properly investigated 
by the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC). 
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The message was stark. The HCCC, set up to investigate 
complaints about health providers, wasn’t doing its job. 
Why not? In an accompanying article also on the front page, 
a journalist offered a comment under the title “Who put the 
muzzle on the watchdog?” 
 
Bret Walker’s interim analysis of the Camden and 
Campbelltown hospitals quagmire can be distilled into 
one arresting finding: the state’s health watchdog is no 
sick puppy. It has long been armed with well articu-
lated jaws and sharp legislative teeth.  
 The problem at the heart of this shocking human 
tragedy is that when it came to pursuing individuals — 
in this case 16 doctors and potentially as many nurses 
— the old watchdog was disobedient to its legislative 
master. 
 And it wilfully refused to bare its fangs. 
 
The HCCC had been given considerable powers by the state 
parliament. It had the power to deal with complaints about 
the health system generally and complaints about individual 
doctors and nurses. But it decided to treat complaints about 
individuals as complaints about the health system. It meant 
that the HCCC essentially did nothing about complaints. 
And, according to the report by Bret Walker, the HCCC’s 
investigations all had flaws. 
 Another black mark for the HCCC was the case of 
Graeme Reeves, a surgeon who carried out numerous oper-
ations that maimed or killed patients, targeting women and 
babies for unnecessary or excessive operations. In one case, 
he removed a woman’s vulva without permission; the oper-
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ation is normally only considered when cancer is present, 
but there was none in this case. 
 In early 2008, Channel 9’s television show Sunday 
broadcast three programmes about Reeves titled “Who 
watches the doctors?” The programmes exposed Reeves’ 
behaviour based on numerous complaints. Channel 9’s 
coverage was followed by major stories in the Sunday 
Telegraph newspaper. As a result of the media exposés, 
hundreds more women came forward with complaints 
about Reeves. 
 Where was the HCCC during this time? Before the 
Channel 9 programmes, the HCCC had received two dozen 
complaints about Reeves. “Who watches the doctors?” put 
the spotlight on the HCCC’s inadequate action.2 
 Reeves was charged with numerous crimes, including 
female genital mutilation, and was convicted and impris-
oned. The legal system seemed to offer Reeves every 
consideration, while his victims received little, but that is 
another story. 
 Reeves, dubbed “the butcher of Bega” — Bega is a 
town in southern NSW — is the poster story suggesting the 
failure of the HCCC. Reeves’ crimes were extensive and 
there were numerous complaints about him, but the health 
watchdog did nothing. However, Reeves was only the most 
 
2 For the HCCC’s perspective, see “Review of past handling of 
complaints against Dr Graeme Reeves,” Media release, 5 March 
2008, https://www.hccc.nsw.gov.au/Publications/Media-
Releases/Review-of-past-handling-of-complaints-against-Dr-
Graeme-Reeves. 
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prominent of numerous doctors whose misdeeds were 
unimpeded by the HCCC. 
 Was the HCCC a rogue operation? Or was its behav-
iour typical of medical regulatory bodies? 
 
The Queensland Medical Board 
In Sydney in November 2013, Whistleblowers Australia 
held its annual conference. One of the speakers was Jo 
Barber, a well-known whistleblower.3 She had a back-
ground in policing and then obtained a job with the Queens-
land Medical Board. The QMB is a watchdog body tasked 
with dealing with complaints about doctors and nurses in 
the state of Queensland. It might be thought of as the 
Queensland equivalent of the HCCC. 
 Arriving at the job, Jo was assigned 50 cases. She 
found an office in a state of disarray. For some of the cases 
she was assigned, there were boxes of files that went back 
several years. These were boxes of complaints and related 
material about a single doctor. What this meant, in some 
cases, is that numerous patients and family members had 
made complaints about a particular doctor, and their 
complaints had sat in files at the office for years, nothing 
having been done. 
 Even worse, Jo discovered that the board had no 
proper filing system. There was no system for recording 
complaints received and the status of an investigation. 
 
3 Jo Barber, “Queensland Medical Board allowed dodgy doctors to 
work,” The Whistle (newsletter of Whistleblowers Australia), no. 
77, January 2014, pp. 9–10. 
224     Official Channels 
Having been a detective, this level of poor record manage-
ment was almost inconceivable to her. 
 After she started going through some of the files, she 
was even more appalled. There were records of doctors who 
had been harming patient after patient over a period of years 
— yet nothing had been done with this information. 
 Jo estimated that the number of “rogue doctors” — the 
ones causing serious harm to patients due to incompetence 
or malice — was only one or two percent of the total. Most 
doctors were doing a good job most of the time, and their 
mistakes were occasional and inadvertent. But a small 
number were causing immense damage, and it was easy to 
identify them by monitoring complaints. 
 Jo discovered there was enormous resistance to taking 
any action against these rogue doctors. The top managers in 
the QMB did not want to disturb the medical profession 
through exposures or vigorous prosecutions. The leaders of 
the Australian Medical Association in Queensland opposed 
exposure and prosecution. Why? Because it would threaten 
the public image of doctors as respected professionals. 
 Jo discovered this when she spoke out about problems. 
She suffered reprisals. Luckily, she obtained publicity for 
her claims. As a result, she was contacted by dozens of 
doctors and nurses from around the state confirming her 
claims. 
 She told about one particular doctor who seemed to be 
a psychopathic killer. He would turn off life-saving equip-
ment or in other ways threaten the lives of patients. After 
the board received complaints and felt compelled to act, 
what did it do? It said the doctor could continue surgical 
operations but he was supposed to stay away from a partic-
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ular item of equipment. Who was monitoring this re-
striction? No one. Jo said this doctor was still practising in 
the state. 
  
Medical dominance 
It may seem amazing that regulation of doctors can be so 
lax. Some insight into the reasons why is provided by 
studies in the sociology of professions.  
 Professions are occupations — like law, medicine, 
dentistry and engineering — in which the practitioners 
claim a special commitment and mandate. Unlike other 
occupations such as farming, carpentry and sales, profes-
sions claim a higher status because they are supposed to be 
highly trained and to make a special contribution to society. 
Lawyers provide adherence to the law, doctors save lives 
and engineers make sure bridges don’t fall down. 
 Because of their special roles, professions claim 
special privileges, including control over training and the 
ability to restrict the number of practitioners. No special 
qualifications are required to be a farmer or a salesperson, 
but to become a doctor, it is necessary to obtain a special 
degree, pass specific tests and undertake an internship.  
 Some sociologists say professions are not really so 
special in terms of their skills and are not really all that 
altruistic.4 Instead, the idea of a profession is a way for an 
 
4 Classic treatments include Eliot Freidson, Professional 
Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care (New York: 
Atherton, 1970); Terence J. Johnson, Professions and Power 
(London: Macmillan, 1972); Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of 
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occupational group to obtain greater power and privilege. 
Restricting entry to the occupation means higher salaries. 
Imagine that anyone could call themselves a lawyer and do 
the things that lawyers usually do. Soon the market would 
be flooded with would-be lawyers and salaries would drop 
precipitously. On the other hand, if no one was allowed to 
fix or sell toilets except for a small, highly trained group, 
their wages would skyrocket. 
 In Australia, medicine is one of the most prestigious 
and high-paying professions. Entry to medical schools is 
highly competitive. At the top universities, studying medi-
cine requires an exceptionally high score on standardised 
tests. This indicates that students are extremely keen to 
study medicine. Not every graduate has great career 
prospects, but specialists — after more training — can do 
very well. In 2014, news stories reported that surgeons 
earned, on average, more than $350,000 per year, about five 
times the average wage.  
 When occupational groups control their own condi-
tions of work, they can make things cushy for their mem-
bers — especially those at the top. They get the government 
to restrict entry to the occupation. They can also attempt to 
avoid scrutiny by outsiders. This is what the Australian 
medical profession seems to have accomplished. 
 There are limits to this process, because various other 
groups want to have a say. Governments try to impose 
financial controls. Companies seek to influence prescribing 
habits. Students compete for entry to medical courses, and 
 
Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1977). 
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universities set up new ones to cater for the demand. 
Finally, patients demand accountability for poor per-
formance. 
 In some countries, doctors are subordinate to the 
government. Their salaries are fixed or restrained. They are 
employees of hospitals or health systems. An easy way to 
determine the independence of the profession is to look at 
average salaries. If entry to the profession were much 
easier, there would be more doctors and salaries would 
drop. 
 In Australia, the medical profession is relatively 
independent, with strong support from the government to 
protect the profession from competitors. The result is high 
income, high status, restricted entry — and lax oversight.  
 
Entering the vaccination debate 
In 2009, the HCCC received an unusual complaint. It 
wasn’t from a patient or a relative of a patient complaining 
about a doctor or nurse. Instead, it was from a member of 
the public, a fellow named Ken McLeod. His complaint was 
about the Australian Vaccination Network (AVN), a 
citizens’ group critical of vaccination.5 
 Ken McLeod’s complaint to the HCCC essentially 
asked for intervention in an ongoing public debate. Remem-
ber that the HCCC was set up to receive complaints about 
health practitioners, such as doctors and nurses. Why 
 
5 For more details about this saga, see Brian Martin, “A 
vaccination struggle,” chapter 8 in Nonviolence Unbound 
(Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2015), especially pp. 275–
279 and 292–307. 
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should it pay any attention to the Australian Vaccination 
Network, whose key members are laypeople who are 
engaged in public debate, not acting as health practitioners? 
Despite this, the HCCC launched an investigation on the 
basis of McLeod’s complaint and another complaint, from 
the parents of a child who died of whooping cough. 
 The HCCC’s rationale was that the AVN was a “health 
education provider” and hence was a “health provider” and 
thus covered by the terms of the legislation establishing the 
HCCC. Whatever the legal niceties, treating citizen 
campaigners as “health education providers” in principle 
opens up nearly every public debate to the scrutiny of the 
HCCC. Critics of wind farms, bicycle helmets, seat belts, 
pesticides, nuclear power, fluoridation or climate change 
could be considered health education providers, with 
complaints made to the HCCC about allegedly false and 
dangerous information. 
 I’ve mentioned here only the critics, although in 
principle the proponents of bicycle helmets and the like are 
also health education providers. However, the HCCC only 
acted on one side the vaccination debate: as an enforcer for 
vaccination orthodoxy. 
 The HCCC demanded that the AVN put a disclaimer 
on its website. The AVN already had a disclaimer and, 
based on legal advice, declined to post the HCCC’s 
disclaimer. Accordingly, the HCCC proceeded to issue a 
public warning about the AVN, which received widespread 
media coverage.  
 What is curious here is how the HCCC transformed 
itself from an arbiter of good health practice — by making 
judgements in response to complaints about doctors and 
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nurses — to an arbiter of what is allowed to be said in the 
vaccination debate. Given that the HCCC made no claim to 
have its own independent expertise concerning vaccination, 
what it did was accept the views of mainstream vaccination 
experts. The HCCC thus became a means of enforcing 
vaccination orthodoxy. 
 The HCCC’s public warning had no legal force. The 
AVN was not forced to do anything in response. However, 
the AVN’s reputation was seriously damaged by the 
HCCC’s warning. Hence, AVN leaders decided to chal-
lenge the HCCC’s jurisdiction in court, arguing that the 
HCCC had stepped outside the bounds of its charter in 
making a ruling against the AVN. 
 Normally, it would be quixotic for a small community 
group to challenge a well-funded government department 
in court. The AVN was only able to do this through the 
willingness of its legal team to work for little or no money. 
Amazingly, the AVN won the case. The HCCC immedi-
ately withdrew its warning. 
 However, the HCCC and its supporters did not give 
up. Instead, they lobbied the state government to change the 
law to give the HCCC greater powers. In a meeting of state 
parliament, one speaker after another supported vaccination 
and praised a bill that would enable the HCCC to legally go 
after the AVN.  
 After state parliament increased the HCCC’s powers, 
in a way specifically designed to get around the court 
ruling, the HCCC launched its own investigation into the 
AVN. It looked through the AVN’s website, seemingly try-
ing to find any statements that conflicted with vaccination 
orthodoxy.  
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 Given that the HCCC itself has no special expertise 
concerning vaccination, how did it justify its criticisms of 
statements on the AVN’s website? It relied on advice from 
three vaccination experts. However, the HCCC refused to 
release to the AVN either the names of these experts or their 
reports. The AVN was thus put in the position of trying to 
justify its statements against the claims of anonymous 
experts whose comments were not open to scrutiny. The 
judge in this contest was the HCCC, which had launched 
the investigation.  
 The HCCC issued another public warning.6 This time, 
however, it received little media attention.  
 In seeking and gaining expanded powers for the 
specific purpose of taking action against a citizens’ group 
advocating a minority position in a public controversy, the 
HCCC had moved quite a distance away from its initial 
premise of handling complaints against health practitioners. 
It had strayed from the core business of addressing unethi-
cal and dangerous health practice to being an enforcer of 
medical orthodoxy. 
 While the HCCC was spending a huge amount of time 
and money in its pursuit of the AVN, a different sort of 
story broke in the media. A neurosurgeon, Suresh Nair, was 
exposed for clinical failures, with a list of surgery patients 
injured. Nair had a cocaine addiction and participated in 
orgies during which two prostitutes died. In June 2014, the 
Sydney newspaper The Sun-Herald editorialised about 
Nair: 
 
6 The warning is dated 10 December 2018. As of October 2019, it 
was the central item on the HCCC’s home page.  
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This week, [Carla] Downes told The Sun-Herald about 
the botched surgery that left her with 27 per cent 
impairment. Incredibly, she cannot access the findings 
of a Health Care Complaints Commission investiga-
tion into her treatment because Nair did not fight the 
charges. 
 The HCCC investigates and prosecutes serious 
healthcare complaints. It operates jointly with the 
Medical Council of NSW (formerly the NSW Medical 
Board) to ensure doctors are fit to practise. 
 Serious failures in its investigatory processes 
were uncovered in the case of Dr Graeme Reeves, the 
infamous Butcher of Bega. One newspaper declared in 
2008 that the HCCC and the medical board had proved 
“by this case alone, their utter uselessness.”   
 … The Medical Council operates a program to 
help troubled doctors continue to work. But on the 
strength of the board and the HCCC’s performance in 
the Nair case, we can have no faith that doctors on this 
program are being properly supervised or complaints 
against them treated with rigour. 
 … As in the Reeves case, the healthcare 
complaints system must be held to account. As in the 
Reeves case, its handling of Nair was utterly useless.7 
 
  
 
7 “Nair’s patients deserve better than bureaucratic silence,” Sun-
Herald, 8 June 2014, p. 33. 
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Conclusion 
The HCCC is supposed to be a watchdog body, intended to 
address abuse, corruption and other problems with health 
practitioners, primarily doctors and nurses. However, many 
of its investigations were later determined to be flawed. 
Furthermore, there had been numerous complaints to the 
HCCC about a doctor, Graeme Reeves, who was later found 
guilty through the courts; some observers thought the 
HCCC’s response to complaints was inadequate. This is 
compatible with the HCCC serving as a misleading symbol. 
It gave the appearance of protecting the public but often 
without much substance. 
 The HCCC, based on complaints from pro-vaccination 
campaigners, then embarked on a different sort of venture, 
making adverse judgements against citizen vaccine critics 
who, in the normal sense of the word, were not health 
practitioners. The HCCC stretched the meaning of “health 
practitioner” and then, when thwarted by a court ruling, had 
its legal mandate expanded so it could embark on its 
vendetta against vaccine critics. In relation to vaccine 
critics, the HCCC’s was in the role of attacker. 
 Curiously, the HCCC seemed far more determined to 
act against citizens involved in a longstanding public 
controversy than to act on complaints against rogue doctors. 
To its critics, the HCCC’s trajectory suggests that it might 
better be named the Health Establishment Protection 
Commission. In this role it served as a tool of the medical 
profession, or rather of the reputation of the medical 
profession, by failing to act effectively against egregious 
malpractice. 
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 The HCCC also fulfils other roles. No doubt there are 
some instances in which it is effective, doing the right thing. 
It also has the role of an organisation with its own internal 
dynamics.8 
 It is wise not to make sweeping judgements. The 
HCCC, like most organisations, plays many roles simulta-
neously. My comments here are based primarily on news 
reports, which seldom capture the day-to-day operations of 
any organisation. What the news reports do suggest is that 
it is sensible not to place too much trust in the HCCC. In 
particular, if you know about a dangerous doctor, it would 
be wise not to rely on making a complaint to the HCCC. 
 Even if the HCCC were a model agency, there would 
be disadvantages in relying on it, because this would divert 
attention away from other ways to address problems in the 
health system. One important option is to give patients and 
 
8 According to Kate Aubusson, “Claims against medical watchdog 
back up,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23–24 November 2019, p. 14, 
“The state’s healthcare watchdog is taking almost a year to fully 
investigate serious allegations including malpractice and sexual 
misconduct amid rising numbers of complaints and dysfunction 
within the organisation” and refers to “months of reports of 
bullying and mismanagement within the commission.” “Earlier 
this year, a whistleblower told the ABC [Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation] about the commission’s ‘dysfunctional workplace 
culture’ and an exodus of staff that was affecting its capacity to 
assess hundreds of patient complaints. In August, the ABC 
revealed the HCCC had hired a convicted sex offender to 
investigate patient complaints and a 2017 consultant report in 
which some staff reported ‘high levels of bullying’ and ‘extreme 
pressure’ on workloads.” 
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doctors skills in recognising and dealing with rogue practi-
tioners. Another important option is to try to change the 
health-system culture so that good practice is the norm and 
exposing and addressing problems is routine. Agencies like 
the HCCC are like band-aids. When the problems are deep-
seated, attention needs to be put on improving skills for 
challenging abuses and on changing the culture in the health 
system. 
Appendix 3 
Showtime in Wollongong 
 
 
The headlines were spectacular: “Shockwaves,” “City’s 
darkest hour,” “Black Tuesday.” These were just a few of 
the front-page stories in the Illawarra Mercury, the daily 
paper in Wollongong. Corruption in the local government 
body was big news in Wollongong and throughout the state. 
 Wollongong is a city with a population of 300,000, on 
the eastern coast of Australia 80 kilometres south of 
Sydney. In Australia, there are six states and two territories, 
and within each state there are local governments called 
councils. Each council is run by elected officials called 
councillors, supported by paid staff who do most of the 
administrative work. One of the key functions of the council 
is managing development, including approving new 
buildings.  
 There is considerable scope for corruption in local 
government. Suppose a developer buys some vacant land. 
It is zoned for single-dwelling housing. However, the 
developer can make a lot more money if it is zoned for 
higher density housing, such as a high-rise block of units. 
Suppose the developer makes friends with a planning 
officer working for the council, and the planning officer 
approves a change in the zoning. The developer makes a 
windfall profit — an undeserved benefit — because the 
rezoning served the interests of this particular developer; 
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other developers didn’t buy the land because it wasn’t 
worth much until the rezoning. 
 If the developer provides some inducements to the 
planning officer, for example some cash or goods or arrang-
ing for tradespeople to fix up a house at no cost, this is a 
type of bribe — and is illegal. This type of corruption is 
pervasive in Australian local government. In Wollongong, 
it was exposed in a dramatic fashion. 
 
ICAC 
The key player in this case was the Independent Commis-
sion Against Corruption (ICAC), set up in 1989 by the New 
South Wales state government. With a budget of $25 
million per year, ICAC has extraordinary powers to inves-
tigate. It can tap phones, confiscate computers and hold 
hearings in which witnesses are compelled to answer. 
However, ICAC cannot prosecute or sentence individuals. 
Anything said by a witness at an ICAC hearing cannot be 
used to prosecute them — except when witnesses lie, in 
which case they can be charged with perjury. 
 ICAC’s efforts are regularly reported by the media, 
and naturally enough its biggest successes in exposing 
corruption receive the most attention. But behind the 
scenes, not everyone is happy with ICAC. In the late 1990s, 
the NSW branch of Whistleblowers Australia — the group 
based in Sydney — received numerous reports from 
individuals who had made complaints to ICAC about 
alleged corruption but whose complaints had not been acted 
on. Cynthia Kardell of Whistleblowers Australia collected 
information from 25 whistleblowers who had complained 
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to ICAC. One of them was partially satisfied; all the others 
were dissatisfied. 
 Sometimes going to ICAC was worse than doing noth-
ing. Complaints to ICAC were supposed to be confidential, 
but in those days ICAC would refer them back to the 
government department involved, sometimes thereby 
revealing the identity of the whistleblower and opening 
them to reprisals.  
 ICAC is a typical official channel. In these instances, 
it gave the appearance of providing justice, namely acting 
against corruption, but from the perspective of many 
whistleblowers it was a toothless tiger. It provided the 
illusion of a solution. From the point of view of most 
whistleblowers, ICAC was a misleading symbol, promising 
justice but in practice seldom delivering any. 
 Years later, I happened to talk with a former ICAC 
commissioner, who told me that they received so many 
complaints that only two or three percent could be 
addressed. That figure fit perfectly with the cases collected 
by Whistleblowers Australia. Going by the percentages, out 
of 25 complaints, ICAC would probably have the capacity 
to act on one of them, or perhaps none.  
 Imagine that ICAC had made this information public, 
with a statement saying “If you make a complaint to us, it’s 
unlikely we’ll be able to act on it. We may refer it to your 
employer, so watch out in case your identity is exposed and 
you are subject to reprisals.” With this sort of honesty in its 
self-description and information for potential complainants, 
ICAC would no longer be a misleading symbol. It might 
still be a symbol of justice against corruption, but one 
perceived more realistically, and perhaps even more 
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sympathetically. On the other hand, this might not serve the 
state government if citizens demanded more action against 
corruption. 
 
The Wollongong corruption scandal 
In its investigation of corruption in Wollongong Council, 
ICAC became a form of high drama. The stage was its 
hearings, the players were ICAC officials and Wollongong 
identities called to testify at the hearings, and the audience 
was the entire population, at least those who bothered to 
watch the news. I refer to this as high drama, because every 
part of life can be interpreted in terms of a metaphor of 
drama, with stage, performers and audience. Most of 
ICAC’s investigations were fairly limited in terms of 
audience: only those with a special interest in the topic paid 
much attention. The Wollongong Council saga played to a 
much wider audience.1 
 ICAC set the stage through its investigations, 
conducted covertly, collecting evidence of corruption. 
Someone or several people had alerted ICAC to corruption 
in Wollongong, but who, when and what are not known 
publicly. ICAC proceeded by tapping telephones and then, 
in a spectacular intervention, raided Wollongong Council, 
confiscating computers and other materials. This public 
action generated headlines and created apprehension 
among many individuals who believed they might be 
 
1 My account here draws on my much more comprehensive 
treatment, “Corruption tactics: outrage management in a local 
government scandal,” Resistance Studies Magazine, 2012, 
https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/12rsm.html. 
Showtime in Wollongong     239 
 
targets of ICAC. The raid served as advance publicity for 
the main show: public hearings. 
 Two factors seemed to move the Wollongong corrup-
tion scandal from a routine investigation to high drama: 
colourful actors and sex. Beth Morgan was a senior planner 
at Wollongong Council, in a position to influence approval 
of development applications. She dealt with applications 
from two developers while having sexual relationships with 
them, and received benefits from them, for example 
extensive renovations to her house at no charge. She aimed 
to leave her position at the council and set up her own 
consulting business. Forging connections with developers 
was in her interest, even without the direct favours 
involved. 
 This core story of sex in exchange for benefits drove 
media interest in the ICAC hearings, which were open to 
the public. But there was much more. Wollongong Coun-
cil’s high-profile general manager, Rod Oxley, was in the 
spotlight for his close connections to developers, in viola-
tion of rules for recording meetings and the like, and for his 
support for development applications seemingly in viola-
tion of rules on height, space and other requirements.  
 Elected politicians were also implicated. Several of 
them had dealings with developers and were claimed to 
have been paid for their support for development approvals.  
 Tying all this together was the so-called “Table of 
Knowledge.” At a small table outside a modest kebab shop, 
various developers, council staff and councillors would 
meet over breakfast. This became a symbol of the improper 
relationships that were alleged. 
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 In addition, there was a bizarre side story. Two “con 
men,” who had been in prison for fraud, approached several 
of the key figures in the drama, pretending they worked for 
ICAC or had influence with ICAC. This was after ICAC’s 
raid on the Council, collecting computers and paper files, 
but before the hearings. Beth Morgan and others paid 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to Ray Younan and Gerald 
Carroll in the hope of escaping ICAC scrutiny. 
 This complicated saga, involving developers, council 
staff, elected councillors and con men, made for colourful 
media stories. The usual type of development-related 
corruption in local government is tawdry: an elected coun-
cillor has investments, or gains benefits from a developer, 
and makes decisions serving their own interests. The 
Wollongong case of this had the added features of sex, the 
Table of Knowledge (a symbol of corruption), several 
levels of government, and con men. 
 The public hearings turned this juicy story into high 
drama. ICAC called various key figures to testify. Some 
were honest council workers who gave their professional 
views about whether projects complied with regulations. 
Others called to testify knew they were targets of ICAC. 
Their actions might be judged as corrupt, so many of them 
started off by lying about what they had said or done. This 
was risky, because lying to ICAC was perjury and could 
lead to criminal sanctions. 
 The ICAC hearings involved the ICAC Commis-
sioner, Jerrold Cripps, presiding and an ICAC lawyer, Noel 
Hemmings, examining witnesses. This was not a court in 
which witnesses were represented by their own lawyers. 
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Instead, the witnesses were on their own, on stage in front 
of everyone present, including media.  
 A typical examination of a witness went like this. 
Hemmings would ask some specific questions, such as “Did 
you ever have a conversation about using Mr Gilbert’s 
computer?” Thinking that no one would know about a 
private conversation, the witness answered “No.” Then 
ICAC played an audio recording of a conversation, showing 
in stark terms that the witness was lying. After this, the 
witness would try to come up with some explanation — for 
example, “You had asked me, I believe a question that I did 
not understand correctly. By playing the tape I have heard 
now what you were asking me” — anything except 
admitting to lying to the commission. 
 This was dramatic material. For weeks, the public 
hearings generated numerous headlines and feature stories 
in the local Wollongong media and also in media in Sydney 
and the state. For a time, the very word “Wollongong” 
became a way of referring to corruption. 
 This was one of ICAC’s finest hours. By dramatising 
the corruption scandal, ICAC achieved one of its key goals, 
to raise awareness. No doubt the hearings provided a 
cautionary tale for the numerous other councils throughout 
the state where corruption was a possibility or a reality. 
 At the conclusion of the hearings, the main act of the 
drama was over. The remainder of the play was less excit-
ing and showed another aspect of how official channels 
work — or don’t work. After the hearings, ICAC produced 
several reports. This staged approach to reporting helped 
maintain interest in the issue, but nevertheless it was slow 
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going. The reports took months to prepare, and meanwhile 
interest died down.  
 There was one dramatic outcome. ICAC recom-
mended that the state government dissolve the council, 
namely dismiss the elected councillors, and replace them 
with administrators for a period of time until a new election. 
The government acted on this recommendation promptly. 
This was an act of political expedience. Wollongong 
Council had been run by the Labor Party, and some of the 
Labor politicians were the ones targeted by ICAC. If there 
had been an immediate new election, most likely Labor 
would have been soundly defeated. The state government 
was also a Labor government, so by installing administra-
tors, the risk of local electoral defeat was postponed.  
 The installation of administrators angered local citi-
zens, especially those who had been campaigning for 
honesty in government. ICAC’s hearings had generated 
huge support for reform, but apparently this reform was to 
be implemented from the top, by administrators, without 
significant citizen input. 
 ICAC could be criticised on another ground: it had 
pulled back from pursuing the extent of corruption associ-
ated with the Wollongong affair when it involved state 
politicians. Noreen Hay was a well-known Labor member 
of state parliament representing one of the electorates in 
Wollongong. Her name came up in the course of ICAC’s 
inquiry, but ICAC declined to name her as a “person of 
interest,” meaning they would not investigate her. She 
incorrectly represented this as meaning she was cleared. 
Similarly, a well-known Labor powerbroker who worked 
for Wollongong Council, Joe Scimone, was one of ICAC’s 
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key targets. He was appointed to a high-paid job in a state 
government body, but ICAC declined to investigate the role 
of state politicians in the appointment. 
 ICAC thus did a much better job in exposing corrup-
tion in Wollongong Council than in pursuing higher level 
political corruption. This might be simply because inquiries 
need to be limited, because otherwise they could go on 
forever, pulling in figures from all sorts of connections. In 
other investigations, ICAC has gone after state politicians.  
 Looking at ICAC as an official channel, it’s possible 
to see several roles. 
 
 • In dealing with whistleblower complaints, ICAC was 
primarily a misleading symbol. It gave the promise of 
providing justice, but because it could act on only a small 
percentage of complaints, the promise was more symbolic 
than substantive. 
 • In investigating and exposing corruption in Wollon-
gong, ICAC was doing the right thing. 
 • In its public hearings into corruption in Wollongong 
Council, ICAC was high drama. The hearings, designed to 
attract media attention, served to put corruption in the 
spotlight. High drama achieved one of ICAC’s purposes. 
Members of the public throughout the state were alerted to 
the potential of corruption. 
 • In the aftermath of the hearings, ICAC reverted to 
being a misleading symbol. ICAC’s subsequent reports 
took a long time to prepare, while media and public interest 
declined. The investigation led to few prosecutions and 
even fewer convictions. 
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In terms of challenging corruption, ICAC’s most useful role 
was in exposing the problem, stimulating changes in 
Wollongong Council and removing some of the most 
serious transgressors. On the other hand, by appearing to be 
the saviour, ICAC undermined citizen action against 
corruption: it seemed that the solution to corruption was 
official action. ICAC did not recommend or stimulate 
measures for greater citizen involvement in local decision-
making. The challenge for citizen campaigners was how to 
make use of official channels such as ICAC without having 
their own agency removed. 
 Whatever ICAC’s limitations, its efforts were unwel-
come in some quarters. In 2017, ICAC’s funding was cut, 
causing it to reduce its number of full-time investigators. In 
a comment criticising the funding cut, barrister Geoffrey 
Watson, who had worked as counsel assisting ICAC, wrote: 
 
In June 2016, then premier Mike Baird made two 
consecutive announcements. His first announcement 
was he and his government had “zero tolerance” for 
corruption. This was a strong, positive sentiment for 
which he could be admired. But his second announce-
ment was he intended to inflict massive funding cuts 
on the ICAC. 
 Baird never got around to explaining how he 
could reconcile these two apparently inconsistent 
propositions. 
 Just as a matter of timing, the funding cuts were 
made shortly after the ICAC had exposed numerous 
members of Baird’s party as committing election fund-
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ing “irregularities.” It is hard to imagine the funding 
cuts were completely unrelated to the ICAC’s work.2 
 
This was another role for ICAC: coming under attack. The 
government’s message seemed to be that watchdogs should 
be seen but not heard. 
 
 
2 Geoffrey Watson, “Brace yourself for a return to the bad old 
days,” Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 2017, p. 20. 
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